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Abstract 
Abstract 
Inter & intra domain adaptive routing protocols are required to propagate reachability information 
to locate other hosts/routers/contents amongst disparate parts of the Internet. Border Gateway Protocol 
(BGP), for instance, is the defacto inter-domain routing protocol operating amongst divergent Internet 
components known as Autonomous Systems (ASes). Nonetheless, the protocol can suffer from 
Byzantine failure whereby a legitimate node simply misbehaves. While security should be a built-in 
element of any trustworthy forwarding design, it appears to be an arduous add-on process for BGP. 
This research addresses such vulnerabilities and can be summarised into the following: 
1. A Detailed Survey on the BGP State-of-the-art Security Challenges and Solutions: these 
analyses proved that Byzantine failure remains the inherent deficiency here. Results also stressed 
the potential solution should be an incrementally deployable remedy, involve minimum/standard 
crypto, be placed on a higher layer than BGP and not be an option. 
2. Robust Modelling/Visual Analytics of BGP & its Security Vulnerabilities/Schemes: the 
experimental results from the emulated Cisco infrastructure evidenced that the magnitude of the 
adverse effect of accepting false or malicious reachability information is reliant directly on the 
location of the origin and thus the Byzantine attacker's position in relation to the victim's location 
becomes determinative. The OPNET-based modelling visualised and validated that the richer the 
attacker is in the interconnectivity, the larger the adversary impact is. Additionally, the closer the 
attacker is to the victim, the higher the attack's success rate. 
3. Analysis, Design, Implementation & Evaluation of a Novel Method for Byzantine Robust 
BGP: studying the hierarchical structure as well as the power-law structure properties of the 
Internet in addition to the thorough OPNET-based analyses, Localised Overlay Management 
Plane (LOMP) was proposed. LOMP demonstrates that having only a few security-conscious 
ASes, placed over particular vantage points, can add Byzantine robustness to BGP to a large 
extent. This research then realised LOMP architecture based on Cisco infrastructure and evaluated 
the deployment critically in terms of the added overhead and protocol message signalling. 
4. Analysing the "Trust" in the Future Internet (Fl) Forwarding Plane Proposals: two 
promising FI proposals namely CURLING as an information-centric networking approach for 
accessing contents at the Internet scale and OpenFlow, the most commonly deployed software-
defined networking technology, are analysed as a final contribution. With the former, five distinct 
attack scenarios for hijacking contents are revealed and addressed through our synthesis design 
proposal. With the latter, this research integrates the forwarding of IPsec flows into the OpenFlow 
architecture in order to facilitate the secure group communication based on a novel method. 
Keywords: BGP Security, Byzantine Failure/Robustness, CURLING, OpenFlow. 
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1 Introduction 
1.1 Inter-domain Routing 
The Internet today consists of geographically separated and diverged components each of which 
adheres to a unique routing policy. These components are known as Autonomous Systems (ASes) 
since each of them is under the administration of a single but distinct entity. Inter-domain routing 
protocols and particularly Border Gateway Protocol Version 4 (BGP) [l], the de-facto protocol, act 
like a glue that sticks the separate components of the Internet together. BGP exchanges Reachability 
information amongst a set of ASes so that they can find the relative reachability address of different 
hosts across the global Internet. BGP routing, as the most mature Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) 
[1], with a huge industrial install base remains the sole inter-domain routing protocol in extensive use 
thanks to its simplicity and the resulting scalability [J]. 
BGP is a hearsay or whisper-like protocol. Simply put, Network Layer Reachability Information 
(NLRI) is propagated via a set of point-to-point exchanges through incremental UPDATE messages 
(unlike the flooding mechanism in Intra-domain routing such as OSPF). Prior to this, BGP adjacency 
must be established between neighbours (i.e. BGP speakers) over TCP (port 179). TCP removes both 
the explicit confirmation of the UPDATE receipt as well as the overhead pertaining to re-flooding the 
entire routing database. BGP' s major tasks and functions can be summarised as follows: NLRI 
exchange, topology maintenance, prefix-to-path binding and policy routing. However, BGP was 
designed without any security in mind [1]. In other words, faulty, misconfigured, or deliberately 
malicious sources can disrupt overall Internet behaviour by injecting bogus routing information into 
the BGP-distributed routing database (by modifying, forging, or replaying BGP packets) [~. The 
current Internet has no secure way of validating the correctness of routing information [fil. 
1.2 Research Motivations 
During the course of civil war back in early 2011 in several North African countries including 
Libya and Egypt, these governments disrupted the Internet through "BGP shutdown" (BGP routing 
disruption) as an attempt to censor the connectivity of the protestors with the outside world [1]. 
According to this study, IP address space that has been withdrawn from the global BGP routing table 
will not be able to receive traffic from the Internet and in the presence of packet filtering/firewall, 
cannot send outbound traffic either. With the aid of studying both the BGP control and data plane data 
sets gathered for these Internet outages, [1] illuminates that BGP Internet disruption (partial outages 
which last for a few days) can be detected due to the fact that it also has an impact on the state of the 
global control plane. In another case in 2011 in Russia, a spammer had been hijacking AS31733's IP 
1 
Introduction 
addresses for five months from the USA-based AS [fil. In addition to withdrawn routes or prefix 
hijack threat models [2.J, [l.Q] implies that with BGP sub-prefix hijacking (also called BGP de-
aggregation attack) in which a more specific (longer) prefix of the victim's prefix is announced, the 
manipulator can hijack traffic from 100% of the ASes. In February 2008, YouTube was blocked as 
Pakistani Telecom tried to filter the website in the country through a BGP de-aggregation attack [11, 
12]. Consequently, many ASes became infected and redirected their traffic to Pakistan rather than the 
relevant server farms in Canada. Such attacks can clearly end up with drastic invasions against user-
confidentiality as well as privacy. 
YouTube utilises five different subnets with /19, /20, /22 and finally two /24 subnet masks. The 
prefix used with /22 is 208.32.153.0 (the server farm was located in Canada). The attack happened 
when in an attempt to filter the website by the government, Pakistani Telecom ISP de-aggregated the 
inter-domain routing space by advertising the aforementioned mentioned prefix with a more specific 
subnet mask through BGP that is /24 [.Ll.]. This makes the traffic route through the red arrow instead 
of the green dashed arrow in Figure 1.1. While this ISP is not supposed to advertise such a prefix with 
the mask, since the AS does not own the prefix, its misbehaviour in this case results in the 
misdirection of the traffic ( devastating consequences can be thought of were this to be a telemedicine 
application or banking system). This is because of the longest prefix match rule which indicates that 
the path for a more specific prefix is always preferred for any destination if more than one path exists 
for that address. 
Figure 1.1 2008 BGP de-aggregation attack (sub-prefix hijacking) against YouTube; hijacker announces the same prefix 
as the target with a more specific subnet mask to misdirect the traffic of the infectors towards himself. 
No matter how BGP attacks are launched, even partial outages which last for a few hours 
constitute the primary factor in a large portion of the Internet's overall end-to-end downtime [H]. 
Even AS-Path Prepending as an inter-domain traffic engineering mechanism can be exploited and 
result in a BGP prefix interception attack Lli]. According to [ill, BGP makes half of ASes vulnerable 
to a prefix hijack, and 100% vulnerable to a sub-prefix hijack. 
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1.3 Byzantine Robust BGP as the Research Challenge 
BGP prefix hijacking as well as de-aggregation attacks are known as the two instances of 
Byzantine Failure vulnerability; a failure in which a legitimate entity in the middle of a conversation 
simply misbehaves [17-25]. Perlman in [lli defines a routing system with Byzantine Robustness as 
the one which behaves correctly when some malfunctioning nodes exist. Perlman later adds that 
Byzantine robustness does not necessarily ask for Byzantine Prevention, while the ideal network can 
have both Byzantine Detection as well as Byzantine Prevention. The process of identifying the 
problematic source(s) in a distributed system expl?iting external observations is also known as Root 
Cause Localisation. Root cause localisation is deemed to be an arduous challenge in many large scale 
systems such as BGP (2§]. In the BGP context, what we are looking for is that in the presence of one 
or more malicious entities exhibiting Byzantine failure behaviour, the BGP routing infrastructure can 
reach a consistent decision to determine the veracity of the prefix. In this way, we attempt to mitigate 
the risk of the BGP prefix hijacking and relax the consequences. 
The way BGP operates can be simplified through the idea of a US game called Telephone Game 
illustrated below. In this game, a message is passed on by each person sitting around a table who 
whispers it in the next person's ear (how a hearsay protocol like BGP functions). This process 
sometimes unintentionally distorts the message in the course of its propagation and ends up with a 
final version of a word which is drastically altered from the initial version. While this might be 
accidental here and thus unintentional, Byzantine failure can be thought of as malicious intention 
whereby someone in the middle of the game changes the word on purpose. 
Figure 1.2 Telephone Game philosophy is analogous to the way BGP operates and the Byzantine failure concept. 
1.4 Key Contributions 
To address the previously mentioned challenge, the current work has made several major 
contributions to the research field. The upcoming chapters elaborate these fulfilled goals in detail. 
1) A detailed survey of the up-to-date BGP security vulnerabilities and countermeasures is 
presented. The comprehensive survey proves that Byzantine failure remains the major deficiency 
in the current inter-domain routing despite previous proposals in the field. It has endeavoured to 
classify almost the entire remedies in the field so far from the Byzantine behaviour perspective. 
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2) The attack scenarios are emulated to disclose the BGP's Byzantine failure in practice. The design, 
configuration, implementation and troubleshooting of such attacks highlight the role of Byzantine 
robustness in the Secure Inter-domain Routing (SIDR) area. In addition, emulation bridges 
between artificial simulation settings and the actual production environment and thus the attacks 
are launched under the exact conditions of the real production environment for a protocol like 
BGP with massive industrial install base (rather than mere simulation work). The state-of-the-art 
countermeasures are also implemented at this stage. Recall that as [.2] asks for, such aggressive 
simulations/emulations of SIDR schemes demarcate the practicable as well as economically 
acceptable trade-offs. 
3) A novel architecture is proposed which entails analyses, design, implementation and evaluation of 
an integrated management plane placed upon the BGP's control plane to achieve Byzantine 
robustness. This integrated management plane is interchangeably referred to as Localised Overlay 
Management Plane (LOMP). For this, comprehensive studies are accomplished that result in 
developing the thorough simulated techniques which address the necessary trade-offs in terms of 
Byzantine security versus deployability for the proposed scheme. Furthermore, another major aim 
of these simulated works is to seek the precise parameterisation by which our proposed 
architecture can fill today's BGP security gap regarding exhibition of Byzantine behaviour on the 
Internet. Lastly, we prove how network visualisation has the potential to aid the Byzantine routing 
patterns detection for massive amounts of BGP control plane data. 
4) One of the issues pertaining to the existing proposals is deemed to be the inaccuracy as well as 
inefficiency of their deployments [11]. To address this, the architecture for LOMP is later 
prototyped. The system realisation is again emulated as well as critically evaluated (to address 
the lack of such a solution in practice) in the interest of clarifying the ambiguities pertaining to the 
design, implementation and evaluation of the proposed architecture deployment. Evaluation 
additionally aims to validate the effectiveness of our economical solution. 
5) For the last two major contributions, we step beyond the current Internet as an attempt to envisage 
the Future Internet (Fl) packet forwarding systems and the relevant security threats. The first 
promising FI proposal is known as Information-Centric Networks (ICN) in which we demonstrate 
how vulnerable CURLING (Content-Ubiquitous Resolution and Delivery Infrastructure for Next 
Generation Services) as one of the ICN evolutionary approaches is to diverged hijacking risks. 
This research has defined five distinct attack scenarios for hijacking content under the CURLING 
architecture. Afterwards, it proposes a novel model to make CURLING robust against these 
hijacking vulnerabilities. 
6) Another substantial FI proposal, Software-Defined Networks (SDN), is the final milestone in this 
thesis. OpenFlow is currently the most commonly deployed SDN technology. OpenFlow 
architecture, nevertheless, is unable to aggregate flows of IPsec-ESP and forwards them in both 
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transport and tunnel modes since layer 3 information is encrypted and therefore unreadable. This 
work also proposes a novel method to identify IPsec flows and direct these flows accordingly. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The content of this thesis is organised as eight chapters. We initially provide two chapters for the 
background materials related to the routing as well as relevant security studies. Chapter 2 on the 
Background Study of Routing: has two generic but different themes, BGP and multicast overview. 
The former extracts the main characteristics of inter-domain routing with BGP which is utilised 
throughout our research. The latter will be used later in chapter six for the implementation phase. 
Chapter 3 on the Background Study of Security: describes the network security essentials firstly 
with more emphasis on the IPsec. This later is exploited in chapter seven where we try to integrate 
IPsec into the OpenFlow architecture. We then give a security angle to chapter two's BGP as well as 
multicast discussion and explain the attack vector against them. Lastly, a secure group management 
protocol standard is introduced which will be used in the implementation phase in chapter six. 
Chapter 4 on the Analysis on the State-of-the-art BGP Security: conducts a thorough survey on 
the issues and remedies proposed so far for BGP robustness. We classify all the countermeasures into 
four categories and reveal how they totally underestimate Byzantine robustness. Thereafter, we 
introduce our simulation/emulation platforms and through four different case studies (the first two 
case studies are detailvd in Appendices A & B), initially BGP operation and its state-of-the-art 
security are anatomised. Byzantine failure attack is emulated and investigated ultimately to highlight 
the gap in the-state-of-the-art. Chapter 5 on the Analysis, Methodology and Design: clarifies the 
progress beyond the-state-of-the-art Byzantine robust inter-domain routing. The proposed architecture 
is then discussed utilising two properties of the Internet which form the main methodology for our 
work. The methodology for our design is afterwards reinforced with the Reachability Analysis as well 
as Flow Analysis simulation results. Complementary discussion at the end of this chapter summarises 
the work and illuminates any ambiguities left. Chapter 6 on the System Realisation and 
Evaluation: endeavours to fill the existing applied research gap in an incrementally deployable 
manner in order to implement the proposed management plane which offers Byzantine robustness. 
We also evaluate the added overhead imposed by such implementation in terms of both message 
signalling as well as IO traffic. Chapter 7 on Towards the Future Internet: demonstrates our 
contributions with respect to the secure packet forwarding towards two promising FI proposals, 
namely Information-Centric Networks and Software-Defined Networks. Chapter 8: finally draws the 
main conclusions of this research and suggests the future work plans. Note that the summaries 
provided in this chapter are in the order of the contributions (not the chapters). 
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2 Background Study of Routing 
2.1 Overview of IP Packet Forwarding 
With Routing/Packet Forwarding, the goal is to examine how learning about a remote network for 
a router will be addressed and subsequently how the best path to destination will be determined. We 
must not lose sight of the fact that finding the most efficient way in which a router can forward a 
packet will clarify the productiveness of interconnected communications to a large degree. 
A routing protocol in IP networks carries and transfers packets amongst nodes hop by hop. 
Routing decisions are made based on routing tables. This requires a router to construct tables with the 
aid of a "learning" process. Establishing the best path from the source to the destination is the main 
functionality of a routing protocol. This will be fulfilled by employing various metrics by which the 
route can be resolved. Two major categories of routing protocols are Distance Vector Routing 
Protocols and Link State Protocols. Both categories share certain features. Convergence time or the 
amount of time it takes for a router to know all networks and how to reach them is the first 
characteristic. The smaller the convergence time the better the routing protocol. Having loop free 
routes guarantees efficient use of bandwidth. Finally, having secure transmission of data along with 
determining the best paths to the destinations are considered other significant characteristics. 
Routing protocols can be classified variously. Apart from being link state or distance vector, a 
routing protocol can be Classless or Classful. Also they can be either Static or Dynamic protocols. 
When the network administrator constructs the routing table manually, static routing has been utilised. 
Although it provides us with more control, less IO usage and simpler processing, it will perform 
poorly upon changing the topology due to the need for reconfigurations. On the contrary, routing 
tables in dynamic protocols are made in an automatic manner. Dynamic routing does open the door 
for negotiation amongst routers. There is no need for administrators to maintain routes manually 
anymore. Although by employing dynamic routing protocols, it is likely that sometimes there will be 
loops or inconsistent routes, the merits outweigh the drawbacks. 
Classful routing does not carry subnet masks within the routing updates. Subsequently, the subnet 
mask is fixed throughout the network. This will result in not supporting Variable Length Subnet Mask 
(VLSM) or subnetting networks. The opportunity of carrying subnet masks in Classless routing 
however, leads to the support of dis-contiguous networks in this category. Version two of Routing 
Information Protocol (RIP), Enhanced Interior Gateway Routing Protocol (EIGRP), Open Shortest 
Path First (OSPF) and our focus, BGP are all categorised under dynamic as well as Classless routing 
protocols. 
With link state routing, each router is asked to calculate the shortest path in the network using 
Dijkstra's algorithm. Afterwards, a link state database will be constructed on each router. Flooding 
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link state advertisements (routing information called LSA) is required with any change in link 
information. Recalculation of the routes is necessary when a new LSA is received. This long process 
will end up with an identical link state database on all routers. However, compared to distance vector 
protocols, they require more bandwidth and IO resources for recalculations. 
Distance vector routing considers a vector of [distance, direction] for each route (BGP is path 
vector routing, but sometimes categorised under distance vector type as well). Exit interface indicates 
the direction and hop count metrics are representing the distance. Bellman's algorithm does the path 
calculations. Exchanging these vectors to the neighbours, each intermediate node will increase the 
metric. Afterwards, these vectors are installed within the routing tables. While distance vector routing 
is easy to configure as well as efficient to maintain, loop to infinity along with poor scalability are 
considered major drawbacks. 
IP addresses used to be given to hosts initially using Classful schema. Three classes were defined 
(A, Band C) accompanied by a default subnet mask for each class. To have a better understanding of 
Classful/Classless routing, we need to know about each default subnet mask as well as the IP address 
ranges they cover. Figure 2.1 illustrates the schema: 
8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 8 bits 
Class A 
Network Host Host Host 
ClassB 
Network Network Host Host 
Class C 
Network Network Network Host 
I I I 
V V V 
Figure 2.1 Classful routing's addressing schema 
Being a Classful routing protocol causes RIP for instance to not send subnet mask info in the 
update messages (there is no room for subnet mask in the relevant message format). Each router either 
exploits the already-configured-subnet-mask on a local interface or alternatively utilises the default 
subnet mask determined by exploring the IP address class within Classful schema. With another 
technique called Automatic Summarisation, like summarising several static routes manually, the 
boundary router will automatically summarise different subnets within one major class to have one 
single update for the entire network class before advertising it to the adjacent network. This behaviour 
within dis-contiguous networks has some merits. 
a) Less bandwidth is occupied due to smaller routing updates 
b) Faster look up process in consequence of having a single route instead of several ones 
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No matter how many subnets we have within 172.30.0.0 major class for instance or how it has 
been subnetted, all packets destined for 172.30.1.0, 172.30.2.0 or 172.30.3.0 are treated as though 
their destination is simply 172.30.0.0. On the other hand, the main disadvantage of automatic 
summarisation in Classful routing protocols is the absence of support for dis-contiguous networks. 
Classful routing protocols perform summarisation on the Classful edge between 2 classes. However, 
having a subnet mask included in the routing updates, classless routing protocols do not need 
summarisation. 
Administrative Distance (AD) is a measurement by which we can indicate how trustworthy a 
routing information source is. AD is normally shown in the form of a numerical value between O and 
255. The higher the AD the less trustworthy the routing information. Therefore, if a router is dealing 
with several routing protocols for the same destination network, the route with the lowest AD is 
preferable. 
Routing loops prevention is assisted by the split horizon rule. Split horizon suggests that routing 
information is not supposed to be sent out from an interface from which that information was 
previously received. 
We need to recall that 1Pv4 was allocated so fast and therefore to save this addressing space, IETF 
brought Classless Inter-Domain Routing (CIDR) to the notice of users. CIDR introduces Variable-
Length Subnet Masking (VLSM) for protecting 1Pv4 addressing space. VLSM is nothing more than 
subnetting a subnet (i.e. sub-subnetting). Swift depletion of 1Pv4 address space caused by Classful 
1Pv4 addressing no longer exists (Class A, B, C, D and E). On the other hand, network addressing 
assignments to customers can be done by ISPs whereby while one portion of a Classful network 
address is assigned to one customer, a different portion is allocated to another subscriber. In addition 
to VLSM and CIDR, we must not overlook the crucial role of private addressing as well as NAT in 
preserving 1Pv4's addressing space. Last but not least, in addition to further subnetting a subnet or 
VLSM, administrators need to know supernetting. Supernet is an aggregated route. Several Classful 
networks are aggregated and summarised so that the mask of this aggregated route is less than the 
mask of the Classful network. Needless to say, with Classful routing protocols it makes no sense to 
make use of this aggregate route since the determination of the subnet mask in these protocols is made 
regardless of the actual subnet mask with summarised route. In summary, more efficient use of 
addressing space provided by 1Pv4 along with summarisation of route can be considered the main 
advantages of CIDR. 
2.2 Overview of Inter-domain Routing with BGP 
Border Gateway Protocol is the defacto inter domain routing protocol in the Internet today [l, 27-
30]. This protocol acts like the glue that binds the divergent components of the Internet together. The 
Internet or internetwork (network of networks) consists of a series of components where each one is 
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under the administrative authority of the single entity and hence complies with the same routing 
policy (the policy defines what paths should be chosen [ll]). Any of these individual networks is 
called Autonomous System. Routing serves the purpose of finding a path between source and 
destination and here this path is located between these ASes (inter-domain vs. intra-domain routing). 
BGP facilitates the communication of NLRI (Network Layer Reachability Information) which in tum 
answers the question of the relative reachability address of other hosts and routers across the Internet. 
The main issue that BGP addresses is that no routing protocol extends to function globally in 
practice. BGP overcomes this scalability obstacle by operating globally while owing its extensibility 
to its simplicity. BGP is a hearsay network in which NLRI is whispered between ASes in a series of 
point to point exchanges between domains. This requires ASes to mutually have trust in each other. 
Internet protocols are either record or stream oriented. BGP utilises TCP as a stream oriented protocol 
and as a result record marking is required for ordering and distinguishing BGP messages. The 
reasoning behind the use of TCP is the elimination of the overhead. While intra domain routing 
protocols are located directly on the medium, BGP sits on top of TCP to satisfy the need for receipt of 
acknowledgement. In addition, re-flooding the whole routing table is no longer necessary (unlike 
intra-domain routing mechanism such as OSPF [32]) if by means of TCP we can add ordering and 
numbering features to BGP. 
Figure 2.2 BGP message types 
Communication between BGP speaker routers takes place utilising four different message types. 
Upon establishment of a BGP session, OPEN messages are exchanged between peers to reach a 
consensus on BGP parameters including AS numbers (indicates Internal BGP/Extemal BGP), BGP 
Identifier (one of the router's interfaces' IPs) and Holddown Timer value (the maximum time to hear 
a message (any) before dropping the BGP session). After the BGP peer relationship has been initiated 
successfully by OPENs, to say Hello, KEEPALIVE messages are sent continuously (implies the 
connection is up and the sender is alive). Afterwards, UPDATE messages are exchanged containing 
NLRI. This info is a combination of announcements of new routes to prefix bindings along with the 
associated attributes as well as a list of withdrawn routes (if prefixes were already advertised). BGP is 
known to have incremental updates whereby when a new route to a prefix is announced, the UPDATE 
is distributed through a series of point-to-point exchanges (unlike intra domain routing protocols like 
OSPF that employ a flooding mechanism). In the case of any errors or mis-match of BGP parameters, 
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NOTIFICATION messages are exchanged resulting in the connection being torn-down and 
subsequently all the routes advertised already by the peer router are purged out. 
2.2.1 BGP Finite State Machine 
2.CONNECT 
! 
3.ACTIVE 
Re-Attempt TCP 
RETRY TIMER 
l KEEPAUVE 
S.OPENCONFIRM 
4.0PENSENT 
Figure 2.3 BOP finite state machine 
Firstly, the router waits for the manual peer configuration. Once BGP has started, TCP resources 
are initiated and by moving to the Connect State, the listening process begins. While in Connect State, 
the router waits for TCP connection establishment. Once established, Open will be sent to the peer 
BGP router along with moving into OpenSent State. If TCP fails to be established, the transition 
would be in Active State in which the router must wait for Connect Retry Timer to expire and 
reattempt the TCP session establishment (before resending OPEN). Once BGP parameters have been 
sent by Open, the router will wait for the corresponding parameters from the other BGP speaker 
within its Open message. These parameters include eBGP/iBGP determination and negotiations 
required for setting the Holddown Timer. In addition Keepalive messages will already have begun to 
be exchanged and the state will transit into OpenConfirm. Any mis-match or receipt of Notification 
will result in transition immediately into the Idle state again. Moving into OpenConfirm implies the 
correct establishment of BGP adjacency with our neighbour BGP speaker. In this state, if Keepalive is 
received from the neighbour, the BGP router moves into an Established state and Holddown Timer is 
started. Nonetheless, receipt of Notification or TCP reset will bring the state into Idle again. Keep in 
mind that if Keepalive(s) were not received in due time (delay), the KEEPALIVE Timer would be 
exceeded and the connection terminated as well as the state moves into Idle (flushing learnt-routes). 
However, upon entering the Established, NLRI starts being exchanged between peers. BGP also 
employs MRAI Timer (Minimum Route Advertisement Interval) during which no new UPDATE 
message for the same prefix to the same peer will be issued. However, this functionality has been 
misinterpreted by some proposals for securing BGP (comes later). 
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Practically, if the router cannot find a way to reach the IP shown in Neighbour Statement, it will 
wait in the Idle state for that prefix to be learnt via Interior Gateway Protocol (IGP), static route or 
Network Statement (in Cisco infrastructure here). If the router finds the IP in Neighbour Statement, it 
transits into Connect/Active State. 
2.2.2 BGP Path Attributes 
BGP is a Prefix-based Path Vector Protocol which propagates NLRI within a domain (through 
iBGP)/between domains (eBGP) using UPDATE messages exchanged over TCP Port 179. There are 
a couple of attributes associated with advertised prefixes in UPDATE. Attributes are employed to 
influence the Path Selection Process and enforce policy routing. Since some BGP security proposals 
require the addition of new attributes to the current BGP, it is noteworthy that standard attributes 
become clear. Figure 2.4 demonstrates the categorisation for BGP attributes. 
Figure 2.4 BGP path attributes 
If every BGP must include the attribute, the attribute is of type Well-known Mandatory (ex. AS-
PATH). Well-known Discretionary attributes are those which must be understood by every router at 
the very minimum (ex. LOCAL-PREF). Optional Transitive attributes must be distributed even if not 
recognised by routers ( ex. COMMUNITY). Optional Non-Transitive attributes, however, must be 
deleted before being propagated further (ex. MED). Route objects distributed through BGP consist of 
NLRI plus path vectors of AS values. These vectors are later on investigated by the BGP speaker to 
be compared against other route objects by the BGP Route Selection Algorithm to determine the best 
BGPpath. 
Initially, each AS adds its #AS (AS number) to the beginning of the AS-PATH attribute (list 
prepending) before propagating it further to its neighbours. ORIGIN code indicates whether the 
source of the NLRI is IGP with code l(ex. Network statement), EGP with code 2 and finally code 3 or 
Incomplete (indicating that the route was learnt by redistribution). NEXT-HOP is another attribute 
which demonstrates the IP of the immediate hop in the path to specific prefix. If it is the eBGP peer, 
NEXT-HOP value is the neighbour's outgoing interface. For iBGP, however, it is the outgoing 
interface from which the route originated (consequently recursive lookup is required). All the 
attributes so far are of the Well-known Mandatory type.Well-known Discretionary LOCAL-PREF is 
utilised to prioritise one path over another if more than one route exists for the same prefix. Optional 
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Transitive Community attribute is the tool for grouping destinations towards which routing decisions 
can be applied. Finally, Optional Non-Transitive MED (Multi-Exit Discriminator) is considered 
whenever an AS has more than one direct link to another AS. MED is best exploited for traffic 
engineering purposes when the optimal path is needed for a specific prefix that might exist several 
hops away and works as a recommendation for the peer speaker [l]. 
2.2.3 BGP Route Selection Algorithm 
Since only single path routing is permitted in BOP and subsequently load sharing is not allowed, it 
is worth knowing how BOP decides the process of route selection. A summary of the algorithm is 
depicted in Figure 2.5. All steps are considered tie-breaking criteria when more than one route is 
available for a particular prefix. The whole algorithm is a series of ordered if-else statements. AW is a 
Cisco proprietary attribute (not advertised to peers). If for a prefix more than one route exists, BOP 
firstly performs Availability Check for the NEXT-HOP of routes. If both are available, Administrative 
Weight is compared and the highest one is chosen. AW is a number assigned to the path and is local 
to the AS (0-65535). The higher the AW, the more preferred the route (by default 32768 for routes 
originating locally and zero for other routes). 
If AW does not break the tie, the route with the highest LOCAL-PREF is selected. At this stage, a 
route learnt through IGP is preferred (Network statement). If the decision has not yet been made, the 
shortest AS-PATH is chosen. If this attribute has the same value for both routes, ORIGIN will be 
checked while IGP over EGP and EGP over Incomplete are picked up. If a tie for multiple routes still 
exists, the lowest MED is our tie-breaking decision criteria. If the problem persists, the route learnt 
through eBGP is preferred over an iBGP route. 
Next, we attempt to find the lowest IGP metric to reach NEXT-HOP. If the decision is still 
ambiguous, Cisco will check at this stage to see if the Multipath option has been configured. To put it 
another way, while by default BOP will only install one best path in the routing table, using maximum 
path command [n] will assist us in determining the number-of-(un)equal-cost paths whereby both 
routes can be utilised for carrying the traffic Q.1, ~. The decision making process, if still intact, will 
be finalised by choosing the lowest BOP Router ID. 
Figure 2.5 BGP decision making process algorithm 
2.3 Overview of Multicast 
Multicast differs from unicast in the way that its data packets are dispatched at the sender site in a 
single stream rather than being replicated for every intended receiver separately. Unlike unicast, with 
multicast the same data does not need to be sent multiple times on precious WAN links. Also, as far 
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as the number of anchors of trust is concerned as we will see with our proposed design, unicast cannot 
scale for a large number of clients. Either a large number of receivers or huge amounts of data make 
the unicast network design susceptible to overload (traffic volume as well as number of clients grows 
at 1:1 rate). In the one-to-many architecture of multicast, transmitter host sends only a single copy of 
multicast data with a multicast group address (instead of multiple same packets in unicast each for a 
distinct destination). While merely this single copy of each multicast packet exists on any given 
network segment, downstream multicast routers replicate and then transit the packet to other segments 
where receivers may reside l}Q]. 
In general, IP multicast is deemed to be more efficient than unicast due to the fact that it benefits 
basically from sending the same data to many locations without having to replicate it in a unicast 
manner for each destined node. This also preserves the precious WAN bandwidth between anchors of 
trust for our proposed model. For Distribution of Software, multicast is largely preferred over unicast. 
Multicast technology commonly has two models, namely one-to-many and many-to-many. One-to-
many applications include but are not limited to media distribution, monitoring, announcements and 
more recently security surveillance. If feedback from receivers is required, then one-to-many changes 
to a many-to-many model. 
It is noteworthy that simulcast is interchangeably used instead of multicast if simultaneous 
delivery for a group of receivers is intended. The reasoning behind this simultaneous receipt is that in 
multicast, unlike unicast, multiple streams of packets are substituted with a single transmission 
minimizing the consumption of valuable resources such as network bandwidth like expensive WAN 
connections as well as processing power. Furthermore, not only is provisioning support for distributed 
applications gained but also enhanced performance due to the fact that not many copies of data need 
processing or en-routing- as with multicast there is no need to add traffic redundancy. 
Nevertheless, since multicast applications are mainly UDP based, best-effort delivery mechanism 
may result in dropped/out-of-sequence packets which is not reliable and as such, reliability is 
recommended to be addressed at the application layer separately. The losses have an impact on real-
time applications like video streaming. UDP also suffers from lack of congestion control as opposed 
to the slow-start mechanism in TCP to deal with congestion conditions. Finally, multicast security is 
receiving more attention recently with regard to allowing only intended nodes to receive multicast 
traffic and thus thwarting eavesdropping on the communications if confidentiality is required. 
2.3.1 Multicast Design Requirements 
The way that multicast provisions a scalable solution is through addressing the following design 
criteria [TI]: 
1. Network administrator launches a multicast application on a multicast server with the aid of 
an assigned IP layer address as the source address of the outgoing packets. 
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2. A multicast address which simply represents the multicast application ( called also multicast 
group). This will be utilised in a packet's destination address field solely (never appearing in 
a source address field) which identifies a particular multicast group. Once again, a multicast 
address is never delegated to a source address field of an IP packet since it does not indicate 
any specific host unlike unicast. Here, a group of destination devices is represented by a 
group address. Upon joining to a multicast group, packets destined for the group address flow 
to a given receiver. Consequently, the source address of the multicast packet remains the 
same as with unicast. Hence, IP multicast groups regulate who will receive multicast packets. 
While it is guaranteed that all group members receive what is destined for their group address 
and it is delivered to group members only, non-group members can also dispatch packets to a 
group (security concern). 
3. All the intended receiver nodes within a given multicast group are required to have the 
multicast application installed on them with the use of the same multicast address which 
points to the given group for the outgoing packets from the server. 
4. Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) [38, 39] facilitates communication between 
hosts on a subnet and their local router to inform the router of the recently-installed multicast 
application and the host's willingness to receive traffic from the multicast source. 
5. A multicast routing protocol like Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) [40-42] which 
forwards multicast traffic from servers through routing infrastructure to multicast receivers. 
Initially, upon starting a multicast application on the receiver site, the application needs to learn 
about active streams/sessions which correspond to different multicast groups. This acts like a TV 
guide which reveals the available multicast contents to users. '.fhis session directory which runs on 
end machines to inform users, utilises either Session Description Protocol (SOP) [ 43] or Session 
Announcement Protocol (SAP) [41]. 
Notifying network elements about which hosts require which data streams is fulfilled by either 
Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP for host-to-router) or Cisco Group Management 
Protocol (CGMP for switch-to-multicast router) [TI]. The optimal way for multicast traffic to be 
~outed is determined by PIM. In· Figure 2.6, the roles of each of the aforementioned protocols are 
illustrated in the Cisco emulator. 
Since any multicast source can dispatch multicast data to any group address and any multicast 
receiver can obtain data from any group address, aggregation/summarisation of multicast group 
addresses does not make sense. In other words, the subnet mask notion does not exist here due to the 
unstructured/non-hierarchical nature of multicast. Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) can 
assign permanent/temporary multicast addresses in general [ 45]. 
Well-known reserved multicast addresses are classified as follows: 
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1. Local scope addresses which are not mutable in the range of 224.0.0.0 to 224.0.0.255. for 
instance, local scope addresses within multicast range listed below are intended for network 
protocols for local segment use only and therefore are not mutable globally: 
• 224.0.0.1 ➔ indicating all hosts 
• 224.0.0.2 ➔ indicating all multicast routers 
• 224.0.0.5 ➔ indicating all OSPF routers 
2. JANA has delegated 232.0.0.0 to 232.255.255.255 to SSM for its applications to select the 
source for the multicast group. 
3. 233.0.0.0 to 233.255.255.255, called GLOP (not acronym), to be utilised by registered 
Autonomous Systems to have 256 global multicast addresses 
4. 239.0.0.0 through 239.255.255.255 for use in private multicast domains (similar to 10.0.0.0/8, 
172.16.0.0/12 and 192.168.0.0/16 for unicast) 
The remaining addresses are termed "Transient Multicast Addresses" which can be 
leased/relinquished for multicast applications if need be by the entire Internet even without permission 
from JANA. Multicast addresses are typically statically assigned. 
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Figure 2.6 Multicast design requirements, role of PIM, IGMP, CGMP and SAP/SDP are highlighted in GNS3 
environment for Cisco emulation 
2.3.2 Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP) 
IGMP has advanced through three versions [38, 46-48]. With the aid of this layer 3 protocol, a 
given host registers to join/leave a specific multicast group. In this way, the router is informed of 
forwarding multicast data to registered hosts. With version 1, multicast-enabled routers dispatch 
"membership queries" periodically to all the hosts (multicast address 224.0.0.1). "Membership 
reports" are then issued by hosts to a multicast group address to indicate that they are willing to join a 
group (or in response to intended membership queries). However, with version 1, there is no 
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mechanism embedded for hosts to leave a multicast group; this is problematic when there is no 
member left anymore in the segment and the multicast data is still delivered to the segment. With 
version 2, "group-specific queries" have been substituted with "membership query" so that while with 
version 1 the membership query was dispatched to all hosts, with version 2, a group-specific query 
gets targeted to multicast merely to that group address. Version 2 also benefitted from "Leave Group 
Message" such that when the last member leaves, the segment does not receive multicast data 
needlessly. Version 3 has evolved in a way that a joining report submitted by a joining member may 
also enclose a source list whereby the host announces acceptable/unacceptable multicast sources from 
which it is willing to receive (not receive) data. Subsequently, the multicast router is aware of those 
sources for which there is no interest by receivers and thus filters out unnecessary deliverable traffic. 
IGMP facilitates communication between hosts that are disclosing interest in given multicast 
traffic and their local router. In the absence of any other multicast protocol for switching devices, 
switches flood out multicast frames across the VLAN similar to unknown unicast frames. IGMP 
messages are dispatched in IP datagrams while the IP protocol number is set to two. It is noteworthy 
that IGMP messages do not traverse further than the local segment's router (TTL=l). Usually, IGMP 
lets the local multicast router know by the receivers if they are wishing to join/leave the given 
multicast group. IGMP is enabled on a router when PIM is configured on it automatically with version 
2 by default. Other versions can also be utilised on each interface of the router. Version 2 is backward 
compatible with version 1. An improved Leave mechanism was the reason for the development of 
version 2 after 1. 
The presence of any active member of the given group on a subnet is verified via responses to the 
"General Membership Query" message (with group address field set to 0.0.0.0 and destination IP of 
224.0.0.1) sent by the router. Also, if the router catches a "Leave Group" message from an existing 
member, then it will send similar queries called "Group-Specific Membership Query" (but with the 
given group multicast address for group address field) which checks the presence of any remaining 
member for the specific group. "Membership Queries" are required to be responded by "(host) 
Membership Report" by an active member of the group on this subnet if they exist, to notify the router 
of the presence of a minimum one alive multicast receiver before reaching the "Maximum Response 
Time Field" of Query messages. "Membership Report" is issued either as a reply to a Membership 
Query (after receiving queries) or initially by a host to indicate its group of interest and spell it out for 
the local router. These two are therefore called Solicited or Unsolicited Membership Report 
respectively. 
For a multicast-enabled router to forward traffic on an attached interface, only one report for each 
multicast application is sufficient (solicited). Subsequently, other reports for the given application are 
considered redundant and thus suppressed after "Maximum Response Time". On the other hand, with 
unsolicited reports, the need for hosts to wait for membership queries to be responded to is eliminated 
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since as soon as a given host installs the multicast application it raises a flag to the group of interest 
explicitly (unsolicited mechanism shortens the latency). 
Upon leaving a group, the router which was previously informed by the leaving member with a 
Leave Group message, now issues a Group-Specific Query message right away so that it can verify 
whether or not any other active receiver for the given group is existing (i.e. remaining) on the 
segment. This in tum shortens the Leave latency unlike the IGMP version 1. 
With the advent of IGMP version 3, the receiving host can filter incoming traffic based on the 
desired source IP address of its interest (which is already a group member) with the aid of Source 
Specific Multicast (SSM). This point is of immense value with regard to security for multicast as well 
as our overlay design. Before version 3, the subnet with any active member used to receive multicast 
traffic forwarded from the router if that host had already joined the given group. By the same token, 
the host could disseminate the traffic of its interest to other members of the group irrespective of 
whether or not others will hear about that traffic. This then jeopardises the safety of multicast if the 
host becomes malicious and wishes to disturb an on-going session like a multimedia conference for 
instance. In other words, the obstacle which is the legacy of the previous multicast design is 
vulnerable to receiving unwanted traffic from malicious or unwanted multicast source(s). These 
sources are also multicast members of that group and as such can be previously 
authorised/authenticated for joining the given multicast application but later on may misbehave 
(Byzantine failure) and become malicious attackers. These attackers not only may multicast their 
meaningful but malicious traffic to victim the multicast group, but can also overwhelm the routing 
and switching infrastructure and come up with a DoS attack. 
IANA has assigned 224.0.0.22 for IGMP version 3 Membership Report to be inserted as a 
destination address for host report messages. 
2.3.3 Multicast Packet Forwarding with Protocol Independent Multicast (PIM) 
On a router, a received multicast packet's destination address discloses the intended group of 
receivers rather than a single receiver as with unicast, and as such unicast routing cannot locate the 
recipients utilising unicast routing mechanisms. Multicast packet forwarding is then performed 
leveraging multicast routing protocol including PIM either in Dense-Mode (DM) or Sparse-Mode 
(SP). Cisco multicast architecture supports various multicast solutions including campus solutions 
such as IGMP for host-to-router communications as well as PIM Sparse Mode (SM) for routers or 
inter-domain multicast solutions like MBGP [12] and PIM Source Specific Multicast (SSM). 
The operation of PIM is explored at this stage [50-52]. Routing multicast packets on routers is 
performed with PIM. PIM is operating irrespective of which underlying unicast routing protocol 
coexists and that is why it is called Protocol Independent. Nevertheless, PIM exploits routing tables 
populated by unicast protocols for its process without propagating any routing updates amongst PIM 
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routers. Upon looking-up the destination address( es) in routing tables with multicast routing, a router 
may disseminate a multicast packet out towards multiple interfaces rather than one interface as with 
unicast. 
From a terminology point of view, independency of the PTh1 acronym implies that no matter 
which unicast routing protocol was utilised to construct routing tables ( or with Multicast OSPF even 
without any unicast routing protocol in place), RPF check, as we will discuss, can operate 
independently. RFC 4608 [51], RFC 4601 [40] and RFC 3973 [54] are elaborating SSM, SM and DM 
types of PTh1 respectively. 
Like other routing protocols, the PTh1-enabled router firstly establishes adjacency with its 
neighbours. To verify that the neighbour PTh1 router is alive and forms the relevant adjacency, Hello 
messages are sent with the current PTh1 version 2 every 30 seconds. Hello messages utilise IP protocol 
number 103 with destination address set to 224.0.0.13 for addressing all PTh1 routers. By discovering 
alive PTh1 neighbours and the establishment of adjacencies with them via PTh1 Hello messages, now 
other PTh1 messages can convey the required info amongst the routers. 
Multicast routing occurs in a connection oriented fashion meaning that initially connection 
messages are dispatched towards the multicast source ( called upstream) to launch the flow paths for 
multicast traffic. Distribution trees are devised leveraging PTh1 and its connection messages on 
multicast-enabled routers to maintain the path that multicast traffic follows across the network to 
deliver data to all intended receivers (called downstream) as well as to respond to topology changes 
dynamically by rebuilding distribution trees. Distribution tree types entail source trees and shared 
trees [50-52]. 
Source trees are devised for each source dispatching data to each multicast group. A direct path 
(shortest) from the root which is the source to branches which finally reach all the receivers is formed. 
Unlike source trees, a single shared tree which is shared between all sources for each multicast group 
forms another category of distribution trees. A common root here is named Rendezvous Point (RP). 
All sources firstly dispatch their multicast packets to RP. Afterwards, utilising shared trees, RP sends 
data to members of the group. 
Upon issuing a "request to join" message for a given multicast group address and a given source 
IP (based on IGMP3 for instance), each router on the path performs look-up within its unicast routing 
table for source IP to identify the outgoing interface towards the source IP. The router then adds the 
group address along with two interfaces which together form an entry inside its multicast routing 
table. First interface is the interface from which the router has heard about the "request to join" and 
which now becomes the outgoing interface towards the requester to deliver multicast data 
(downstream interface). Second interface, which indicates the outgoing interface for a "request to join 
"message, stems from looking-up within the unicast routing table for source IP which in turn becomes 
the incoming interface on which the current router will expect to hear about the given multicast group 
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and its data (upstream interface). In summary, a quadruple (Source IP, Multicast Group Address, 
Downstream Interface, and Upstream Interface) forwarding state will be constructed within the 
multicast routing table theoretically. The "request to join" will be propagated further in a similar 
approach until finally reaching the intended multicast source. Multicast data can now flow away from 
the multicast source downstream towards multicast receivers, exploiting the devised multicast 
distribution tree. This is called Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF). · It is noteworthy that RPF also 
guarantees the loop avoidance objective as discussed later. Note that a router will transfer a multicast 
packet further only if it was received on its RPF interface or upstream interface. 
Back to distribution trees, for every source (S) associated with group (G) in the source tree, a 
separate instance of source tree is constructed on each router denoted by (S, G) state ( current values 
called states. This is a short form for denoting the aforementioned quadruple). While this reduces the 
latency due to the shortest path element, routers must keep track of path info for each source which is 
not scalable. Denotation for shared trees changes to (*, G) in which wildcard entry refers to any 
source. Maintaining such a shared state eliminates memory consumption limitations with source trees. 
Note that source trees are utilised to forward multicast packets to RP from difference sources, and 
from there they will be dispatched through a single shared tree. This, however, might introduce some 
delays since the direct path from the source to destination might be better than the path from source to 
RP and then to the receiver. 
According to the usage of either source or shared trees, PIM can have three different deployment 
models. For one-to-many applications with heavy use of source trees, Source Specific Multicast 
(PIM-SSM) is utilised. Many-to-many applications take advantage of Bidirectional PIM (Bidir-PIM) 
in which shared trees are basically used which eliminates the need to maintain states like (S, G). 
Finally, Sparse Mode (PIM-SM) or Any Source Multicast (ASM) combines the utilisation of source 
and shared trees. 
2.3.3.1 Source Specific Multicast (PIM-SSM) 
We then briefly overviewed PIM-Source Specific Multicast (SSM) and its implication on security. 
SSM is widely used in one-to-many applications in which efficiency for data delivery is substantial. 
Traditionally, if two sets of (source, receivers) exploit the identical IP multicast group address, 
receivers of both sets receive the traffic of both sources, even if reluctantly. With SSM, the receiver 
will hear about a valid multicast source through out-of-band mechanisms like trusted Web Server or 
Electronic Program Guide (EPG) [55] that provide directory services; it then dispatches "request to 
join" to the given source within the multicast group directly. This not only adds another layer of 
defence by authorising the valid source through trusted out-of-band mechanisms, but also makes 
receivers responsible for discovering desired source and group as well as intended traffic they are 
willing to obtain. Accordingly, the trust paradigm shifts in a way that an unknown source cannot 
19 
Background Study of Routing 
mandatorily transit its intended traffic (likely malicious) to receivers of a given multicast group who 
wish not (already in an explicit manner) to gain such data. 
SSM operates merely with source trees and as such there is no shared RP or shared trees anymore. 
This mechanism best matches IGMP version 3 as discussed earlier in which "request to join" for a 
specific source within multicast group G from the receiver is issued to the immediate router. IGMP 
version 3 with Include mode (as opposed to its Exclude mode) carries the specified source IP address. 
The "request to join" from this SSM-enabled router will be then forwarded hop-by-hop towards the 
immediate router to the multicast source building up the source tree. Upon receipt of (S, G) the join 
query for the closest router to the source; the source tree has been consequently constructed and the 
traffic will flow down the tree. Recall that IANA has assigned 223.0.0.0/8 for SSM applications and 
asks for a source IP address which is globally routable. 
Back to Figure 2.7, initially the Receiver becomes aware of the trusted desired source of multicast 
via out-of-band mechanisms such as www services. At the beginning of Join Process, Receiver issues 
IGMP version 3 for (S, G) towards R6 depicted by a green arrow. SSM-enabled R6 afterwards 
dispatches a "request to join" with PIM protocol for (S, G) destined to a globally routable IP address 
of the source. As this request traverses and hops one after each other utilising unicast routing tables 
along the path, routing devices maintain the relevant multicast states for building a source tree later on 
(violet arrows). Upon receipt of a join request by Rl, RPF flows the data downwards from the 
specified source via a source distribution tree down towards the Receiver. As a result, with SSM, the 
network is not forced to keep track of which active sources are transmitting to which active multicast 
groups. Note that SSM with an Include/Exclude mode acts as a deterrent with invulnerability 
provisioning against unknown sources who wish to forward attack traffic to victim receivers by letting 
merely explicitly queried traffic flow across interested transceivers. 
For one-to-many applications with Internet broadcast style, implementation of SSM is 
recommended. This is owing to the simplicity achieved here since the network does not maintain 
states for which active source is sending to which multicast group. It also benefits from the 
invulnerability reached against multicast DoS with unknown sources with attack traffic through SSM. 
2.3.3.2 PIM in Sparse Mode (SM) 
For an overview of the SM operation, the first phase entails a multicast source sending packets to 
RP and secondly forwarding this traffic to already-registered receivers with the aid of a shared tree. 
Immediate router to the source tries to register with RP. RP then succeeds with the registration only if 
the RP is already aware of active receivers who wish to obtain that traffic. For security reasons, 
another layer of defence can be formed here by specifying allowed receivers on the RP. For the 
implementation part later, enabling "ip multicast-routing" globally as well as "ip pim sparse-mode" 
under all interfaces with Cisco environment, we then need to specify the RP interface via "ip pim rp-
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address (interface address)" [33]. This will be done on the RP router itself as well. RP interface is 
typically a loopback interface which is advertised through a unicast routing protocol to all neighbours. 
IGMP version 3 
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Figure 2.7 Construction of Source Tree for SSM architecture 
Upon receipt of a first unicast PIM Register message from the immediate hop after the source to 
RP, if RP has not heard of any active receiver willing to obtain traffic for the given group, RP will 
dispatch unicast Register-Stop message in response to the immediate hop's router registration query 
indicating the unwillingness for such traffic from the source. More precisely, unicast PIM Register 
message already encapsulates the first multicast packet. Having sent the Register-Stop message, RP 
still forwards the first encapsulated multicast packet downstream just in case any new possible 
receiver becomes interested in pursuing the given group. This is accompanied by starting a Register-
Suppression Timer at the immediate router no sooner than it receives the Register-Stop message from 
RP. This results in the second unicast Register message being sent from the immediate hop to source 
towards the RP with set flag and without any encapsulated multicast packet. RP can now make its 
final decision either to warn the immediate hop again of its reluctance to multicast traffic of the source 
via a Register-Stop message (which in tum resets the timer) or to not respond with the advent of a 
new interested receiver and wait for the timer to expire. After the timer expires, RP subsequently 
receives a fresh Register message again which encompasses the encapsulated multicast packet this 
time and then joins accordingly. 
Forwarding packets from RP to downstream routers/hosts are feasible utilising a shared tree also 
called a Root-path Tree (RPT as opposed to Shortest Path Tree, SPT, with SSM). In other words , each 
active multicast group has an instance of shared tree which determines the path to deliver traffic from 
the root, namely RP towards receivers. The Join process for PIM-SM consists of dispatching PIM Join 
messages to RP from PIM-SM routers which jointly contribute to the creation of a shared tree. More 
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precisely, the receipt of either a PIM Join message on the local router through an interface apart from 
the one connected to RP or a IGMP Membership Report from hosts within the local subnet will 
trigger the local router to disseminate a PIM Join message towards RP. 
2.3.3.2.1 Join Mechanism for SM with Shared Tree 
A deployment model in which information is downloaded as it is requested is called a pull model. 
In this sense, PIM-SM/ ASM utilises the pull model to dispatch multicast traffic to segments on which 
receiver(s) who already queried the data directly reside. Administratively configured RP at the very 
beginning utilises shared trees so that everyone will be informed about active sources on shared trees 
at first through forwarding some data packets. This requires the sources to register with RP initially. 
Active receivers then issue an explicit "request to join" for a given multicast group to be registered to 
RP. Those receivers who have already joined the group will now obtain multicast data down the 
shared tree. 
Figure 2.8 depicts the idea of a Shared Tree Join. According to this figure, Receiver node attached 
to R6 is willing to join multicast group G which is sourced from the server linked to Rl~ The server 
had already registered with RP. R6 has been already notified administratively of R3's IP address as 
Rendezvous Point (RP). Therefore, R6 sends the(*, G) request to join G explicitly, destined for RP 
utilising unicast routing table. Recall that (*, G) state is devised only along the shared tree. As (*, G) 
request to join traverses each hop towards RP, a branch of the shared tree is built up which in total 
forms the shared tree from RP towards the Receiver. Multicast data is forwarded from RP down the 
shared tree towards the Receiver who already issued a request to join. 
SM begins operating with receipt of the first packet by RP with Destination Address field set to 
intended multicast group. RP then, unlike DM discussed later, waits for the explicit request for the 
multicast traffic (rather than forwarding it blindly as with DM). For best practice, loopback interface 
on RP is statically configured as "RP address" and will be advertised with the aid of unicast routing 
protocols such as OSPF/EIGRP [32] so that all the routers learn how to locate an RP. At this point in 
time, the host will request to join the group through an IGMP request to its immediate router. This 
immediate router to the receiver is now issuing a PIM Join request to RP for the group address. In this 
way, RP is now informed of the outgoing interface for future packets destined to this multicast group 
address. Recall that for this process to succeed all routing devices are required to acquire the RP's IP 
address, which is addressed here with OSPF or other intra-domain unicast routing protocols. Needless 
to say, other routers in the network do not dispatch any PIM Join as a result of not receiving any 
IGMP Join for the group and thus do not receive any multicast traffic for this group (preserving 
network resources like bandwidth). 
To limit how far a multicast packet can propagate across the network, multicast scoping 
techniques are used, namely TTL Scoping and Administrative Scoping. With TTL scoping, if the 
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received packet's associated TTL field at each router after decreasing one hop for the last traver e i 
not higher than/equal to this number on the outgoing interface from which the packet is supposed to 
continue its journey, the packet is not forwarded further through that interface. On Cisco 
infrastructure, the interface's TTL value has a default of 0. This is now an arduous challenge for the 
server's application to modify TTL for the leaving packets for the appropriate distance which they 
want to reach. For Administrative scoping, a proper filtering mechanism should be in place so that 
private multicast addresses (239.0.0.0 to 230.255.255.255) discussed before do not leave the local 
domain. 
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Figure 2.8 Shared Tree Join mechanism in PIM SM 
2.3.3.2.2 Sender Registration Mechanism for SM 
The mechanism by which the multicast source is registered with RP is called PIM-SM Sender 
Registration. For demonstration purposes here, we utilised static RP configurations for Cisco in which 
for each PIM domain for each multicast group there is only one RP (typically the closest router to the 
multicast source). Within this PIM domain, all routers will share the same "ip pim rp-address". 
To clarify, we elaborate this mechanism in Figure 2.9. According to this figure, the server for 
multicast group G initially notifies Rl which has the responsibility of registering a multicast source 
with RP. To perform this, Rl firstly encapsulates the multicast data obtained from the server in a 
PIM-SM Register Message and unicasts this message to RP (green arrow). This triggers RP to create a 
source tree back to Rl (blue arrow). On R3 , upon receipt of an encapsulated register message, the 
multicast data packet will be extracted by Decapsulation and forwarded down the shared tree towards 
the Receiver (red arrow). As mentioned, R3 issues (S, G) a "request to join" message towards the 
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Server to create source tree branches as the message traverses each hop (blue arrow). Multicast traffic 
from the Server can now begin to flow towards RP along the source tree. As soon as RP starts 
receiving multicast data, R3 notifies RI by a Register-Stop message to indicate the fact that there is 
no more need to dispatch an encapsulated unicast Register message (black arrow). 
If RP is already informed of an interested receiver for G, RP decapsulates the encapsulated 
multicast packet obtained initially from the immediate hop to the source by a unicast Register 
message and forwards it downstream via the shared tree. This is accompanied by issuing a PIM-SM 
Join message for (S, G) from RP towards the closest router to the source to put all the transit routers 
on the way towards this immediate hop in a forwarding state for the given multicast traffic (via SPT). 
This lets multicast traffic traverse through (S, G) towards RP and from there via (*, G) and onto the 
receivers. The Source Registration process will terminate by issuing a unicast Register-Stop message 
from RP to the immediate hop after the source to make this router stop forwarding encapsulated 
packets of multicast traffic with the Register. 
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Figure 2.9 Sender Registration Mechanism for SM 
Rendezvous 
Point 
To keep interfaces in a forwarding state (not bringing them back into pruned state), periodic PIM-
SM Join messages must be issued from SM-enabled routers. This stems from either downstream 
routers issuing periodic Joins or local host still dispatching IGMP Join/Report in response to IGMP 
Queries (sent every 60 seconds). As a result, the Prune timer on the upstream router will be reset to 
180 seconds (default). If the upstream router has not heard of any Joins from the downstream router 
before the Prune timer expires, it will bring the state of the interface from forwarding into pruned. 
Consequently, traffic on this interface will not be forwarded anymore. 
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The output of "show ip mroute" [33] for multicast route table entry with code lists characteristics 
of (*, G). Flag S implies that the PIM routing protocol in sparse mode is in place. Associated 
incoming interface with G along with neighbour RPF are listed. This RPF neighbour is the one which 
reaches RP (not a particular source). The forwarding state can be verified for relevant interface(s) 
under "Outgoing interface list:" for each group. The list contains the interface on which periodic Joins 
are obtained from downstream SM-enabled routers along with the interface on which IGMP Join 
message from the local host has gained (IGMP Join/Report has sent from host to multicast router in 
response to its periodic IGMP general query which dispatches every 60 seconds). 
The most interesting results can be verified under RP' s multicast routing table. RP on one hand 
contributes to the creation of SPT for source S for group G (S, G). On the other hand, RP is the root 
for the shared tree for (*, G). Flag S reveals the shared tree output. Incoming interface for shared tree 
of RP is indicating Null. By the same token, RPF is set to 0.0.0.0 here. This makes sense as traffic for 
G will originate from RP across the shared-tree and as such RP is independent of any other routers for 
RPT. On the contrary, T flag displays SPT notion. The incoming interface here points to the interface 
with the shortest path towards the source. 
While so far RP was supposed to have been pulling traffic from the source through SPT and 
pushing it down to the receivers via RPT, more efficiently, each PIM-SM router is also able to 
construct its own SPT path to the source with the aid of a better existing path. This is performed after 
finishing the source Registration process discussed earlier. In an attempt to build its own SPT path, a 
downstream router will notify the upstream router via a Prune message issuance to stop sending traffic 
and then will switch over from RPT to its own SPT. This happens typically with receipt of a 
considerable amount of multicast traffic from the source according to RFC 2362. For Cisco 
infrastructure, the default for switching over to SPT is receipt of the first packet via the shared tree. 
This is tuneable through "ip pim spt-threshold (rate in kbps)" [33]. Construction of RPT from the 
beginning is necessary since the router must initially become aware of the source of the multicast 
before switching over to its SPT. However, at the end, the most efficient paths are utilised for 
forwarding traffic for each SPT (S, G) tree instance. 
2.3.3.3 PIM in Dense Mode 
With DM logic, the assumption is that the popular multicast application is in place and therefore 
in each subnet, there is at the very least an active receiver who wishes to hear about multicast traffic. 
So by design, the DM router floods out multicast traffic to all configured interfaces except the one on 
which it already obtained the packet (termed split horizon). Nonetheless, DM lets the router ask to not 
receive multicast traffic from the upstream router by issuing a Prune message for a given group not 
only if no active receiver exists but also if this router has not heard of anyone who has joined that 
group beforehand. 
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As an attempt at loop prevention in multicast, Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) check is 
performed. RPF will be then added to DM logic so that for the received multicast packet, the local 
router will examine the packet's source IP field in its routing table. If there is any matching entry and 
if the outgoing interface listed in this entry for the source IP corresponds to the interface on which the 
router has obtained the multicast packet, an RPF check is successful and subsequently the traffic is 
forwarded with split horizon in mind. Otherwise, the packet is discarded to prevent loops and 
bandwidth waste. 
As discussed earlier, DM best fits dense topology in which multicast traffic is flooded until being 
notified by sending Prune messages. Upon receipt of a multicast packet in this mode, an RPF check is 
performed. If successful, the packet is flooded until there is no more downstream PIM router left. The 
source-based distribution tree (also named shortest-path tree) has the responsibility of keeping track of 
the path originating from the multicast source towards receiving subnets as the tree's leaves. To this, 
we firstly enable multicast through "ip multicast-routing" in global configuration mode with Cisco 
code on each router. Each interface on every router is then needed to have DM activated on it by "ip 
pim dense-mode". Each instance of SPT is displayed with (S, G) as mentioned earlier. Importantly, 
each (S, G) may be different for various source and group pairs due to different locations on which 
receivers for each group might reside. 
Each router's contribution to form given (S, G) as well as its multicast routing table are verified 
under "show ip mroute". The result reveals many parameters including the amount of time for which 
(S, G) has been up, the amount of time left after which if the local router has not forwarded any (S, G) 
packet then it will ignore the entry, C flag, which indicates a directly connected group member exists 
for group G, T flag, which points out the shortest path tree is in place for forwarding traffic for (S, G), 
incoming interface for G, neighbour interface to perform RPF and finally outgoing interfaces in 
forwarding state listed to send traffic unless being stopped by Prune messages. For the latter, if the 
neighbour router disseminates the Prune message to the local router, the local router will then remove 
the link from which the message was received (S, G), for instance SPT, which will be reflected as 
Prune state in the results. 
It is worth mentioning that while many outgoing interfaces may be listed here, the incoming 
interface is pointing to one interface all the time and this interface called the RPF interface is the one 
on which the local router has heard about the given multicast data originating from the particular 
source. If for any reason a link fails, multicast routing protocol here dynamically changes in order to 
adapt, for instance by bringing the already pruned interface into a forwarding state. On this, DM 
exploits Graft messages to bring back the pruned link. 
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2.3.4 PIM Variants Contrasts 
Contrary to DM, the SM strategy works on the premise that not only do downstream routers 
explicitly ask to join a given multicast group through PIM Join messages, but they also need to keep 
sending Join messages continuously to receive traffic. Otherwise, the link is considered a pruned link. 
There is no notion of RP or a Source Registration Process with DM. 
Unlike the assumption of having interested receivers in almost all subnets with DM, SM functions 
on the premise that merely a few subnets are targeted with interested receivers to the given multicast 
group. For the latter, usage of DM will end up flooding the entire network with unwanted traffic 
which is a waste of resources. What differs between DM and SM fundamentally however is that DM 
keeps forwarding multicast traffic unless advised by Prune messages from downstream routers while 
SM does not forward group traffic to other routers unless requested to do so. 
SM and DM however share some characteristics. They both utilise unicast routing table for RPF 
checks but independently as PIM acronym suggests. Exchange of PIM hello messages facilitates the 
discovery of PIM neighbours in both modes. Upon a change of unicast routing table, RPF interfaces 
are recalculated on these modes similarly. Also, in the real world, SM as well as DM take advantage 
of a single message named Join/Prune message with a given group address listed either under Join 
field or Prune field. Nevertheless, SM does not have a notion of Graft messages. 
It might seem the same at the end when sending sources are transmitting to listening receivers via 
SPT for both DM and SM modes. Nonetheless, SM' s philosophy of not forwarding multicast until an 
explicit request has arrived, especially with minor usage applications, has made this mode more 
popular for enterprise implementations nowadays. With the growth in the number of multicast 
transceivers, SM switches to SPT faster than if DM is in place. Above all, inter-domain multicast is 
clearly benefitting from SM today. 
2.4 Summary 
The fundamentals of IP packet routing and in particular inter-domain forwarding plane were 
briefly discussed in this chapter. BGP was introduced as the de-facto inter-domain path vector routing 
protocol and its decision making process by means of which the best path towards the given 
destination is preferred over others was underlined. The main conclusion to be drawn so far is that 
BGP was designed without any security considerations in mind from the scratch. Next, multicast 
foundations were overviewed. Particularly, PIM-SM as well as IGMP are of immense importance in 
this work as they will be utilised in Chapter 6 for realising the upcoming proposed architecture. 
In Chapter 3, we explore network layer and its de-facto security solution, i.e. IPsec, from security 
viewpoint. The potential attack vector against BGP and secure multicasting are also seen. Finally, a 
secure group key & policy management protocol is discussed which will be exploited in Chapter 6 
again for the implementation phase. 
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3 Background Study of Security 
3.1 General Network Security 
As an integral part of computer networking, network security includes protocols and technologies 
to secure data and alleviate the threats. More precisely, the process of preventing and detecting 
unauthorised use of resources as well as reacting to an established threat or danger is defined with 
network security. Security goals are measures aimed at preventing and detecting the activities of 
malicious entities through the provision of information security. The general goals in network security 
are: 
• Only intended audience should know the content of transmitted or stored data 
• Every data must have a source to facilitate detection of any possible modification 
• Every communication event must be traced to an entity 
• Network services should be available and function correctly 
• Certain services or resources should be restricted to only authorised entities 
We then briefly overview basic security terminology used in the course of this research work[~: 
Plaintext: The original readable message in plain form before being encrypted into ciphertext or 
after being decrypted. 
Ciphertext: The output result obtained when an encryption is performed on a plaintext using a 
cipher to make it unreadable before decryption. 
Cipher/Crypto: This is an algorithm for performing an encryption or decryption and its operation 
is dependent on a key. 
Key: This is a piece of information or parameter used to determine the output of a cryptographic 
algorithm. It is often of various sizes depending on the algorithm used. 
Encryption: The process of distorting data (plaintext) with a key and an algorithm (cipher) to 
make it unreadable to an unauthorised party. 
Decryption: The process of applying a relevant key to encrypted data and an algorithm to make 
the resultant output readable to an authorised party. 
Signature: A signature is a bit string attached to the document when signed (e.g. one-way hash of 
the document encrypted with the private key). Digital signature algorithms are public-key based 
algorithms with secret information to sign documents and public information to verify signatures. 
Nonce: This is a number or bit string used only once in a secured communication. 
Hash-based Message Authentication Code (HMAC): This is a specific construction for 
calculating a Message Authentication Code (MAC) involving a cryptographic hash function (Message 
Digest 5 (MD5) or Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA)) in combination with a secret key. 
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Cryptographic Hash Function: This is a deterministic procedure that takes an arbitrary block of 
data and returns a fixed-size bit string (hash value) that changes with a change to the data. 
Timestamp: This is a sequence of characters denoting the date and/or time of occurrence of an 
event. 
Certificate: A certificate is a tool used to bind a public key to a principal or a public key to an 
attribute. Certificates (with X.509 for example) are always generated by a trusted authority to ensure 
the correctness of the conveyed information. 
Attribute: This is a specification that defines an object's, element's or file's property. It comprises 
a name and a value in the case of an object; a type or class name in the case of an element; a name and 
extension in the case of a file. 
3.1.1 IPsec Fundamentals 
Working at the Network Layer, IPsec protects the traffic between peers by provisioning 
encryption as well as authentication from Layer 3 to Layer 7 [TI]. On the other hand, all the current 
Layer 2 technologies let the IPsec framework function over them. IPsec framework consists of five 
different components as building-blocks. Available algorithm choices facilitated for each of these 
components result in different security solutions with each combination to satisfy various needs. The 
first component highlights the IPsec protocol and can support either Authentication Header (AH) or 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (protocol type 50 for ESP and 51 for AH). Each IPsec protocol 
operates either in transport or tunnel operation modes. The Encapsulations of the IP packet secured by 
IPsec with AH/ESP in both operation modes of transport as well as tunnel are depicted in Figure 3 .1. 
{1 Original IP HDR AHHDR TCP/UDPHDR I Data l (1) Transport l\lode AH NewIPHDR AHHDR Original IP HDR TCP/UDPHDR Data (2) Tunnel Mode 
{ Original IP HDR ESPHDR TCP/UDPHDR Data ESP Trailer ESP Authentication (3) Transport l\lode ESP NewIPHDR ESPHDR Original IP HDR TCP/UDPHDR Data ESP Trailer ESP Authentication (4) Tnnnel l\lode 
Figure 3.1 IPsec packet encapsulations with AH and ESP in both tunnel and transport modes; fields in red are encrypted 
and thus known only to end entities (i.e. not any third party in the middle of conversation including OpenFlow Switch or 
Controller). It is also noteworthy that both protocols in different modes have their Security Parameters Index (SPU in 
plaintext within the ESP/AH header. 
Both protocols share provisioning authentication and integrity security services. Nevertheless, 
confidentiality is not considered in AH. This is crucial to differentiate segments of information which 
are encrypted and thus unreadable from other readable segments which can be meaningful for the 
third party in the middle of the conversation. 
The second component demonstrates the choice for the encryption/decryption algorithm which is 
pertaining to the confidentiality service. As with every cryptographic system, the longer the key, the 
harder it is for an attacker to break into the IPsec communication. The third component ensures that 
the IPsec communication is not tampered with in transit and thus provides integrity. The fourth 
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component facilitates authentication of the endpoints in secure communication via IPsec. The last 
building-block specifies the Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm group according to the different needs. 
DH as a public key exchange mechanism allows for both communicating parties to come up with the 
same key over an unsecured channel. The driven shared key is used by peers for symmetric 
encryption as well as hashing through MAC in the second and third components of IPsec respectively. 
In IPsec with AH, a message digest is formed by applying the hashing function to the original IP 
header and data payload utilising the shared key. A new AH header is then constructed with the digest 
and is injected into the original packet. The same calculation takes place in the receiving party to find 
the exact match of hashes. Nonetheless, the whole data is transmitted in plaintext. An encryption 
mechanism leads to having all the Layer 3 information in plaintext and therefore routable. However, 
the original IP header is also encrypted/unreadable with ESP in tunnel mode. Despite AH, in IPsec 
with ESP, encryption makes payload and the identification of the ultimate transmitters meaningless to 
the eavesdroppers. The whole IP header and data payload are encrypted in this mode. This is followed 
by appending the new ESP header (as well as ESP trailer) and ESP Authentication fields including 
relevant encryption and authentication data respectively to the original packet. 
As seen in Figure 3.1, IPsec in transport mode merely considers the encapsulation of the data 
payload and TCP/UDP data (Layer 4 and above). Nonetheless, tunnel mode suggests that the whole IP 
datagram is encapsulated within a new IP packet. On the other hand, while secure communication 
between gateways demands tunnel mode of the IPsec solution, transport mode facilitates the host to 
host immune transmissions. The observation is that while in AH the original IP header remains 
unencrypted thus leaving the routing intact, the original TCP/UDP header will be encrypted in ESP. It 
is also noteworthy that both protocols in different modes have their Security Parameters Index (SPI) 
in plaintext within the ESP/ AH header. SPI uniquely differentiates various on-going conversations at 
the receiving party. 
3.1.2 Internet Key Exchange (IKE) 
The key exchange mechanism in IPsec is accomplished through IKE version 2 protocol [~. The 
key exchange process with IKE finally leads to the construction of Security Association (SA) for 
IPsec. To establish an IPsec connection, IKE involves two phases. During these phases a set of 
messages are communicated (either in Main Mode or Aggressive Mode) resulting in establishing a 
secure channel between the peers. Phase 1 lets peers agree on the security proposals generally as well 
as the shared secret key and authenticate each other. Upon finalizing a secure tunnel in phase 1, phase 
2 negotiates the custom security parameters between peers. On completion of phase 2, an SA is 
formed in a unidirectional manner. Each SA, as a logical connection, defines the way that the 
traversing traffic will be processed. Subsequently, the same security processing applies to the traffic 
associated with every SA. 
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Since a single SA specifies only two parties in a unidirectional manner, each party holds a Security 
Association Data Base (SADB) comprising of multiple SAs where each SA is associated with a 
different peer. SPI consists of an arbitrary 32-bit value utilised by a receiving party to differentiate the 
SA to which an incoming IPsec packet is associated. For a unicast communication, SPI on its own can 
specify an SA. Other parameters such as the type of IPsec protocol can come along with SPI to 
highlight a unique SA. However, [59] emphasises that the sufficiency of SPI on its own to determine 
an individual SA to which inbound traffic will be mapped or the necessity to exploit other parameters 
in conjunction with SPI is a local matter. As we will see later, SPI can fall into a domain large enough 
to uniquely identify an SA. The following tuple illustrates the parameters, any combination of which 
can be used to construct the primary key for SADB locally: 
{ SPI, IPsec Protocol Type (AH/ESP), Peer IP Address, Transform Set, Secret Key, SA Lifetime} 
A combination of the elements in this vector will shape SADB and determine various SAs 
stored on each peer. 
3.2 Diversity of the Attack Vector against BGP 
Concerns have arisen from the design time of the Internet regarding its routing security [Q.Q]. From 
a security point of view, an attacker might want to send a TCP reset to drop the BGP connection 
which results in Denial of Service. This attack can be categorised under Spoofing attack. At the very 
minimum, the attacker must find five matches for a spoofed TCP RST packet including matches for 
Source Address, Source Port, Destination Port, TTL Field and finally Sequence Number 
(Reconnaissance Attack is required firstly). However, finding these matches in practice is not an easy 
task. It might require direct access to a medium and is considered as a time-consuming process. We 
need to note that TCP MD5 also adds another layer of security and mitigates the spoofing risk 
between BGP speakers [fil]. 
Also, one might think of an attacker who can successfully masquerade as another party in Open 
message. In this way an attacker can inject false routing info which can have devastating effects on 
the forwarding system. Nevertheless, the local BGP router will start initiation of the BGP session with 
the neighbour if a remote IP address is configured manually on the IOS (and consequently validated) 
before moving to the Connect state. This adds another level of security in which only BGP messages 
from the remote but specific router's interface can be accepted. Importantly, these BGP messages sit 
on TCP segments later and the masquerading party will ultimately need _to find the five 
aforementioned matches. 
Another attack to be considered at this stage is a Direct DoS/DDoS attack on port 179 TCP 
against the BGP speaker router by flooding TCP SYN packets. The aim here is to saturate the 
memory required for a 3-way handshake of TCP session establishment which results in DoS. We 
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argue that this type of attack is more a Resource Saturation Attack rather than BGP Attack and 
subsequently is not BGP' s direct concern here. 
With these vulnerabilities in mind, the major focus of this research is on the trust paradigm of the 
semantics of BGP. According to 12], NLRI can be modified or forged by either an outsider or BGP 
peer source. No matter which, they can disrupt routing, overwhelm a router along the advertised 
router, end up with DoS or data loss where the advertised route will not forward traffic to the expected 
network and finally enroute the traffic through a sub-optimal route. 
As [17-25] highlight, the vulnerability in which a legitimate entity in the middle of conversation 
simply misbehaves is called Byzantine Failure. While BGP with a huge install base remains as the 
sole inter-domain routing protocol in extensive use [J], faulty, misconfigured, or deliberately 
malicious sources can disrupt overall Internet behaviour by injecting bogus routing information into 
the BOP-distributed routing database (by modifying, forging, or replaying BGP packets) [ii. The 
Internet currently has no secure way to validate the correctness of routing information [fil. In other 
words, there is no systematic way to validate claims of address ownership or location at the Internet 
scale [fil;]. 
In addition to withdrawn routes or prefix hijack threat models [2], [J_Q] implies that with BGP sub-
prefix hijacking (also called BGP de-aggregation attack) in which a more specific (longer) prefix of 
the victim prefix is announced, the manipulator can hijack traffic from 100% of the ASes. No matter 
how BGP attacks are launched, even partial outages which last for a few hours constitute the primary 
factor in a large portion of the Internet's overall end-to-end downtime [14]. Even AS-Path Prepending 
as an inter-domain traffic engineering mechanism can be exploited and result in a BGP prefix 
interception attack [U]. According to [lfil, BGP makes half of ASes vulnerable to a prefix hijack, and 
100% vulnerable to a sub-prefix hijack. 
3.3 On Security of Multicast Designs 
From a security point of view, the main concern here is a rogue source who impersonates a valid 
multicast source by sending malicious traffic to the multicast group receivers. While in unicast this 
threat should be addressed explicitly with the aid of Firewalls and Access Control List(s), in multicast, 
receivers are asked to initially join a multicast group in an explicit manner before traffic is forwarded 
to that group address and subsequently to them and that is why in an implicit fashion, receivers are 
guaranteed to not receive malicious traffic from unknown sources (unlike unicast). 
Recall that Sender Registration Mechanism discussed before in 2.3.3.2.2 requires Rl at the very 
beginning to contact RP for registration. Afterwards, if there is any interest in the source registered 
with RP, the receiver will need to issue (*, G) along the shared tree in Join Process. Therefore, not 
only has RP the ability to discard malicious requests from unknown senders in theory, but also if the 
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receiver is not interested they can refuse to join a given multicast group and consequently not receive 
attack data from unknown sources. 
Additionally, with PIM-SSM (Source Specific Multicast), a rogue source attack threat is 
eliminated since the receiver must join to hear from a specific source host within a specific multicast 
group. This to a large extent provides our design with an acceptable level of invulnerability against 
receiving undesired and possibly attack traffic from unknown source(s). Having said that, multicast 
DoS attack is possible (also termed state attack) and should be addressed differently. If the amount of 
state information becomes too large that routers cannot deal with it, then these devices might crash or 
suffer from low convergence. Unwanted traffic from unknown sources in PIM-SSM implementation 
will again be discarded at the immediate hop after the source so the network is again immune against 
such attacks. Nevertheless, with PIM-SM-ASM, if the rogue source targets RP by issuing Register 
messages to it, (*, G) state on the RP is formed. As the number of these rogue sources increases with 
Distributed DoS resulting in multiple (*, G) formation or a receiver within the shared tree responds 
causing creation of a source tree with constructing (S, G) from RP towards the immediate router after 
the multicast source, the number of state entries grows dramatically which ultimately results in the 
routing infrastructure crashing. By default these state entries last for 260 seconds. 
3.4 Overview of Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) 
GET VPN is in fact a Cisco IOS software solution in which a fully meshed network is catered for 
with tunnel-less technology that can provide end-to-end security for voice, video and data conduits. 
For a private WAN, secure group management is exploited to secure IP multicast traffic as well as 
unicast particularly amongst different sites within an enterprise over MPLS for instance. Cisco IOS 
GET VPN is deemed to provide revolutionary technology which alleviates complexity and overheads 
pertaining to scalable as well as secure transport remedy for always-on and dynamic connectivity of 
extremely integrated network sites spread over diverged domains. Any-to-any network connectivity is 
guaranteed to be end-to-end encrypted, authenticated and globally scalable for all applications namely 
voice, video and data with both unicast as well as multicast traffic [50, 51, 63-65]. 
With the advent of secure group management technology, the arduous obstacle of complexity 
pertaining to manageable as well as scalable VPN solutions for an abundance of fully-meshed sites is 
not out of the question anymore. Secure group management is considered the ultimate solution which 
addresses transmission protection requirements but eliminates any need for point-to-point tunnels. 
Subsequently, this solution for site-to-site transmission protection is also deemed to provide a scalable 
and connectionless remedy which operates over current routing infrastructure namely IP, MPLS, 
ATM or Frame Relay and as such is not bounded to a particular core technology. Secure group 
management offers an IPsec security model [57, 59, 66, 67] in which the notion of "Trusted Group 
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Members (GM)" allows trusted routers, without considering any legacy point-to-point IPsec 
tunnelling relationships, to operate with the aid of the same security methodology. 
Besides, secure group management protects the original (source, destination) address pair in the 
encryption header suited for optimal routing purposes. By preserving the original address pair, this 
solution respects QoS as well as traffic engineering requirements. The merits of GET VPN outweigh 
MPLS VPN in the sense that unlike MPLS VPN, secure group management provides end-to-end 
encryption which is substantial for many applications including this work. 
Secure group management is widely considered an encryption technology for next-generation 
WAN which lets trusted Group Members (GM) take advantage of a common Security Association 
(SA) which is independent of any endpoint IPsec tunnelling relations. Whereas in traditional endpoint 
IPsec tunnels, the tunnel overlays routing with a new IP header as the original packet has left 
multicast replication inefficient (i.e. multicast replication is normally efficient meaning that "only 
replicate when the network splits" and "then send two copies in the two directions". Nevertheless, 
enhancing security with gateways and IPsec in tunnel mode with new IP header makes multicasting 
less efficient and like unicast), in secure group management, highly scalable instant and dynamic 
connectivity is provisioned with IP header preservation which operates over underlying routing 
infrastructure via a single key pair and SA shared for the entire group (traditionally it was O (N"2) for 
the number of individual SAs required for peer-to-peer IPsec tunnels). 
Secure group management architecture entails two major components namely Group 
Controller/Key Server (GCKS or KS) as well as Group Members (GM). For each group management 
domain, KS is required to provide admission control as well as authentication for GMs. Afterwards, 
transmission protection is achieved through the distribution of a group authentication key as Security 
Associations (SAs) supplied by KS for GMs so that member-to-member communications can be 
conducted in a safe and secure manner. In other words, the centralised key and policy distribution 
mechanism here allows KS to propagate keying materials as well as policies to already-authenticated 
GMs to fulfil their site-to-site transmission protection goal. Centralised key management architecture 
benefits from ease of maintenance as well as distribution for keying materials and policies [68]. 
Group Domain of Interpretation (GDOI) [69-71] provides a means of keying protocol for secure 
group management in which IPsec guarantees encryption/decryption services for data packets. In 
other words, secure group management lets routers encrypt multicast/unicast data packets removing 
legacy need to tunnels used to protect the traffic. GDOI functions amongst a set of group members 
and a set of group controllers/key servers. Internet Security Association and Key Management 
Protocol (ISAKMP) [12, 73] phase 1 Security Association (SA) ensures the invulnerability of GDOI 
(ISAKMP as well as IKEvl and v2 provide a secure key exchange mechanism for use with IPsec). 
Key Server is responsible for establishing SAs between group members which are authorised. Also, 
the key server maintains keying materials for each group along with associated policies. Policies in 
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addition to relevant keying materials are obtained from key servers by group members. To make this 
happen, initially a group member is required to register with a key server providing group ID to gain 
the SA required to speak to the group. The registration makes authentication as well as authorisation 
of group members feasible for key server. Group member is now able to download the IPsec policy 
and keys needed for encrypting/decrypting multicast data. Encrypted IP multicast packets with the aid 
of IPsec can be exchanged among members now. 
GDOI as a cryptographic protocol for key management is based on ISAKMP. While IKE ensures 
pair-wise security associations between various peers, GDOI utilising IKE phase 1 between each GM 
and KS ends up with a single and common SA amongst all GMs. Additional to pair-wise SAs with 
IKE phase 1, GDOI also "interprets" ISAKMP/IKE to come up with a single SA for group security 
domain. In other words, as the foundation of the secure group management solution, GDOI defines 
ISAKMP Domain of Interpretation (DOI). Utilising UDP port 848, GDOI messages are performing 
creation, deletion and maintenance of SAs established amongst authenticated and authorised GMs. KS 
rekeys the group before current keys ( downloaded at the time of registration by GMs) expiration. This 
means that to avoid expiration of keys, the key server is also asked to provide rekeying for the group 
by pushing the rekey message to group members. This message entails the new IPsec policy and keys 
to be used upon expiration of the previous keys. For an up-to-date version of keying materials, rekey 
message is supposed to be dispatched before the current SA expires. 
To summarise, secure group management integrates routing and cryptography together in the 
network. Trusted GMs are managed via GDOI standardised in RFC 3547 [1Q] and RFC 6407 [fil]. 
Traditionally, point-to-point tunnels between VPN gateways were utilised to carry authenticated as 
well as encrypted traffic from one site to another. With GDOI, the encryption/authentication task is 
separated from the transport task. The merit is that secure communication amongst various sites is 
performed without any tunnels in place amongst these branches. However, other mechanisms might 
be required to accomplish the transport task such as dynamic Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) 
111] tunnels or BGP extensions. 
3.4.1 GDOI Key Types for Group Security Association Management Protocol 
Secure group management works around IPsec [.51] whereby with the aid of GDOI GM-to-GM 
crypto is facilitated, eliminating the legacy need in advance negotiation from spoke-to-spoke. As 
discussed before, GDOI distributes cryptographic keys and policies amongst GMs. GDOI 
communication is protected via the IKE phase 1 between KS and GMs. GDOI details two new key 
concepts namely Key Encryption Key (KEK) as well as Traffic Encryption Key (TEK). KEK is 
utilised for securing the control plane while TEK ensures that the data plane is protected (KEK is also 
called group key, the group key encrypts keys which decrypt application data). Lifetime span is 
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associated with keys and therefore rekeying is required. GDOI distributes group keys which can be 
exploited by the entire group. 
KEK is a symmetric cipher key used to secure Push message. TEK is a symmetric cipher key for 
protecting data security protocol such as IPsec ESP. KS distributes both TEK and KEK to all GMs. 
GMs utilise TEK to protect communication with other GMs. GMs also exploit KEK to decrypt 
incoming rekey messages from KS. In other words, GMs under the same group communicate securely 
with each other using TEK, which corresponds to the single IPsec SA or group key shared between all 
members. On the other hand, KS encrypts rekey messages with KEK for GMs who use the same KEK 
to decrypt incoming messages [ 65]. 
The tunnel-less and secure communication for secure group management requires GMs firstly to 
dispatch a registration query to KS. With the aid of GDOI, KS performs authentication as well as 
authorisation for the given GM and sends back keying materials in addition to the IPsec policy needed 
for secure multicasting back to GM. Upon downloading IPsec policies and keys, GM is now 
registered with the IPsec SA for the group and can exchange multicast traffic securely with other GMs 
away from KS. This is due to the fact that TEK is exploited by all the GMs. Under the same group, 
KS can dispatch a rekey message to all GMs which entails new keying materials and IPsec policy 
when current IPsec SA becomes outdated. To make this happen, rekey messages are sent prior to the 
existing SA expiration time to keep the group key fresh. 
GDOI Register 
Messages from Gl\ls 
to KS and 
Subsequent 
Downloading of 
IPsec SA and Keys 
GDOI Rekey 
Messages Including 
New Policies and 
Keys 
Tunnel-less 
Encrypted 
Multicast/Unicast 
Communications 
KS 
GM 
Figure 3.2 GMs communicate with each other securely using TEK bypassing KS; TEK secures data plane (in the form 
of data security protocol such as IPsec ESP). Despite TEK, KEK secures control plane which protects GDOI Push messages. 
GDOI ISAKMP Phase 1 
Maintenance of secure group management's policies and control plane is centralised within KS. 
Upon registration by GMs, KS firstly authenticates and then pushes down crypto policies towards 
GMs including type of encryption protocol, SA, keying materials and interesting traffic. GM is 
ultimately responsible for encrypting/decrypting data traffic using the keys as well as policies 
downloaded earlier from KS at registration time. Scalability in addition to performance with regard to 
the number of tunnels as well as associated SAs amongst routers is no more of an issue since GMs all 
now have a common crypto policy and a shared SA called group SA for member-to-member secure 
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communications. TEK becomes IPsec SA by means of which GMs within the same group 
communicate; KEK is used by GMs to decrypt the rekey messages obtained from KS. 
Figure 3.2 summarises the conduits for distributing GDOI keys. Regardless of what the core 
network's technology is (WAN, MPLS, etc.), each GM initially exchanges a GDOI Register message 
with KS which leads to downloading the required keys and policies via bidirectional arrows. KS at 
some point in time before the current keys expire pushes the Rekey message which entails new 
policies as well as keys to the given GMs via unidirectional arrows. In this way, encrypted 
multicast/unicast conduits are established amongst all GMs to communicate without any tunnelling in 
place. Unlike traditional IPsec, secure group management can be deployed over all underlying 
networking infrastructure namely IP or private WAN, MPLS, ATM or Frame Relay since it preserves 
original source and destination IP addresses. This preservation lets secure group management trust the 
existing routing infrastructure and as such tackles successfully the legacy multicast replication issue in 
which one-to-many transmission is bound to local LAN solely. Entire communications between a KS 
and GMs are encrypted with IKE phase 1 and thus secured. With the advent of GDOI, traffic amongst 
GMs is protected by TEK; while in the course of refreshing a key, _KEK ensures the safety of rekeying 
between KS and GMs. 
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Figure 3.3 Negotiating IKE policy sets (i.e. IKE SAs) through GDOI IKE Phase 1 to establish the same IKE policy on 
both KS and GM(s). GDOI Pull & Push discussed before are GDOI IKE Phase 2 Protocol Messages that must be secured 
through GDOI IKE Phase 1. 
IKE' s main responsibility is defined here as establishing mutually agreeable SAs on end-points. 
IKE's phase 1 can occur either in main or aggressive modes. The main mode takes a longer time and 
requires an initial contact which is not needed with aggressive mode. Over UDP port number 500, the 
IKE session begins with initiator (i) dispatching proposals to responder (r). Accompanied by peer 
authentication at the very beginning, proposals include transform sets, IKE policy sets, 
hashing/encrypting/authenticating algorithms which are mutually determined and agreed upon at this 
stage. Both KS and GM must have the same ISAKMP policy (ISAKMP and IKE terms are utilised 
interchangeably here). Phase 1 ISAKMP policy is then accompanied by four GDOI messages being 
exchanged between GM and KS. Figure 3.3 illustrates the architecture for GDOI phase 1 IKE 
exchange. 
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To summarise, GDOI communications are immune to the aid of IKE Phase l SAs. For this, KS as 
well as GM must have the same IKE policy. IKE establishes mutually agreeable IKE SAs on 
endpoints. GDOI IPsec SA is not directly IKE SA but IKE SA can be converted to IPsec SA or GDOI 
SA finally. With IKE Phase 1, mutual authentication of KS & GMs is achieved as well. Pull and Push 
are GDOI ISAKMP Phase 2 protocols that must be secured by ISAKMP Phase l. 
3.4.2 Role of IPsec in GDOI ISAKMP Phase 1 
Using IKE different parameters within the IPsec framework are finally configured. We then 
explore IPsec IKE to later highlight the role of GDOI phase 2 message exchanges [75]. IKE as a 
hybrid protocol and ISAKMP are interchangeably used to refer to the same notion. While peers must 
have identical ISAKMP parameters known as IPsec policies to communicate securely, ISAKMP is 
not bound to a specific method for managing or sharing keys. Figure 3.4 illustrates the independency 
of the IPsec framework and as such diverged combinations of methods/algorithms available to be 
utilised. Think of five different building blocks (or bricks) of various types which can be chosen to 
build up the framework [76, 77]. 
!Psec Framework Options 
Protocol Type AH ESP-ESP+AH 
Confide nt iali ty Not Applicable DES (56 bits) - 3DES (3*56 bits) -AES (128,192,256 bits) 
-SEAL (160 bits) 
Integri ty MDS (128 bits) - SHA (160 bits) 
Authentication PSK- RSA- RSA-Encrypted-Nonce 
Diffie-Hellman Groups 
DH1 (Key Size of768 bits) - DH2 (1024 bits) - OHS (1536 bits) 
For Future Developments: DH14,DH15, DH16, DH19, DH20, DH24 
Figure 3.4 Identical ISAKMP Policy on Peers is required but this is not bound to any specific methods/algorithms. IPsec 
framework consists of five building blocks which are independent of particular implementation. 
With the aid of the Diffie-Hellman Key Agreement, even over an unsecured channel, two peers 
can come up with a shared secret key which is only known to them [78]. This will be discussed later. 
The derived shared secret key from this stage is then utilised by other encryption or hashing 
algorithms to perform crypto. DH key exchange variations called DH groups function in this manner: 
the longer the key size, the more secure the protection of IPsec keys in the course of negotiations. 
To achieve mutual authentication, either the Pre-Shared Key (PSK) is manually entered by peers 
or RSA signatures are utilised. While PSK is preferred if simplicity is required, it is not scalable. With 
RSA, digital signatures are exchanged to authenticate peers. Identity in addition to authentication key 
is hashed and afterwards encrypted using local private encryption key to form a digital signature. 
Digital signature plus digital certificate (which entails local public key used to decrypt digital 
signature) are then exchanged to a remote device. The remote device is then able to derive the hash by 
decryption and subsequently compare it against its own created hash (calculated independently from 
received hash) to verify whether or not they are equal. This process ensures that the local device is a 
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genuine peer for the remote one. Note that if the public key of endpoints is available on the other peer 
in advance before the second set of IKE phase 1 exchange, then RSA-encrypted nonces can also be 
employed to accomplish the mutual authentication. 
Hashed Message Authentication Code (HMAC) is derived from the shared-secret along with the 
message itself at each peer and then will be appended to make the other end sure that the data was not 
tampered with by any middle entity in transit. For confidentiality, all algorithms mentioned are 
symmetric cryptosystems which benefit from high performance encryption. 
Finally, the top building block namely IPsec Protocol choices include AH (Authentication 
Header) and ESP (Encapsulating Security Payload). With AH, a keyed message digest of the entire 
packet is derived by one-way hash algorithms and then appended as an AH header to the packet. All 
data is communicated in plaintext while AH ensures its authenticity and integrity. On the other hand, 
with 'ESP, encrypted payload is hashed which provides confidentiality in addition to authentication 
and integrity. ESP can also play a substantial role for the anti-replay attack mechanism whereby sent 
packets are kept track of by both peers using a sliding window and subsequently out-of-sequence 
packets as a symbol of replay attack are dismissed. 
~ ~ 
lnltlator Responder 
i~~ ...---------. \:~ 
. .,.. ---! 1 • IKE SAs Exchanges (IKE Policy Sets/Proposals) !- ---· -
Encryption 
Integrity 
Authentication 
D11 Group Variations 
Other Information (Cookies, Nonces, Key Life Time, etc.) 
Encryption 
Integrity 
Authentication 
DH Group Variations 
Other Information (Cookies, Nonces, Key Life Time, etc.) 
Figure 3.5 GDOI ISAKMP Phase 1 's first exchanges 
Both IPsec protocols can operate in two modes namely Transport and Tunnel mode. With 
transport mode, as the name suggests, only the transport layer of the OSI model and above are 
secured. Nonetheless, with tunnel, an original IP packet is encrypted and then inserted into a new IP 
packet (termed IP-in-IP encryption) and thereby is completely protected. Between hosts, Transport 
mode works well with Generic Routing Encapsulation since GRE adds its own IP. On the other hand, 
between host and gateway or two security gateways, Tunnel mode is likely to be utilised. 
Recall that peers negotiate security parameters through SA. Three sets of exchanges happen 
between peers in the course of IKE phase 1. In the first set, for negotiating IKE SAs as the basic 
security policy sets (i.e. hash, authentication, encryption algorithm along with DH group variation as 
well as life time of utilised keys are determined), let peers agree on methods to be used to secure IKE 
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communications later. The responder is supposed to look for the received proposal to find the best 
matching IKE SA in its own SADB (Security Association Database) and reflect it back to the initiator. 
Note that IKE SA is not equivalent to IPsec SA. However, IKE SA can ultimately be changed into 
IPsec SA or GDOI SA. In fact, creation of IPsec SA is performed at the end of IKE phase 2. Also, the 
term "key" is more generic since we can have different implications for it including authentication 
key, private/public encryption key, etc. 
3.4.2.1 GDOI ISAKMP Phase l's First Exchanges 
At very beginning, IKE SAs are forming the first set of exchanges between GM and KS. This 
includes proposals for accepted Encryption, Integrity, Authentication, DH Group methods/algorithms 
and finally entails other information fields as well. This information contributes to the creation of 
SKEYID which in turn devises SKEYID _a, SKEYID _d and SKEYID _e for endpoints. This 
information includes a nonce as well as a cookie from both initiator and responder. The way that 
SKEYID is calculated relies on the method employed for authentication. If a pre-shared key is 
chosen, then SKEYID is the result of a hashing function such as HMAC (key, 
Nonce1nitiator1NonceResponder) in which I indicates concatenation function. Other secrets can be derived 
from SKEYID (but not reversible due to one-way hash paradigm) including SKEYID_d for creating 
IPsec's keying data, SKEYID_a for integrity as well as data source authentication and finally 
SKEYID _e which encrypts IKE messages. GDOI ISAKMP Phase 1 first exchanges have been 
summarised in Figure 3 .5. 
3.4.2.2 GDOI ISAKMP Phase l's Second and Third Exchanges 
Pulnltl.ltor 
Pr1n1t1.1tor 
CM KS 
Initiator Responder 
''.'.' ...• ~ ..... •···· .. ·.... ~ .... ·.:•-.. · 
,., .. ~ ,--------------. 
-•-~---. ----·-· -! 1• IKE SAs Exchanges (IKE Policy Sets/Proposals) !-·--
... ,, .. -. •-·------·- ........ j 2- D11 Public Key Exchanges j .,,, ---- -.. ----- ... 
PU1nltlator: (GA (Pr1n1tl•torll mod p ~ 
E 
) 
Pun,.pondcr 
PrR ond-.-r 
DH's Devised Key= ((Pun.-pond,•r" Pr,0111, 10,) mod P) OIi's Devised Key: (Pu,.111.itor I\ Prn .. pondorl mod P) 
Figure 3.6 DH Public key exchanges as the second GDOI ISAKMP Phasel exchanges 
The second exchange consists of creating and negotiating DH' s public keys between peers to 
establish a shared secret key. DH's derived secret is used to encrypt all the further negotiations 
(before it used to be unencrypted). Lastly, through the third set of IKE phase 1 message exchanges, 
peers authenticate each other before the channel is deemed to be secure. The second exchange is 
displayed below. We assume that G is the primitive root of P and they have been already negotiated. 
Pu1nitiator is the public key calculated from Pu1nitiator = ((G " (Pr1nitiator)) mod P) in which Pr1nitiator is the 
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corresponding private key or just a random number. By the same token, PuResponder is the public key or 
value obtained from PuResponder = ((G /\ (PrRespondern mod P) in which PrResponder is the associated private 
key or a nonce. DH's derived secret key is then equal to ((PuResponder" Pr1nitiator) mod P) which is the 
same with ((Pu1nitiator" PrResponder) mod P). 
3.4.3 Anatomy of GDOI 
GDOI operates over UDP port 848 utilising ISAKMP/IKE. Nonetheless, unlike cookie with 
ISAKMP/IKE, the cookie pair in the GDOI ISAKMP header is determined by the KS. The cookie 
pair is supposed to differentiate the secure groups managed by a KS as well as to identify Rekey SA. 
GDOI uses the cookie fields as an SPI (Security Parameter Index) to fulfil these purposes. Anatomy 
of a GDOI header is illustrated below. In summary, a pair of cookies (Initiator, Responder) 
determined by KS are supposed to identify the Rekey SA and thereby differentiate the secure groups 
from each other. In the course of the GDOI Registration process, each group member also retrieves 
the multicast group address. Each member then registers with the multicast group, which is required 
in order to gain multicast rekeys. KS sends multicast Rekey to those GMs that have registered with 
the multicast group. Rekeys as we will explore later on can also be sent in unicast from KS to have 
more control over it. 
MAC IP UDP GDOI 
Header Header Header Header Data 
Initiator/Responder Cookies, Flags, Message IDs, etc. 
Figure 3.7 Unlike ISAKMP or IKE, the cookie pair in the GDOI header is completely determined by the KS. The 
cookie pair in the GDOI ISAKMP header identifies the Rekey SA to differentiate the secure groups managed by a KS. 
GDOI uses the cookie fields as an SPI. 
Four GDOI protocol unicast message exchanges for Registration that follows six ISAKMP Phase 
one message exchanges are transferred between GM and KS. The first six messages are for the 
protection of the other four messages to form ten GDOI message exchanges in total at the end. The 
last four messages are supposed to provide security policies in the form of IPsec SA as well as keys to 
the GM. In addition, in the course of the last four GDOI message exchanges, each GM also obtains a 
Multicast Group Address from KS to retrieve rekeys sent to the multicast address later on. This is 
where Multicast is the approach considered for the rekey dissemination as opposed to the unicast 
approach. GM is required to register with the multicast group. Subsequently, KS sends Multicast 
Rekey to those GMs that have registered with the multicast group afterwards. Figure 3.8 reveals the 
last four GDOI message exchanges. Note that the last four message exchanges are protected through 
the first 6 exchanges of ISAKMP Phase one. GDOI gains an advantage from the simplified key 
distribution mechanism whereby KS in a centralized manner authenticates GMs initially. This is 
considered client/server architecture in which for every GM there is a distinct IKE phase 1 SA 
established with KS directly. Nonetheless, under the same group, all the authenticated GMs share the 
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same unique IKE phase 2 SA amongst each other. The scalability issue is therefore eased since all 
GMs share a single IKE phase 2 SA. Unlike traditional VPN, with secure group management, the 
external IP header is the same as the original packet's IP header stored within an ESP header rather 
than those of VPN gateways. By sharing a common SA amongst GMs (also known as single group 
SA), GMs are able to encrypt/decrypt given traffic to/from other GMs in a tunnel-less fashion (no 
negotiation amongst GMs for point-to-point IPsec tunnels between them is needed). 
GM 
lnilla!Or 
I 2- DH Public Ke Exchanges I 
I 3- Mutual Authentication I 
14· GDOI Registration (Unica t) I 
Header, Hash, Group ID, Nonce,0111 • ..,, 
---~-~--- - - - -- - --- - -
Header, Hash, SA,~ NonceR~pondrr 
KS 
Res ponder 
Prorected 
8v IS,\K 1r 
Ph• e One 
Figure 3.8 Four GDOI protocol unicast message exchanges for Registration that follows six ISAKMP Phase one 
message exchanges for downloading security policy (IPsec SA) & Keys. If Rekey is sent in Multicast manner then each GM 
also obtains Multicast Group Address from KS and is then required to register with that group to retrieve Multicast Rekeys. 
GDOI lSAKMP Phase 2 
According to RFC 6407 [ 69], in the course of registration, GM and KS perform mutual 
authentication and authorisation. Upon construction of an encrypted as well as authenticated session 
between given GM and KS, KS dispatches current group policy and keying material over this conduit. 
KS also might rekey with GMs in an attempt to update current group policy. By ISAKMP phase 1, the 
mutual authentication of KS and GM is achieved. As a result, SAs are established over which 
ISAKMP Phase 2 exchange can be executed. GDOI adds two new ISAKMP Phase 2 exchanges 
namely GROUPKEY-PULL and GROUPKEY-PUSH in addition to new payload definitions to the 
standard ISAKMP protocol. With Pull protocol, GM contacts KS initially to retrieve group SA, 
representing group policies over the IKE Phase 1 encrypted and authenticated channel for secure 
group communications. On the other hand, KS initiates Push rekey protocol exchange dispatched to 
IP multicast address (if multicast approach is in place) to deliver group policy to authorised GMs 
only. This in turn might result in de-authorisation of some GMs in a way that they cannot participate 
in secure group communications anymore. New payload definitions with GDOI include KEK, TEK, 
Group Associated Policy, Sequence Number, etc. In other words, KS listens on port 848 for GDOI 
Pull exchanges and might dispatch Push exchanges over the same port. With the aid of Pull 
exchanges, TEK and KEK are downloaded under phase 1 SA' s protection. To avoid man-in-the-
middle-attack for a rogue GDOI entity interfering with trusted KS and trusted GM, both trusted ends 
might maintain an authorisation list to verify whether the phase 1 identity of the other end 1s as 
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expected. Figure 3.9 displays GDOI Phase 2 protocols while the multicast approach is in place for 
transmitting rekeys. This results in the protected communications of GM to GM at the end of the 
implementation through Data Security Payload such as IPsec ESP; for instance, the blue curvy arrow 
in the figure is the conduit for IPsec encrypted packet exchange from the GM on the left to the GM on 
the right ( or vice versa). 
Figure 3.9 Pull & Push are ISAKMP Phase 2 protocols that must be secured by ISAKMP Phase 1. With Pull, TEK & 
KEK are downloaded under ISAKMP Phase 1 SA Protection. KS pushes Rekey exchange also with multicast approach 
which might result in de-authorisation of some GMs. Ultimately, GM-to-GM communication is protected through IPsec. 
To summarise, recall that upon GDOI Registration, GM and KS perform mutual authentication 
and authorisation by ISAKMP Phase 1. Authenticated GMs share the same unique IKE phase 2 SA 
under the same group. GDOI adds two new ISAKMP Phase 2 Exchanges. Pull & Push are ISAKMP 
Phase 2 protocols that must be secured by ISAKMP Phase 1. With GROUPKEY-PULL, GM retrieves 
Group SA over encrypted and authenticated ISAKMP Phase 1. With Pull, TEK & KEK are 
downloaded under ISAKMP Phase 1 SA Protection as well. Nevertheless, GROUPKEY-PUSH lets 
KS push Rekey exchanges which, with multicast design, are dispatched to IP Multicast Address to 
authorised GMs only. This might result in De-Authorisation of some GMs however. 
3.5 Summary 
General network security and its necessities were overviewed in this chapter. IPsec & ISAKMP 
( or IKE) was discussed in short. IPsec will be pointed out in a few points in the course of this thesis: 
where it initially plays role of a BGP security remedy in Chapter 4; secondly, whereby it is part of our 
proposed architecture deployment in Chapter 5 & Chapter 6 and lastly, whereby its unseen 
characteristics will provide the key opportunity for SDN OpenFlow in Chapter 7 to integrate 
encrypted flows. Afterwards, GDOI, as an application layer cryptographic ( & secure) group 
key/policy management protocol was demonstrated which has use-case in Chapter 6 in the 
implementation phase. Next chapter steps beyond the essentials and analyses BGP and its security 
threats & countermeasures from the Byzantine robustness/failure viewpoint assisted with 4 
emulation/simulation case-studies. 
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4 Analysis of the State-of-the-art BGP Security 
Having considered related works including significant studies ~, 79-82], we classify the state-of-
the-art security concerns and solutions in BGP into 4 different categories. We then critically evaluate 
them from a Byzantine Robustness/Failure viewpoint [17-24]: crypto solutions which benefit from 
cryptographic techniques, oddity check remedies in which strange behaviour of the protocol raises the 
alarm for the attack, anomaly detection where violating from expectations triggers the alarm and 
finally, the comprehensive security architectures proposed so far. Lastly, we exclude some other 
proposals since their focus was merely on the path authentication (not origin authentication) and 
therefore are not in the scope of the current research. 
4.1 Crypto Solutions 
This section describes the cryptographic based solutions for securing BGP. 
4.1.1 IPsec for Securing BGP 
IPsec is considered a suite of protocols that offer security at the network layer. For BGP, in 
addition to TCP MD5 (4.1.2), IPsec is another available choice for securing the peering speakers~]. 
Especially, IPsec with Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) option in tunnel mode [59] will meet the 
main security requirements such as Confidentiality, Integrity and Authenticity [~. Nevertheless, in 
our minds, Integrity in the context of BGP security not only encompasses the correctness of NLRI in 
the course of transit, but also emphasises the veracity of the info with regard to Byzantine robustness. 
The question here is whether authentic NLRI is allowed to be distributed or not. While exploiting 
Digital Signature aids IPsec in assuring that the transmitted NLRI has not been tampered with, this 
protocol is still vulnerable to BGP prefix hijacking if the legitimate entity misbehaves. This work tries 
to address the issue of authenticity of the semantics of BGP payload and its crucial role in routing 
infrastructure with respect to security. 
For confidentiality, some researchers argue that business relationships can be deduced if an 
attacker manages to actively discover unencrypted routing updates. On the other hand, fundamentally 
the routing info is not in confidence and therefore should not be our concern. It is noteworthy that if 
crypto solution is proposed, as is the case with IPsec, cryptographic validation is also required 
resulting in placing a process burden on the BGP routers and consequently, this does open the door 
potentially for DoS attacks if the routing resources are saturated by an attacker. According to[~, by 
injecting 10000 routes, the average router CPU utilisation is increased by 7%. 
IPsec exploits Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol to dynamically negotiate the keys for long-
term sessions to address key management as the legacy problem of the symmetric cryptography [TI]. 
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Timestamps in addition to sequence numbers are employed by IPsec to provide anti-replay 
countermeasures (no such mechanisms are embedded in BGP) [.82). However, IPsec is not secure 
enough against DoS attacks. There is no standard profile for BGP over IPsec in practice yet. No 
precaution was considered in the course of IPsec development with regard to Byzantine robustness 
and the BGP routing system is still vulnerable to prefix hijacking. While IPsec is the dominant 
solution for secure peering, our proposal later on partially includes the use of IPsec between anchors 
of trust (discussed in chapter 5). To employ this, we might need a Generic Routing Encapsulation 
(GRE) protocol to construct tunnels amongst nodes and run it over IPsec (to force traffic to a specific 
location) IB§]. The most advanced industrial solution is to take advantage of the transport VPNs 
which are tunnel-less (discussed in 3.4). 
4.1.2 TCP Message Digest 5 (MDS) between BGP Peers 
In addition to IPsec, TCP MD5 is another method for securing the communication between BGP 
peers. MD5 was initially developed to provide Digital Signature solutions. Unlike IPsec, TCP MD5 
only utilises symmetric cryptography where a shared secret key is already known by BGP peers. 
Keyed digest of the header of TCP along with BGP info made up by MD5 is carried in TCP extension 
and transmitted to the peer. This method is also known as keyed Message Authentication Code 
(MAC) constructed by MD5 and ensures integrity ( due to hash mechanism) in addition to authenticity 
(due to key element) of the transmitted data [.8.1]. In this way, modification of the packet by an 
attacker sitting in the middle is impossible (man-in-the-middle attack). Use of TCP can also guarantee 
anti-replay protection with the aid of sequence numbers and timestamp. While the state of the art 
solution in BGP security is TCP MD5 MAC, the method suffers firstly from the key management 
issue due to employment of symmetric crypto and lack of the key identifier field in TCP next. Also, 
no encryption is supported by the method and therefore confidentiality is not fulfilled. Last but not 
least, the routing system is still vulnerable _to Byzantine failure employing TCP MD5 MAC (as will be 
shown later). 
Replacement of TCP MD5 with TCP Authentication Only (AO) will address some of the 
method's drawbacks and offer more protection for long-lived sessions of routing protocols like BGP. 
As rn.8_] suggests, if TCP is applied to BGP Keepalives, the connections whose keys are lost are 
discarded after a certain time. Nonetheless, the standard emphasises that TCP AO is intended to 
protect the TCP protocol itself rather than the data stream as proposals like SBGP/soBGP ( discussed 
in 4.4) do. Use of Sequence Number Extensions (SNE). expands the domain of TCP sequence 
numbers in a way that numbers are always unique in the course of a single connection. This 
substitution also fulfils the substantial requirement of modern cryptography in which keys must be 
updated from time to time and the security is reliant on the security of the key rather than the 
algorithm by allowing rekeying while the connection is up [.8.fil. The key rollover mechanism is 
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already addressed in IPsec utilising the Diffie-Hellman algorithm where two nodes can reach a shared 
key without having prior knowledge propagated amongst them. Other proposals also consider TCP 
MD5 between BGP speakers as a mechanism for fulfilling Integrity, including[~. 
4.1.3 Smith et al.'s Approach 
This approach firstly proposes the use of session keys exchanged upon the establishment of BGP 
adjacency between peers. This key will be utilised to encrypt BGP control messages (Symmetric 
Cryptography) to fulfil confidentiality. The proposal also asks for enforcing the ordering mechanism 
so that BGP messages will be numbered sequentially and stamped in a timely manner. This remedy 
requires the addition of a new BGP attribute called Predecessor where the last AS before the 
destination AS for the current route will be indicated (Predecessor is a tool for AS path validation). 
Finally, within the UPDATE message, the entire fixed field will be digitally signed by the peers. 
Digital signatures ensure that the BGP message has not been altered in transition and therefore 
guarantees the integrity [2Q]. The proposal firstly suffers from the key management issue due to the 
usage of the symmetric crypto solution and thus is not scalable to the Internet. More importantly, any 
BGP solution with the assumption of altering BGP itself is not considered promising in today's 
Internet due to BGP's massive install base. This requires all the ISPs and ASes to adopt and change 
their infrastructure which obviously has prohibitive costs. Note that this attitude makes out-of-band 
remedies like IRV more promising. We also argue that in comparison with IPsec, Smith et al. has not 
added any new levels of security while it demands for BGP alteration as a barrier as well. However, 
the idea of digitally signing fixed fields merely opens the door for the lighter crypto operations which 
is promising with regard to performance degradation imposed by heavy cryptographic structures [91]. 
4.1.4 DNS-based NLRI Origin AS Verification 
[.22] defines verification of route origination as validating whether the originating AS specified in 
BGP UPDATE is indeed authorised to announce the NLRI or not. While the receiver party can 
examine the AS-PATH list to verify authentic origin, the path itself can also be validated ensuring that 
the list has not been tampered with by any malicious entity in transit. ASes may artificially add their 
own AS numbers several times in an attempt to make the route less attractive for others [U]. This 
artificial inflation in the AS-PATH attribute is known as the AS prepending process. This brings 
another security requirement for BGP of whether the accumulated info in the AS-PATH is authentic 
or not. [93] suggests that through Looking Glass (LG) servers, which are web-based portals run by 
network operators to provide a look into the BGP routing tables of the ASes (allows running 
commands such as show ip bgp or traceroute summary from BGP routers that are under the control of 
the given LG server) in which the server resides, one can trace back misconfigured BGP route 
advertisements (likely malicious). 
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Employing DNS for securing BGP deals solely with origin validation. While the approach leaves 
BGP control plane intact, the data plane is required to be interconnected with an authoritative DNS 
system for authenticity confirmation of the NLRI origination. Upon receipt of an UPDATE, the local 
BGP router will issue a DNS query to ensure the veracity of the route. In this way, DNS acts like a 
distribution mechanism for origin information credentials in a similar manner to IRV [2±]. 
Each administrative space within the global DNS is considered as a DNS zone over which the 
authority is delegated to an organisation. "bgp.in-addr.arpa" is defined as the new DNS zone which 
contains DNS AS Resource Record (RR). AS-RR is responsible for binding prefixes to #AS along 
with the prefix length. This forms the cornerstone for responses to queries which will reveal the 
authorised origin for each prefix and its length. 
The security of the DNS itself is questionable since a secure DNS infrastructure is the additional 
requirement now [25_]. While any attempts towards securing BGP must first break the implicit trust 
relationships between speakers as the fundamental vulnerability in BGP security, the approach here, 
places the same implicit trust in DNS instead. However, use of DNSSEC was proposed later to ensure 
the authenticity of DNS responses with the aid of digital signatures [96]. DNS delegation hierarchy 
employs a tree-like structure to form a framework for address allocation. Digital signatures must be 
accurately aligned with the address allocation framework so they either have to be put in place in a 
hierarchical manner as DNSSEC suggests or exploit X.509 Certificates and their corresponding PKI. 
No matter which, as [21] reveals, crypto-based protection mechanisms such as DNSSEC will suffer 
from break-ins, implementation defects and human errors. 
Finally, the approach can be partially considered as the one that theoretically takes Byzantine 
robustness into account while unlike the origin validation (prefix-hijacking), AS-PATH verification is 
not addressed. DNS itself is limited in the sense that if the entire address block is fully delegated to a 
DNS sub-level, the prefix might be referenced to the parent DNS entity instead of the ultimate and 
indeed owner. These make the DNS use for authenticating BGP origins unfeasible in practice. 
4.1.5 Inter-domain Route Protocol (IDRP) 
Before the development of BGP for TCP-IP suite, OSI employed IDRP (International Standard 
ISO/IEC 10747 1st Edition: 1994, Intermediate System to Intermediate System Inter-Domain Routing 
Information Exchange Protocol), for routing amongst its domains. In this approach, authentic 
messages distributed between BGP speakers can be validated by means of transmitting an encrypted 
checksum as the security credential [80]. The robustness of the method can also be further enhanced if 
authenticated timestamps and #sequence are added to deal with replay attacks. A pair of speakers 
decides on the type of algorithm used for encryption of the checksum in advance. While the protocol 
is secure against masquerading attacks in which malicious parties try to impersonate other entities due 
to the secrecy of the key, the remedy is prone to Byzantine failure if the prefix is hijacked. However, 
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the main obstacle in the way of the deployment of IDRP is the huge install base of BGP as well as the 
diminishing tendency towards other layer three technologies apart from IP supported by OSI. BGP, as 
the most mature Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP) [2], with huge install base remains the sole inter-
domain routing protocol in extensive use Q]. We then claim that unlike BGP, IDRP had a level of 
security in mind from scratch but BGP has become the de facto protocol for inter-domain routing in 
practice and due to its massive installation currently, a descendant protocol is not feasible. However, 
attempts like IDRP being an alternative to PKI for BGP security are appreciated due to lack of such 
an infrastructure in today's Internet. 
4.1.6 Pretty Secure BGP (psBGP) 
psBGP rn2] combines the best feature from SBGP and soBGP discussed in 4.4 [2.fil. psBGP 
utilises a centralised trust model for path authentication as well as a decentralised trust model for 
prefix ownership using PALs (Prefix Assertion Lists). 
In comparison with SBGP, psBGP refuses centralised PKI required for address attestations due to 
the unmanageable nature of its address space (the same deficiency with IRR is discussed in 4.3.7). 
However, stability of the list of ASes facilitates PKI for path authentication. Path attestation in psBGP 
binds the public key of an AS to its #AS. The security credential is transmitted modifying UPDATE 
messages. psBGP for origin authentication employs a rating mechanism whereby each AS digitally 
signs not only its advertising prefix( es), but also those prefixes which its peers announce in a manner 
similar to soBGP. This assertion is called Prefix Assertion List (PAL). To authenticate an Origin, the 
consistency amongst PALs of peers around the advertising AS is compared. While the method might 
seem simple and secure, it fundamentally suffers from the false assumption that ASes will not collude 
with each other on the Internet (Collusion Attacks) [.2.1.]. We also agree with [U] in that like SBGP 
and soBGP, it is not feasible to deploy psBGP solution in reality since ASes might gain IP addresses 
from different ISPs in a hierarchical way. 
We propose adding the option of subset of ASes consistency-check for origin validation; the 
subset of one Tierl in addition to two Tier2 ASes or one Tier2 in addition to two Tier3 ASes, for 
instance, must attest to the veracity of the new route. In this way, we aim to reduce the possibility of 
collusion attacks. 
The remedy places implicit trust in aliens for origin validation while the BGP' s implicit trust issue 
is not addressed (Byzantine failure). To make the crypto validation lighter, psBGP can be tuned to 
validate a subset of the signatures instead of the full-path check. However, more secure psBGP by full 
path check demands increased complexity which is a prohibitive factor in inter-domain routing. Also, 
P ALs will contain peering relationships and their exposure to origin authentication links to business 
reluctance. To conclude, similar to [2..2.], the semantics of psBGP are still based on PKI and as such 
are computationally expensive. 
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4.1. 7 Enhancements for Efficiency 
We categorise a couple of efforts for improving the already proposed remedies under 
enhancement for more efficient security solutions. These solutions mainly mitigate the costs 
associated with the aforementioned crypto solutions. 
One proposal states that since address allocations are stable over time [62, .82), origin 
authentication is considered feasible with the aid of Merkle-hash tree. Leaves of the tree store #AS-to-
prefix bindings (data). Each parent keeps the hash of the data located at each leaf. To validate 
integrity of the data, a new hash is computed and compared against the parent's value. However, any 
change in the leaf results in changes from the leaf all the way to the root since the root value of the 
tree enables authentication of all leaf nodes. Next, symmetric crypto approaches like MAC or hash 
functions are considered to be 3 to 4 orders of magnitude faster than asymmetric crypto remedies. 
This does open the door for reducing overheads associated with remedies such as SBGP utilising 
more efficient cryptographic structures. After the origin authentication proposal above, Hu et al. [ 100] 
suggest later the use of MAC instead of recursive digital signatures for path validation (Secure Path 
Validation (SPV), does not deal with origin authentication). MAC is distributed through altered 
UPDATE between pairs consisting of the hash function along with the PSK applied on the fixed fields 
of UPDATE plus the path in addition to an initial authenticator. Successor ASes will perform the 
same operation while the received MAC plays the role of the authenticator. Validator AS using its 
PSK with preceding AS recursively authenticates all the MACs. However, the approach is still prone 
to Byzantine failure while it reduces the overhead associated with asymmetric crypto (digital 
signatures) to some extent. Having said that, similar to [99], SPV by Hu et al., while it seems efficient 
compared to other PKI-based solutions, is heavily dependent on pre-computation and state overhead 
meaning that each router keeps track of the one-way hash chain values and generates the values that 
need to be delivered to the next hop router. Another proposal explores the techniques for aggregating 
signatures with the aim of signature amortisation. The premise is that instead of signing each 
UPDATE, a group of UPDATEs waiting in the output buffer of the speaker can be signed in order to 
diminish the validation cost on the receiver as well as the generation cost on the sender side (rather 
than having k signatures fork UPDATEs). Nevertheless, the technique does not take into account the 
fact that the Minimum Route Advertisement Interval (MRAI) timer might be set to zero [.82). Recall 
that MRAI controls the BGP message rate injected into the network (two BGP UPDATEs must be 
separated by at least one MRAI) [ 10 l]. 
4.1.8 Summary of Crypto Solutions 
Table 1 demonstrates and critically evaluates all proposed crypto solutions so far. To conclude, 
similar to m], it is obvious that pure crypto-based solutions are not cost-efficient to defend against 
routing attacks and this prevents their deployment on the Internet today. 
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4.2 Oddity Check Solutions 
4.2.1 Generalised TTL Security Mechanism (GTSM) 
According to [103], GTSM's main objective is to protect a router's IP-based control plane from 
CPU-utilisation based attacks (i.e. against DoS). This remedy is considered more of a TCP protection 
solution. Time to Live (TTL) is one of the IP attributes whose value is decremented by one when a 
packet reaches a router (maximum 255). This mechanism is initially recognised for restricting the 
lifespan of an IP packet and stopping it from being propagated limitlessly. The idea here stems from 
the fact that most of the BGP peering sessions are between adjacent routers in practice. GTSM 
demands for artificial increase of TTL to 255 for BGP UPDA TEs so that if the malicious UPDATE 
by an attacker is coming from more than one hop away, it will include TTL valued less than 254 and 
therefore is detrimental. The main obvious advantage of the approach which makes it effective in part 
is its simplicity and low cost. However, this solution is not concerned with multi-hop BGP sessions in 
which two adjacent routers are sitting more than one hop away from each other. Also the security of 
the local AS is dependent on the security of its neighbour, since if the attacker can manage to 
compromise the neighbour, local AS can also be targeted subverting GTSM. A motivated attacker can 
penetrate the target using tunnelling attacks in which TTL has its maximum value and remains intact 
when the whole IP packet is encapsulated within another packet and enrouted to the neighbour BGP 
speaker sat one hop away. The method clearly does not aim to address Byzantine failure. 
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4.2.2 BGP Route Flap Damping 
From a security point of view, change in the BGP routing platform imposes processing and 
bandwidth burden on the whole routing system and therefore is undesirable. If an attacker manages to 
bombard a victim by DoS for instance, the effect will be further propagated to other BGP speakers as 
well. These speakers will then withdraw the routes learnt previously through the victim. The 
devastating effects regarding processing and bandwidth consumption would be doubled if the victim 
managed to come up again and re-advertise its routes. This kind of attack is categorised under 
Backhoe Attacks or Link Cutting Attacks where an adversary targets the stability of the whole BGP 
network rather than a single entity. To avoid this, route flap damping suggests that unstable BGP 
routes should be penalised so that a flapping route cannot be continually advertised and then 
withdrawn to others wasting their vital resources. UPDATEs between peers are exchanged no sooner 
than every 90 seconds. To fulfil this, the route will be blocked for a while (tuneable timeslot), 
although the physical path between source and destination prefix might still exist [104, 105]. 
Further studies on BGP route stability reveals the fact that although BGP aims at having BGP 
speaker configuration correlated to the traffic outcome ( one to one), a category of configuration may 
result in a different but stable forwarding state not intended initially [106, 107]. Figure 4.1 
demonstrates the idea and highlights how a flapping BGP route can result in unintended but stable 
forwarding state. AS4 has one route to AS2 as the primary route and another one to AS 1 as the 
backup. Through these routes, AS4 can announce its prefixes to the whole Internet. Note that AS2 is 
considered a provider to its customer AS4 and has a peering relationship with AS3. AS3 also is a 
provider for its customer, ASl, which is in tum a provider for AS4 customer ISP. ASl will use the 
route AS l-AS3-AS2-AS4 as its primary route for reaching AS4. If for any reason, such as a malicious 
attack, this route goes down AS l-AS4 will be utilised instead of the primary route. 
If the attacker manages to bring the AS2-AS4 route down, AS2 withdraws its already advertised 
prefixes of AS4 from AS3 which in tum does the same to remove AS4's routes from ASL This 
example emphasises the devastating consequences of attacks targeting BGP by highlighting how far 
the adverse effects will be propagated. The intended operation of using backup in the failure of the 
primary route will be fulfilled and AS4 will start exploiting the AS4-AS 1 link to retain its 
connectivity. 
If the AS2-AS4 link is brought up again, the intended outcome is to have the primary route in use 
again while the backup route turns back to its awaiting state. However, BGP' s policy routing premise 
is that routes announced by customers (who are paying), must be preferred over peer routes which we 
do not want to become transit ISP. To put it another way, AS3 is reluctant to retake the primary route 
re-announced by AS2 while the route announced by its customer, AS 1, is still in service. This 
situation is known when BGP is wedged. According to [108], the existence of the BGP wedgies is a 
sufficient condition for making a network unsafe under filtering. 
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Figure 4.1 Unintended forwarding state with route flap damping 
To overcome BGP wedgies, intervention by ISPs are required to bring the backup route down 
manually to force election of the primary route again. Let's not lose sight of the fact that a flapping 
route penalised by a route flap damping mechanism might have the same consequences no matter if 
this flapping stems from mis-configuration or malicious attack. 
Simulating with Cisco Infrastructure, the recent IOS has the built-in Route Flap Damping 
mechanism. A penalty of 1000 is assigned to a route for each flapping until it reaches 2000 when the 
route is considered historical or dampened and thus is not advertised/accepted anymore. The route is 
suppressed afterwards for a maximum of one hour (4*half-life). The reuse threshold is 750 below 
which the route transits from a dampened state. This is subject to no flapping anymore for the route 
after being stable for half of the half-life (7.5 minutes) after which the penalty decreases exponentially 
every 5 seconds. 
4.2.3 Summary of Oddity Check Solutions 
Table 2 demonstrates and critically evaluates all proposed oddity check solutions so far. 
Table 2 Summary of Oddity Check Solutions 
Remedy Fid::MS Pros Cons 
• Byzantine Failure 
• Only against Remote Attacks 
• Simplicity • More TCP Protection rather than BGP BGP Peers 
Discard if 
• Low Cost to Implement 
Protection are 
Yes TTL< 254 Not Covering Multi-hop BGP 
Adjacent 
• Partially Effective • Mostly 
• Not Covering Tunnelling Attacks 
• Short-Term Countermeasure 
• Stops Destabilising 
Consequence of Flapping 
• Byzantine Failure To Routes 
Dampen • Not Really BGP Security Solution Still in 
the • Simplicity Yes 
Flapping • No Support for Confidentiality, Service 
• Low Cost to Implement Route Integrity, Availability (CIA) 
• Partially Effective 
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4.3 Anomaly Detection Solutions 
This section describes anomaly detection solutions for securing BGP. 
4.3.1 Multi Origin AS Detection (MOAS) 
MOAS conflicts occur when either a prefix has been hijacked (therefore we have two different 
routing entries for the same prefix but with different originating ASes) or an AS is multi-homed and 
thus the prefix is reachable either way. The approach highlights invalid MOAS conflicts by attaching 
an authorised list of ASes with the right to advertise a given prefix with the aid of COMMUNITY 
attribute [109]. In this way, any violation from the authorised list in which another AS announces the 
prefix is considered prefix hijacking (to prevent a router from detecting the false announcement, an 
attacker must block all the potential paths through which the valid route can reach the router.) The 
method obviously suffers from Byzantine failure since optional and transitive COMMUNITY can be 
discarded causing no errors in the routing system; the UPDATE can even be maliciously altered with 
a bogus COMMUNITY attribute where it is in the attacker's interest to inject false routing info. 
More precisely, we can simplify the BGP decision making process discussed before into 8 distinct 
criteria to check namely: 
1. Highest Local Preference 
2. Lowest AS Path Length 
3. Lowest origin type 
4. Lowest MED 
5. eBGP-learned over iBGP-learned 
6. Lowest IGP cost to border router (i.e. hot-potato routing) 
7. If both paths are external, prefer the path that was received first (the oldest path) 
8. Lowest router ID (as tie-breaking criterion) 
then, according to [110], telecom operators were asked at what step in the aforementioned BGP 
decision process they would incorporate information about route validity. The result of this study 
shows that only 9% of the operators prioritise security first. This clearly indicates that ASes are 
underestimating BGP security and that is why Local Preference is still the predominant criterion for 
policy decision [110]. In other words, we cannot expect the operators themselves to care about MOAS 
conflicts or respect COMMUNITY. 
Another substantial implication of the remedy is that since routes to popular destinations such as 
top-level DNS servers are found to be stable, subversion of the appended authorised list can be easily 
noticed and flagged based on heuristics [97]. By the same token, the more static the route, the more 
robust the route is to prefix hijacking. However, as the word "Heuristics" implies, the indeterminate 
nature of address space may result in false positive cases and this challenge in our minds remains 
unsolved for all the security solutions for BGP. 
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4.3.2 Prefix Hijacking Alert System (PHAS) 
The philosophy behind the PHAS is that the best judge for validating a prefix is the owner entity 
and thus if the owner with the-right-to-advertise registers their NLRI into a registry, they can be 
notified in an out-of-band manner upon any diversions of the registered ownership as a prefix 
hijacking attempt. According to [ill], PHAS alerts whenever new origin AS within an UPDATE is 
announced against a previously observed set of origin ASes for the same prefix; a new more specific 
sub-prefix of an existing announced route is detected, and finally if a new last-hop AS (the AS which 
is one hop away from the origin AS) in an UPDATE for the same prefix is announced. The merit of 
the approach is that it allows for piecemeal deployment. This factor (incremental deployment) must be 
considered in any design towards securing BGP since there is no flag day for new protocol 
substituting BGP as mentioned due to its huge install base (similar discussion by Jennifer Rexford in 
[112]). By the same token, a secure design here must leave BGP' s specification unchanged. However, 
the PHAS server can exhibit Byzantine failure behaviour and thus acts as a single point of failure. The 
applied database must be cleansed in advance as well as fresh all the time. Also, the success of PHAS 
is directly dependant on the accuracy of the routing info registered by entities into IRRs. 
4.3.3 BGP Intrusion Detection 
This method aims at monitoring the ownership of the prefix over time (BGP routing paths are 
highly stable [ill]) and upon violation or unexpected change, raises the alarm. The criteria upon 
which the bogus origin advertisement can be detected are either abnormal aggregation or being in 
breach of historical behaviour regarding prefix to #AS bindings. The upside of the remedy is that it 
leaves the BGP intact. Also, the false positive rate according to the relevant study is 20 over 5 million 
UPDATEs per day which is interestingly low [80]. However, the assumption that the network's 
topological structure remains static is false. While the remedy is effective in detecting an intrusion, we 
argue that prevention of the attack meaning that the risk of hijacking becomes less and limited to only 
a small infected area is the future tendency of the field (absolute security is impossible though) and 
shapes partially our research work. This solution can make a contribution to providing Byzantine 
robustness. 
4.3.4 Defensive Filtering of Malicious BGP Advertisements 
The state of the art in BGP security solutions is defensive filtering of suspicious BGP 
announcements and attributes. The filtering is performed at both egress and ingress points of the AS 
according to the AS's routing policy. According to [114], BGP filtering is of immense importance for 
lessening BGP prefix hijacking as well as de-aggregation attacks' impact. 
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Bogons or Martians are defined as the BGP advertisements of addresses and ASes which have not 
been allocated so far and thus must not be seen in the routing table of the core routers. Packets with 
source address field of Bogons are likely to be the source of Distributed DoS attacks [115]. [116] 
specifies the 1Pv4 Bogons as private addresses, reserved addresses and finally addresses not allocated 
by IANA to any entity. Full-Bogons list on the other hand, not only covers the aforementioned 
address space, but contains also the space that has been assigned to Regional Internet Registries (RIR) 
by IANA (even though not further delegated to smaller ISPs). The substantial point here is that these 
lists change significantly over time and therefore it is the administrator's duty to ensure maintenance 
of an updated list (not a systematic approach). In addition to Bogons, Documented Special Use 
Addresses (DSUA) are also prevented from being propagated in BGP infrastructure (for example 
loopback addresses). This remedy can be further enhanced by filtering BGP advertisements that 
contain private AS numbers (part of our simulation as well) [ill]. If the route has been under the 
prepending process, the AS-PATH list is abnormally long. A filtering mechanism can check if this 
attribute has been artificially inflated and therefore discard the route. If an attacker exhibits Byzantine 
behaviour in a way that aims at de-aggregating the IP address space by announcing more specific 
routes towards destinations, correct filtering mechanism in service can compensate for that by 
blocking small blocks with more than a /24 prefix length. This will resolve the de-aggregation attack 
to some extent, and also decrease the size of the routing table and its storage requirement on the 
router. However, too aggressive filtering may cause unintentional outages for customers and thus has 
been faced with ISPs' reluctance for being taken into consideration. 
Figure 4.2 depicts the increase of the active BGP entries over time [118]. We argue that the 
Internet and the glue protocol, BGP, is now too large to imagine a Flag Day for a new secure inter-
domain routing protocol which has the security considerations in mind in the course of the design 
from scratch to operating globally. This huge install base is the main reason for rejection of adopting 
many security solutions for BGP proposed here, especially if the remedy requires any changes to the 
operation of the current protocol or asks for new infrastructure as the platform (business reluctance). 
More than 500000 BGP entries on the core routers in the backbone of the Internet after 2014 has 
significant implications on the performance and storage as well. After version 4, by employing CIDR 
(Class-less Inter-domain Routing), this rate has been slowed down. However, due to reasons such as 
multi-homing or load-balancing, there are still incentives for any AS to advertise small address blocks 
either for making its end-customer reachable or providi!).g connectivity for two upstream providers. 
This does open the door for de-aggregation by which more specific routes are advertised and 
accepted. That is the reason why filtering in service can on the one hand decrease the BGP table size, 
and also stop the announcement of more specific prefixes with malicious intentions on the other hand. 
[119] reveals that the most aggressive filtering policy leaves about 0.3% of the address space 
uncovered by any remaining prefix in the routing table. However, ISPs must reach a clear consensus 
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on how and where the filtering should be applied (future work). It is also ambiguous whether the 
filtered UPDATE should be discarded or utilised to route towards a less specific prefix that covers the 
filtered prefix IBQ]. The legitimate traffic engineering reasons, as mentioned above, require the 
allowance of specific prefix advertisement at least only to direct customers and providers. This is also 
emphasised by the fact that the most ASes in the Internet are stub-ASes with specific prefix allocated. 
Finally, the filtering mechanism in place only has insight into direct BGP adjacency and therefore is 
limited to peers as well as vulnerable to Byzantine failure (limited by Heuristics). We suggest that any 
promising remedy for securing BGP must take a look at the ASes global view-versus AS-wide view 
to be effective and to ensure the safety of the end-to-end IP communication. With AS-wide view, an 
invalid and possibly malicious route, originated several hops away, cannot be identified easily. 
Another crucial point here is that filtering with the aim of the amendment of the BGP COMMUNITY 
attribute can also be considered fruitful. If local AS wants to instruct the neighbour to treat an 
UPDATE as being of interest, the route can be tagged utilising the BGP COMMUNITY attribute. 
However, this is subject to an already existing agreement between ASes to respect the attribute 
otherwise the COMMUNITY can be stripped off . 
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Figure 4.2 Increase of the active BGP entries over time (the trend of the size of the BGP Forwarding Table (Forwarding 
Information Base - FIB) [llfil 
4.3.5 Pretty Good BGP (pgBGP) 
Similar to route flap damping, some countermeasures here exploit the stability of the BGP path to 
detect and mitigate the risk of the prefix hijacking. The premise behind pgBGP is that the originating 
AS of a prefix will not abruptly change over time and thus swift change indicates a probable hijack 
[J_Q]. The significant point here is that according to studies, hijacking attacks (as well as mis-
configuration events) continue for less than 24 hours before being handled. According to [ill] by 
Butler, a one-year study on BGP traffic on 40 globally distributed ASes proves that less than 0.06% of 
advertised prefixes were announced with more than 20 paths (2% for 10 paths) and therefore the BGP 
57 
Analysis of the State-of-the-art BGP Security 
path is naturally stable. pgBGP flags any violated route for this amount of time (24 hours) while the 
suspicious route is quarantined. This might result in DoS for a short period of time. However, the 
prefix hijacking risk becomes significantly low. 
As is the case with PHAS, effectiveness of the pgBGP also relies on the accuracy of the employed 
database. Detection of hijacking attempts requires pgBGP to have a cleansed vision of the peering 
relationships between ASes in advance which acts as much of a deterrent since businesses have their 
own incentives to obscure such sensitive information. However, pgBGP is considered a distributed 
security remedy for BGP which imposes little overhead to the routing system due to not employing 
any cryptographic approaches. This, in our minds, meets the future demand of BGP security as well as 
being welcomed by businesses to have a robust remedy with no or low crypto involvement for one 
thing, and the piecemeal deployment option for another. The topological structure of the Internet 
allows for successful security countermeasures to be implemented partially (our focus). For instance, 
pgBGP according to [120] is quite effective in practice if deployed by a very small number meaning 
that for most attack scenarios running pgBGP on only 125 (0.5%) of all ASes would suffice to protect 
the entire Internet from both invalid path and origin AS attacks. Finally, the approach is another 
attempt to provide Byzantine robustness partially for inter-domain routing infrastructure. 
4.3.6 Hu and Mao. Approach 
Unlike pgBGP, some proposals take advantage of real time monitoring and thus respond just in 
time to attacks. The Hu and Mao proposal emphasises the unique characterisation of different 
UPDATES to form a cornerstone for further comparisons. Any violation from the characteristics 
associated with an already advertised prefix raises the alarm. A set of probes are sent to the 
originating ASes and collected in return to be consulted against the received UPDATE' s 
characteristics. Each prefix advertised by a network is expected to be associated with a particular OS 
running on the underlying remote routers, unique IP Identifier Field and finally comparable ICMP 
timestamps. These factors can be utilised to fingerprint various prefixes in a unique manner 
accordingly. Note that while assembling different fragments of an IP datagram is feasible with the aid 
of a unique identifier (the same value for all fragments of an IP datagram), the IP protocol does not 
specify the algorithm for the assignment and thus different algorithms can be utilised in theory [121]. 
The remedy suffers from the fact that in a secure design probing is blocked with the aid of the 
boundary routers. As [121] implies, one challenge here is to select probe locations in a way that probe 
traffic reaches different origin ASes. Also, the process of sending/receiving probes to/from originating 
ASes requires a level of synchronisation with UPDATES to avoid inconsistency stemming from the 
late responses of probes. While the proposal aims at providing a level of Byzantine robustness, its 
feasibility is simply controversial (feasibility of probing). It is important that proper use of cache in 
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some approaches, including this remedy, may result in a significant increase m performance, 
especially if the method is operating in a real time environment. 
4.3. 7 Internet Routing Registries (IRRs) 
According to [122], the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) assigns blocks to the 
Regional Internet Registries (RIRs), which then assign the blocks to local Internet registries, national 
Internet registries, and ultimately to the end users. Figure 4.3 demonstrates the hierarchy by which IP 
address blocks as well as AS numbers are delegated. The root is Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) linked to RIRs operating in different geographical areas. RIR like 
Reseaux IP Europeens (French for "European IP Networks" - RIPE) in turn allocates IPs and #ASes 
to Local Internet Registries and the delegation reaches further by LIR to small ASes. RIRs have 
evolved over time to encompass basic routing information represented by Routing Policy 
Specification Language (RPSL) in addition to serving as an address repository. Utilising various 
object classes was first introduced by the RIPE-181 standard according to [123]. Each instance of the 
class (objects) includes some mandatory attributes which may have security implications. The most 
prevalent type of object within the routing registry is "route" object which contains a CIDR prefix 
accompanied by its origin AS ("prefix" and "origin" attributes) . These objects are exploited to feed 
the filters provided that ISPs are willing to register their routing information. For multi-homing 
reasons, a prefix may be associated with several "route" objects of different origin. Adoption of [124] 
is proposed for IPv6 Routing Policy Specification Language Next Generation RPSLng. Also, [ 125] 
suggests the transition from 16 bit AS numbers to 32 bits as support for BGP. 
Figure 4.3 Interaction between IANA/ICANN and IRRs 
IRR employing RPSL constructs a shared repository for ASes to mirror queries regarding the true 
owner of the prefix. This querying mechanism occurs by means of either a web-server or through 
whois protocol operating on TCP:43. For whois protocol, amongst different flag options, -k flag will 
provide us with the primary key of the IRR route object database which is the prefix and its legitimate 
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origin AS. ASes may filter their customer announcements to prevent route hijacking attacks based on 
the contents of the IRRs. 
We argue that while ICANN finally assigns IP to a customer, the customer needs to be willing to 
register the correct routing info to IRR to add security to BGP. However, ASes are reluctant to share 
their routing policies since they consider them in confidence for one thing (the assumption of 
representing the same configurations by ASes as their RPSL to registries is wrong basically), and also 
the final owner of the prefix is not always clear (for example businesses fall into bankruptcy or 
different organisations merge). Also, according to [110], only 9% of the operators care about route 
validity information in the presence of other BGP attributes. Any attempts towards securing BGP with 
regard to prefix hijacking must take cleansing IP address space into consideration (requires a 
systematic and global approach). 
To evaluate IRR, the security of the registry itself is questionable. The devastating effects of a 
malicious entity (Byzantine failure) make IRR the single point of failure while ASes as mentioned 
earlier are reluctant to share their routing policies with registries. After that, stale routing information 
over time can endanger the safety of the relying parties especially if there is not enough incentive for 
ASes to cleanse and update their registered info. 
As [Q] reveals, in reality, IRR info is not cleansed or well-maintained currently. This is due to the 
fact that ASes are reluctant to share their business relationships and policies. The latter also emphasise 
that sensitive information of the IRR is not protected and no authorisation mechanism for the database 
queries exists currently. The study concludes that the security of the IRR has not been well studied so 
far. Having IRR in service, the fundamental security problem in BGP that is its implicit trust 
relationship between entities remains untouched while a level of trust must further be put on the 
registry as well. The future direction of IRR emphasises the use of Resource Public Key Infrastructure 
(RPKI) as the glue between collected information by IRR regarding prefix ownership as well as 
connectivity at AS-level (routing policy is not our concern here) and RIR as trusted roots to mitigate 
hijacking attacks. RPKI similar to [126] facilitates the secure distribution of authentic Route Origin 
Attestations (ROAs) along with attested adjacency relationships. Authoritative registries (still an 
active field of research) store public keys for #AS and prefixes of different ISPs and employ PKI as 
the infrastructure to propagate this information. 
4.3.8 Summary of Anomaly Detection Solutions 
Table 3 demonstrates and critically evaluates all proposed anomaly detection solutions so far. In 
summary, similar to [.Ll.], most of the solutions of this category raise false positives and require 
network operators to take action in order to block detected anomalous routes underestimating the fact 
that operators on their own do not care much about route validity [ 11 0]. 
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Table 3 Summary of Anomaly Detection Solutions 
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4.4 Security Architecture Solutions 
4.4.1 Secure BGP (SBGP) 
The most comprehensive security architecture for BGP is SBGP. SBGP works by digitally signing 
and validating all the path attributes while PKI is providing an infrastructure for distribution of 
corresponding public key certificates. The authentication of address delegation is performed by PKI 
hierarchy rooted to !CANN. Certificate is the means of binding the public key of an ISP to its #AS 
and the prefix. All the NLRis are signed by the AS's private key and can be validated on the receiver 
party with the public key indicated in the certificate. 
Asserting the authentic prefix owner and valid routes occurs by employing address and route 
attestations. Address attestation is a digitally signed statement which states the right to originate a 
prefix for the indeed owner by validating the delegation hierarchy traceable to !CANN and from there 
to the originating AS. The distribution conduit for address attestations in SBGP is out-of-band. Each 
AS along the way also signs previous route attestation containing the path vectors (BGP attributes) in 
a nested manner after performing validation and before propagating the UPDATE further to the 
neighbour. In this way, an onion-form attestation of previous signatures made by all the traversed 
ASes will be created at the end. This provides SBGP with full origin and path authentication to 
destinations [127]. However, in-band distribution conduit for SBGP route attestation requires BGP 
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alteration to modify UPDATE for attestation carriage (acts as barrier [@]). As discussed earlier, 
altering BGP or adopting PKI is not an option for today's Internet due to its huge install base. 
Validation starts by ensuring the originating AS listed in AS-PATH is the true owner of the prefix. 
Then the current AS verifies if the last AS in AS-PATH is authorised by its previous AS to announce 
the route (nested) and this validation terminates when the current AS ensures that no (malicious) 
intermediary has been added or deleted in the AS-PATH. Note that each certificate has an expiry date 
so maintenance of up-to-date CRLs (Certificate Revocation Lists) is crucial. 
The first arduous obstacle in SBPG adoption is its costly validation [.Ll]. The overhead 
(processing and storage) added by adopting SBGP is estimated to be the one that can be handled by a 
desktop PC. This implies longer convergence time for the routing system (some papers argue that 
SBGP almost doubles the convergence). The onion-style route attestations at the end require a 
massive storage area on the routing infrastructure [128]. This is considered another prohibitive cost 
for ISPs in undertaking SBGP. The remedy is immune against Byzantine failure due to the out-of-
band conduit for address attestation validations. 
We argue that core routers in today's Internet are suffering from the huge increase in the number 
of BGP entries and therefore bearing extra burden for validating cryptographic route and address 
attestations is not feasible. Finally, the design by Kent and Lynn initially asks for the use of IPsec 
with ESP but null encryption between SBGP speakers (ESP with Null-mode for SBGP does not 
provide confidentiality). However, this design is vulnerable to passive wiretapping with the aim of 
inferring business relationships (although the active attacks have been addressed). 
4.4.2 Secure Origin BGP (soBGP) 
As a response to some of the major issues that have been raised with the SBGP [~, the second 
security architecture, soBGP, introduces three different certificates: EntityCert, AuthCert and 
PolicyCert l]_Q]. The first certificate propagates the public key bound to #AS for various ASes. The 
third party is required to act as a well-known verifier such as Verisign.(to issue certificates). AuthCert 
certificate contains the binding of the #AS to the prefix. Finally, each AS will sign a list of the ASes 
peered with itself by means of its private key and distributes it via PolicyCert certificate (self-signed 
certificate). If ASl lists AS2 and AS3 as its AS-peering and AS2 and AS3 do the same, the peering is 
considered valid and verified by others. In this way, soBGP constructs a topology map with AS-level 
connectivity clarified to validate whether an UPDATE is feasible between any given pairs or not (if 
such a path does not exist). 
soBGP router's view of the topology is assembled prior to establishing BGP adjacency via 
PolicyCert propagation. For security credentials pertaining to PolicyCert to be distributed, the 
protocol requires a new message type called SECURITY (regardless of the barriers for BGP 
alteration). Similar to SBGP, soBGP requires PKI in a hierarchical manner for validating AuthCert 
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and EntityCert certificates (a valid public key of the AS is required for PolicyCert validation). 
However, unlike SBGP ( dynamic distribution of route attestation within each UPDATE), the final 
database here contains the static view of the topology merely meaning that soBGP does not use 
cryptographic mechanisms to secure the authenticity of the entire AS-PATH [129]. While soBGP 
discards any path within UPDATEs which violates this static view, the protocol does not consider the 
changing nature of the inter-domain routing due to reasons such as traffic engineering. 
The remedy first suffers from Byzantine failure if a malicious soBGP router manages to initially 
feed invalid paths. The required hierarchical PKI for validation of certificates does not exist while 
PKI itself faces serious adoption difficulties [130]. Due to static view of the network in soBGP, it is 
vital to keep a consistent view all the time over the topology database (SBGP benefits from real-time 
view). However, soBGP does not address the required synchronisation when issuing new PolicyCert 
demands for all other soBGP routers to be synchronised. The certificates introduced by soBGP are not 
compliant with IETF standards for certificates. Lastly, ISPs are reluctant to share their routing policies 
and this has been ignored by the soBGP proposal. While real-time view outweighs static view of 
soBGP due to the changing nature of the network, the construction and authentication of the long-
term topology view before establishing BGP sessions decreases the run-time processing overhead 
pertaining to signature validations. Another advantage of soBGP architecture is its tuneable options 
for deployment. New routes can be verified before installing them in the routing table, firstly 
installing them and then performing authentication ( called Optimistic Routing), or avoiding validating 
them. These options give soBGP ease of deployment on one hand, and let the operators chose 
between a more secure and more flexible inter-domain routing system on the other. 
4.4.3 Inter-domain Route Validator (IRV) 
IRV is the first attempt at more decentralised security architecture for BGP. Each AS is associated 
with an IRV server. This originating AS's server is going to be queried upon receipt of an UPDATE 
to validate the correctness of the received info. Authoritative responses by IRV provides authentic 
origin and AS path information. This server might in turn require querying a bunch of relevant IRV 
servers for enhanced verification. The substantial difference here is that unlike SBGP and soBGP, 
IRV does not demand BGP alteration and is operating independent of the routing system (invalid 
prefix origination and AS-PATH is detected by discovering inconsistencies among responses from 
other servers 1]2]). We argue that due to arduous functionalities performed currently by BGP, future 
BGP security remedy gives an insight into the higher levels of the TCP-IP protocol suite; and to avoid 
single point of failure, decentralised solutions are gaining much appreciation. Unlike routing 
registries, IRV leaves the full authority over the NLRI to ASes themselves. This is beneficial since 
ASes are the best choice for keeping their routing information up-to-date and accurate. If each AS in 
transit agrees that the UPDATE has been received from the predecessor AS and sent to the successor 
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AS on one hand, and the origin AS confirms that it is the owner of the prefix, the UPDATE 1s 
considered authentic. In this way, IRV enhances IRR using DNS style linked lookups in a 
query/response framework [1 31]. 
Above all, IRV cannot detect a forged AS attack [122]. The solution clearly suffers from 
misbehaving IRV server (Byzantine failure). While IRV eliminates storage costs and performance 
overheads associated with SBGP and soBGP architectures, the structure of IRV is ambiguous with 
regard to the protocol's discovery, query redirection and query/response validation mechanism (it 
unclearly specifies how an IRV response is validated as [98] points out). To put it another way, it is 
not specified how IRV recovers from outages. IRV's underlying BGP network is required to be 
functioning properly to be utilised by the remedy for contacting servers. To tackle the potential DoS 
threat of IRV servers, optimistic routing can be employed in which validation occurs after immediate 
installation of UPDATEs. Also, implicit trust relationship as the main issue with BGP here is moved 
towards implicit trust in the IRV server and thus is not addressed. 
IRV tries to add a routing access control mechanism to BGP's control plane. Unlike other 
architectures, IRV keeps policy as well as peering information in ASes' confidence which is of 
interest to them as well (local policy is respected). Another merit of uptaking the remedy is that BGP 
itself remains intact. IRV's validation process benefits from discretionary options for deployment 
such as each AS along the transit path has to be queried or merely a subset of ASes is enough. This 
does open the door for ASes to place the premium on either security or traffic engineering. However, 
the assumption that ASes will not collude with each other in the Byzantine robustness concept is not 
considered correct for all the time if one thinks of querying a subset of ASes only (while undoubtedly 
the risk is mitigated). This thesis is also addressing ambiguities concerning IRV's architecture and its 
feasibility with regard to the heavy BGP install base later on in the implementation phase. 
4.4.4 Summary of Security Architectures 
Table 4 demonstrates and critically evaluates all proposed security architectures so far. 
Table 4 Summary of Security Architectures 
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4.5 Summary of the state-of-the-art BGP security issues and solutions 
Our first contribution here is to investigate the state-of-the-art security concerns and remedies for 
BGP to determine which of them are robust enough against Byzantine failure behaviour. We 
classified security solutions in BGP into four different categories followed by a critical evaluation of 
them. 
With regard to Table 1, it summarises our analysis about crypto solutions for BGP security from a 
Byzantine robustness point of view. Note that for each table, the first column reveals the premise 
behind each remedy along with its pros and cons. This is accompanied by showing whether the 
solution is robust from a Byzantine view or not. IPsec protocol sui te will meet the main security 
requirements which are the traditional CIA. However, similar to TCP MD5 , no mechanism is 
embedded to prevent peers from exhibiting Byzantine behaviour. Employing DNS for securing BGP 
deals with the origin validation merely and ignores path validation. Nonetheless, this is deemed as one 
of the few proposals so far which considers Byzantine immunity partially while ignores poisoned 
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DNS. For IDRP, while the protocol is secure against masquerading attacks in which malicious parties 
try to impersonate other entities due to the secrecy of the key, the remedy is prone to Byzantine failure 
if a legitimate entity hijacks a prefix. For psBGP, to authenticate an origin, the consistency amongst 
P ALs of peers around the advertising AS is compared. Nevertheless, the proposal ignores the fact that 
ASes may collude with each other on the Internet today and thus overlooks Byzantine robustness. 
Table 2 concludes the summarisation of our findings for those solutions which take any simple 
changes and strange behaviour as a symptom of attack against BGP under oddity check category. 
Neither GTSM nor Route Flap Damping considers Byzantine attacks based on our analysis. The idea 
for GTSM stems from the fact that most of the BGP peering sessions are between adjacent routers in 
practice. Route flap damping suggests that unstable BGP routes should be penalized so that a flapping 
route cannot be continually advertised and then withdrawn to other routers wasting their vital 
resources. 
Table 3 reveals the summarised anomaly detection remedies for BGP security. MOAS is not 
immune against Byzantine failure if a poisoned list is intentionally attached. Analysing Internet 
Routing Registries (IRRs ), we should not lose sight of the fact that any network design with one 
control entity as the root for security purposes forms a single point of failure theoretically and thus is 
vulnerable to Byzantine failure. Nonetheless, IRRs brought us to the fact that BGP prefix hijacking 
cannot be prevented without a globally shared view (versus AS-wide inconsistent views) of up-to-date 
address ownership. Defensive filtering in place only has insight into direct BGP adjacency and 
therefore is limited to adjacent peers and subsequently is vulnerable to Byzantine failure (optional and 
limited by heuristics). In addition, defensive filtering on its own is more a prevention mechanism than 
detection mechanism. Later on, we show how through our proposed architecture, filtering can 
compensate for BGP prefix hijacking by reacting to such an attack. On the other hand, detection of 
hijacking attempts for pgBGP require us to have a cleansed vision of the peering relationships 
between ASes in advance which acts as a deterrent since businesses have their own incentives to 
obscure such sensitive information. But the database can contribute to Byzantine robustness to some 
extent. 
Finally, SBGP as the most comprehensive remedy so far, fulfils Byzantine robustness with 
authenticating address delegation through PKI hierarchy rooted to Internet Corporation for Assigned 
Names and Numbers (ICANN) which is the ultimate entity responsible for address delegations. In 
fact, ICANN provides the shared global view of address space ownership introduced earlier as one of 
the major requirements needed to overcome BGP prefix hijacking attempts. However, the required 
PKI does not exist for the Internet today. We argue that the Internet and the glue protocol, BGP, is 
now too large to imagine a Flag Day for a new secure inter-domain routing protocol like SBGP which 
has security considerations in mind in the course of the design from scratch to operating globally. This 
huge install base is the main reason for rejection of adopting many security solutions for BGP 
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proposed here, especially if the remedy requires any alterations/modifications to the operation of the 
current protocol or asks for new infrastructure such as PKI (business reluctance). Similar to SBGP, 
soBGP utilises the database with a global view. Nonetheless, unlike SBGP, soBGP does not provide 
Byzantine robustness since this global view is assembled individually by each soBGP router receiving 
various policy certificate claims from other routers. The remedy consequently suffers from Byzantine 
failure if a malicious soBGP router manages to initially feed invalid paths into the system. For IRV, 
the solution clearly suffers from misbehaving IRV server (Byzantine failure) that must validate its 
own origin; while IRV eliminates storage costs and performance overheads associated with others (i.e. 
SBGP and soBGP). 
4.6 Initial Emulation/Simulation Results 
This section details four case studies emulated/simulated to practically analyse BGP and its 
current Byzantine failure behaviour. 
4.6.1 Introduction to the Upcoming Implementations 
Aiming at constructing a benchmark for evaluating our proposed method in inter-domain routing 
security with BGP later, we simulate the state-of-the-art security issues and solutions discussed in the 
previous sections. This is to firstly explore the characteristics of BGP along with evaluating how 
vulnerable the protocol is in practice, as well as to highlight the gap in the current trend of the 
research area towards which future research attempts will be dedicated. 
Four different initial case studies have been emulated/simulated at this stage considering ~, 75, 
77, 132-137] as the major practical studies (topologies as well as addressing schemes are sometimes 
borrowed). The goal of case study A is to simulate BGP with Default Routing and Exploiting the AS-
Path Attribute. Later on, case study B will examine interactions between IBGP and EBGP sessions, 
Route Reflectors and Route Filters. In case study C, OPNET simulator was utilised to study the 
impact of the DoS attack on BGP convergence time. More importantly, case study D, will exploit the 
implicit trust relationship between BGP peers in order to penetrate inter-domain routing infrastructure 
with regard to Byzantine failure. This is the most relevant practical study for the research work at the 
early stage. 
4.6.2 Emulation/Simulation Tools 
We decided to utilise the real routing infrastructure, in which Cisco has the dominant 
technologies, through Graphical Network Simulator version 3 - GNS3 [138] emulator to highlight the 
deficiency in the industry with the huge install base of BGP today. We also u(ilised Wireshark as the 
de-facto and open source packet/network analyser [139, 140]. Empowered features of Wireshark 
include deep inspection of different protocols, powerful and standard packet browser, rich analytical 
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tools, live capture and offline analysis, multi-platform, user-friendly GUI for analysis purposes and 
finally rich VoIP tools. 
Figure 4.4 GNS3 emulation environment screenshot 
GNS3 has been utilised for the simulation work at this stage. GNS3 involves Dynamips, the core 
program that facilitates the Cisco IOS emulation. GNS3 application is an open source software which 
is free as well as platform independent and therefore available to be used for various types of 
operating systems including Windows, MacOS, Linux [139]. While Dynagen is the text-based front-
end for Dynamips, GNS3 provides the emulation with graphical front-end. The merit here is that 
GNS3 bridges between simulated work and the real work environment, performing emulation under 
the exact conditions of the production environment rather than mere simulation. GNS3 utilises a real 
IOS, intemetworking operating system, which is a software program for routing, switching, 
intemetworking and telecommunicating of real network elements such as routers and switches [141 ]. 
GNS3 allows for emulation of different platforms and technologies including Cisco, Juniper, ATM, 
Frame Relay, etc. Besides, GSN3 emulates complex network scenarios [142]. However, the emulator 
is highly memory intensive and therefore prone to systematic crashing. 
Emulating BGP vulnerabilities on GNS3 will clearly highlight the significance of the security gap 
found in today's routing infrastructure employed by various ISPs. Figure 4.4 is the screenshot which 
demonstrates the environment of the simulator and the code panels corresponding to three routers 
shown. 
Additionally, we use OPNET, the de-facto network simulator to provide further analysis required 
for the proposed method later on. Riverbed OPNET Modeller suite is providing the largest, most 
comprehensive library of open source, discrete event simulation models for the industry today [143]. 
The routing protocols and technologies provided by OPNET are partially listed below. This is 
followed by the partial list of Vendor technologies supported in the open source simulator. 
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OSPFv3 
PNNI II (for ATM Networks) 
RIP 
RIPng 
Static Routes 
3Com Coyote Point Motorola 
Alcatel-Lucent Extreme NEC 
Avici F5 Nortel 
Brocade FORE (now part of Ericsson) Radware (including Alteon) 
· Cabletron (now part of Siemens) HP Any custom model using Device 
Cisco Juniper Creator 
Figure 4.5 Supported Routing Technologies with OPNET along with Vendor Technologies Supported in OPNET 
For the interoperability of the results gained from the GNS3 emulation with OPNET simulator, 
note that as we can see below, the Cisco infrastructure employed so far for exploring BGP through the 
GNS3 emulator is also supported by OPNET. Figure 4.6 illustrates the Cisco CLI provided in OPNET 
in which a Cisco router from the 3600 platform is configured to implement a BGP instance for AS 1. 
All the code scripted for the case studies with GNS3 can therefore be imported here to be simulated 
via OPNET as well. 
C#PflMW+ 11 of., ·l@§§bffirifj• 
node_O(config)#router bgp l ~ 
node_O (config-router) # 
aggregate-address Configure BGP aggregate entries 
auto-summary Enable automatic network number summarization 
bgp BGP specific commands 
default-information Control distribution of default information 
distance Define an administrative distance 
distribute-list Filter networks in routing updates 
exit Exit from routing protocol configuration mode 
maximum-paths Forward packets over multiple paths 
neighbor Specify a neighbor router 
network Specify a network to announce via BGP 
no Negate a command or set its defaults 
redistribute Redistribute information from another routing protocol 
~~~nization m!~~ ~~~i:~n~~:~zation J 
nnr1A Ofr:nnfia-ront.Arl#I ~· ,, ,. '..:.f w~ ~ 
~~ ~_ti:Ll 
Figure 4.6 Interoperability of emulation results by GNS3 with simulation ones by OPNET 
4.6.3 Case Study A: BGP with Default Routing and Exploiting the AS-Path 
Attribute 
Objectives of case study A are listed below. The emulation results and code are presented in 
Appendix A in detail. 
1. Implementing Default BGP Routing for Customer (AS200) to Providers (AS 100 and AS300) 
Multi-homed Scenario 
2. Verifying Correct BGP Implementation on the Scenario 
3. Simulating Reconnaissance Attack as well as Access Attack (Passive Man-in-the-Middle) and 
Analysing the Results 
4. Constructing Route Filters (Distribute Lists to Control UPDATEs) as an Attempt for the-
state-of-the-art Solution for BGP Security (Defensive Filtering) 
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5. Providing Redundancy for ASes with the Aid of: 
a. Floating Static Route with Tuneable Administrative Distance 
b. Default-Network Configuration for Legacy Classful Routing Protocols 
c. Default Route Injection through BGP version 4 
6. Filtering Private AS Numbers from Being Announced to the Global Internet with the Aid of 
Filter-List 
7. Simulating Byzantine Failure by Manipulating BGP AS-PATH Attribute to Conduct DoS 
The topology for case study A is demonstrated in Figure 4.7 (see Appendix A. 1). 
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Figure 4.7 Case-study A, simulation topology for studying BGP with default routing and exploiting the AS-Path 
attribute 
While for each UPDATE packet the neighbour statement specifies the destination IP, the source 
will be set as the outbound interface of the router towards the destination which has already been 
under a router lookup process (the same applies for any router generated packet). BGP also 
emphasises that this source IP must be the same on the neighbour statement of the other router 
(otherwise the UPDATE will be ignored). Regarding security, this will be considered as another line 
of defence when forged UPDATEs from the attacker are ignored if the source IP of the BGP 
UPDATE does not meet the target's expectation from the adjacent BGP speaker in the source field. 
However, the source IP field can also be altered artificially as an attempt at impersonation attack. 
Received BGP messages from each neighbour are queued before process. Outgoing as well as 
incoming BGP messages are queued before propagation. This queuing stems from the fact that TCP 
sitting on top of BGP acts as a deterrent in preventing the router from being overwhelmed by other 
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routers while an attacker can try to send a very large BGP UPDATE to saturate the CPU and cause 
DoS. 
Regarding objective 3, we simulated a reconnaissance attack against the transit link between Rl 
and R2. Network attacks can be generally categorised into Access, Reconnaissance and DoS attacks 
rnJ. Illegitimate discovery and mapping of the system is considered a reconnaissance attack and 
theoretically is performed prior to access or DoS attacks (information-gathering process). Any packet 
sniffer along with a network card in promiscuous mode can be utilised to analyse underlying protocols 
and their vulnerabilities. Here, Wireshark has been used. 
Afterwards, we tried to act as a passive man-in-the-middle attacker to read and eavesdrop 
sensitive data such as NLRI in an attempt to perform an Access Attack. However, a motivated 
attacker can later actively try to impersonate another party or cause DoS. Please note that although 
routing information might not seem confidential (security through obscurity fails), ASes (business) 
have their own incentives to hide peering relationships as their business secrets (to avoid being 
misused by others) and thus such information is recognised as an asset as well. Up to this point, the 
received NLRI info is related to the direct BGP neighbourhood that is Rl-R2. Due to the structure of 
BGP as a hearsay routing protocol, the consequence of the attack can be further extended to reveal 
NLRI announced by R3 but eavesdropped by the attacker residing on the Rl-to-R2 link. This is 
because of the implicit trust relati?nship as the main vulnerability in BGP. 
Regarding objective 4, the distribute list employs an access list in a way that instead of controlling 
data plane traffic (as ACL does), the control plane which deals with routing info is filtered. To put it 
another way, BGP UPDATEs to and from neighbour speakers can be refined utilising filters. 
Evaluating a filtering mechanism using the distribute list, the access list is scanned sequentially line 
by line and this occurs for each BGP prefix in every UPDATE. Considering the arduous obstacle of 
heavy access lists to configure especially for Transit ASes (with loads of entries), the alternative 
solution to access lists which is the Prefix List may get more appreciation. Then we apply appropriate 
distribute list on R2 to filter Rl 's as well as R3's internal networks from advertising via BGP. This 
adds a level of Byzantine robustness to the routing system in case either Rl or R3 wants to misbehave 
by en-routing their own transit traffic via customer AS200. New policy enforcement takes place by 
exploiting new filters when the local router informs the remote site of a change by resetting the BGP 
session. 
Regarding objective 5, to add redundancy to the routing system in case one link goes down as a 
result of malicious attack, primary and backup routes might be utilised by the customer AS' s 
boundary router. Afterwards, we reset the BGP TCP session between R2 and Rl to see if R3 correctly 
substitutes the primary link. This can be considered as an attempt at recovery from saturation attack 
aiming at the Rl-R2 link. 
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Regarding objective 6, since AS65536 has been deliberately assigned an AS number within the 
private range, the goal here for AS500 is to strip off the private #AS from the BGP UPDATE' s AS-
PATH attribute to avoid leakage of such problematic routing information into the global Internet. This 
filtering can be considered as the addition of another layer of security into the BGP' s control plane. 
Simultaneously, it highlights the adverse impact of implicit trust relationship with regard to Byzantine 
failure whereby neighbouring AS can lie or pretend about the NLRI. 
In objective 7, we assume that AS500 starts exhibiting Byzantine failure behaviour. This can be a 
possible scenario if a motivated attacker can manage to compromise the security countermeasures of 
the boundary router in AS500. BGP is an inter-domain routing protocol in which AS400 implicitly 
puts a level of trust on AS500 to advertise its reachability information (10.4.4.0) to the rest of the 
Internet behind the R5 (hop-by-hop as well as hearsay protocol). However, AS500 can maliciously 
filter NLRI originating from AS400 without causing any damage or leaving any trace in the BGP' s 
control plane. To simulate the attack, we construct a route filter on the malicious AS500 and try to 
filter routes based on the source of the UPDATE ( exploiting AS-PATH) in the way that NLRI 
originating from AS400 is ignored. This must result in DoS for 10.4.4.0 on R6 after resetting the 
adjacent BGP TCP session (soft) via R5. Legitimate entities take advantage of the Route Filters to 
filter out malicious or unallocated IPs from the routing space. While AS65535 will not see any 
symptom of the attack, Byzantine failure behaviour of one entity can adversely affect another entity 
(victim AS400) due to the implicit trust relationship in BGP. The result highlights the fact that 
although AS500 has conducted a DoS attack, BGP is still in place (and unaware) and the routing 
infrastructure is operating normally. 
4.6.4 Case Study B: Interactions between IBGP and EBGP sessions, Route 
Reflectors and Route Filters 
In the next stage of emulation, case study B was performed to fulfil the following objectives listed 
below. The emulation results and code are presented in Appendix Bin detail. 
1. Implementing and Verifying Correct NLRI Exchange between IBGP Peers as well as EBGP Peers 
2. Simulating Attack against EBGP session and Analysing its Adverse Effects on BACKUP Link 
3. Modifying the Default Behaviour of Not Changing NEXT-HOP between IBGP Peers 
4. RIB Failure Observation and its Relevant Analysis 
5. Manipulating BGP Path Selection Process with the aid of Route Maps 
6. Enforcing Inbound and Outbound Routing Policy with the aid of BGP LOCAP-PREF as well as 
MED Manipulation 
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7. Observing the Default Behaviour of IBGP to Not Announce Routes learnt through IBGP to Other 
IBGP Speakers 
8. Resolving IBGP Scalability Issue with the aid of Route Reflectors 
9. Injecting Aggregated Supemet into BGP with the aid of BGP ATOMIC_AGGREGATE BGP 
Attribute 
10. Longest Prefix Match Rule and its Implications on the Security of BGP 
11. Implementing Defensive Filtering 
a. Filtering More Specific Routes through Sending Aggregated Addresses 
b. Filtering More Specific Routes through Prefix List 
12. Analysing the Filtering Behaviour From Security Point of View 
The topology and the addressing scheme used for case study Bare depicted below (see Appendix 
B. 1). 
Figure 4.8 Case-study B, simulation topology for studying interactions between IBGP and EBGP sessions, route 
reflectors and route filters 
Rl in Figure 4.8 plays the role of provider for the customer AS64535 by allowing for redundancy 
through two lines, first MAIN with unlimited use as well as BACKUP which is a metered Tl 
connection (usually at massive expense) with 1.544 megabits per second speed. EIGRP (Enhance 
Interior Gateway Routing Protocol) is implemented for intra-domain routing between R2 and R3 
within AS64535. Default BGP has the obstacle of relying too much on the existence of physical 
interfaces. In other words, physical interfaces can fail for any number of reasons and subsequently the 
BGP session with the neighbour can be lost (the worst case scenario is when the fully meshed IBGP 
with multiple paths towards each destination faces a link failure or saturation attack while dynamic 
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routing tries to forward packets from any alternative routes except the one that the other BGP speaker 
expects but the packets get rejected). To eliminate this heavy reliance on physical interfaces (tempting 
target for an attacker), always-available loopback interfaces can be a good substitution for source IP 
of UPDATEs (tie-breaking). To fulfil this, both adjacent routers must have a routing entry to the other 
router's loopback interface (in the IBGP scenario, both loopbacks must be advertised through IGP). 
Following objective 1, EBGP is required to be implemented between Rl and AS64535 boundary 
routers. Rl merely advertises 192.168.200.0/24 representing all the networks reachable by means of 
the provider. Since EBGP adjacency is considered to operate over point to point connections, there is 
no need to exploit loopback as the source for BGP UPDATEs here. Unlike IBGP, the only available 
address for EBGP is the direct external interface by default. However, not having an alternative EBGP 
path may result in DoS if MAIN line fails for any number of reasons. BGP is routing AS by AS and 
as a result it does not alter the next hop IP by default. This imposes problems when a boundary router 
receives an UPDATE from its external neighbour (through EBGP) and wants to spread the NLRI out 
through IBGP within its own AS. 
With regard to objective 2, BGP NLRis advertised by Rl have the NEXT-HOP of either 
192.168.1.1 or 192.168.1.5. Internal routers within AS65535 are unaware of these IPs. By default, the 
NEXT-HOP attribute does not change between IBGP peers. To overcome this issue, the transit links 
should be advertised either through IGP or BGP. The latter has been simulated at this stage on Rl to 
inject WAN connections into BGP. Now, we should expect to see the opposite WAN lines on the 
routing table of either R2 or R3. At this level, the full reachability has been gained. However, if the 
attacker manages to bring the MAIN line (192.168.1.4/30) down, 192.168.1.0 is then accessible only 
through 192.168.1.1. But the unavailability of the EBGP adjacency already removes 192.168.1.0/30 
(learnt through EBGP with AD 20) from R2' s table and thus while the alternative path towards this 
subnet exists, the DoS occurs. This attack scenario can be better understood if bringing MAIN down 
is maliciously targeting 192.168.200.0/24 instead (attacking 192.168.1.5 extends to 192.168.1.1 as 
well since the latter subnet has been learnt through 192.168.1.4/30 EBGP session, another example of 
an implicit trust relationship). 
To fulfil objective 3, we have changed the default behaviour of not changing the NEXT-HOP 
attribute between IBGP peers when a boundary BGP speaker has one IBGP hand while 
simultaneously another hand is within EBGP adjacency. Afterwards, we have noticed that the route 
for 192.168.1.4/30 is flagged with r for RIB Failure (the same result for the WAN subnet on R3). We 
investigated the reasoning behind this failure further at this stage. We later discovered that since R2 
has two routes towards 192.168.1.4/30 with different Administrative Distances- one advertised 
through EBGP with AD of 20 to R3 and another one which is directly connected (indicated by C) 
with the AD of 0- the second one will be installed in R2's routing table while the first one will 
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substitute it if need be. This is because the higher the AD, the lower the trust ranking. However, this 
failure is not disruptive to the routing system. 
Regarding objective 5, path selection manipulation in BGP will result in influencing the path 
selection process which aims at implementing various traffic policies, both inbound and outbound, of 
an AS. The basic tool for BGP policy implementation along with manipulating and filtering routing 
UPDATEs is route map. While this work has focused mostly on security rather than traffic 
engineering, it is noteworthy that even temporary increases above 100% in utilising bandwidth cause 
higher CPU usage due to the greater number of packets to be routed and does open the door 
potentially for DoS attacks. 
Fulfilling objective 6, utilising a route map, the local router can announce to all other IBGP peers 
that the prefix of interest is preferably reachable by higher local preference through itself. Like tuning 
outbound traffic, adjusting inbound loads is substantial even from a security point of view to mitigate 
risks regarding saturation attacks. MED acts like a recommendation to the adjacent AS when a lower 
value for a route is preferred, specifying how to direct traffic to the local AS (at least two direct links 
between ASes must exist). In addition to link saturation attack, spiking to more than 100% link 
utilisation would also result in BGP route flapping as well as lost sessions. If the asset here is financial 
transactions enrouted to a banking server within the AS, for instance, the consequences would be 
more severe. At this stage of the simulation, we implemented a route map on R2 and R3 (IBGP 
speakers) to enforce a routing policy which aims to tune the outbound traffic in a way that the 
outgoing flow off R2 via MAIN is preferred over BACKUP (metered financially for usage). The 
conclusion to be drawn here is that adding any new link for redundancy is simply a matter of 
constructing a new route map to adjust LOCAL-PREF on incoming routes and MED on outgoing 
routes. By default, MED is compared only for routes received from the same AS. However, the 
attribute is optional and therefore can be ignored. 
With regard to objective 8, in the next phase of simulation, Route Reflector (RR) is examined 
[144]. The requirement of not advertising routes learnt through IBGP to other IBGP routers is 
addressed by having all the IBGP routers fully meshed. However, as the number of routers (k) inside 
the AS increases, the number of BGP TCP sessions required for the topology grows exponentially 
((k*(k-1))/2), which imposes scalability issues. Additionally, the amount of replicated routing traffic 
required to be propagated within the AS and its impact on the robustness of the network acts as much 
of deterrent. 
Regarding objective 9, to prevent rapid growth in the size of the routing table on the core routers 
as well as to reduce attacks aiming at de-aggregating the IP address space between BGP speakers, 
Route Filters are employed. By default, BGP here sends both aggregate addresses and fine-grained 
prefixes in this infrastructure. To have secure routing space, we filtered out more specific routes from 
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UPDATEs. R6 should in turn reflect the supernet to RS since the router has already been configured 
as an RR server. Figure 4.9 illustrates the routing table on RS. 
172.24.0.0/24 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
R 172.24.1.0 (120/1] via 192.169.1.6, 00:00:18, Serial0/0 
10.0.0.0/24 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
R 10.10.10.0 (120/1] via 192.169.1.6, 00:00:18, Serial0/0 
192.169.1.0/30 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
C 192.169.1.4 is directly connected, Serial0/0 
B 198.200.200.0/24 [200/0J via 172.24.1.18, 00:33:40 
B 198.0.0.0/8 [200/0] via 172.24.1.18, 00:05:58 
Figure 4.9 R5's routing table 
As seen above, the supernet route will never be utilised due to the observation in objective 10 and 
if the router advertising 198.200.200.0/24 exhibits Byzantine behaviour to conduct de-aggregation 
attack (as was the case with YouTube), the traffic will always be enrouted to reach the more specific 
prefix. At this stage, we simulate the defensive filtering firstly through removing more specific routes 
from UPDATE by sending summarised route only, arid later through the IP Prefix List to fulfil 
objective 11. 
The simulation at this point is led by defining a prefix list on R6 for filtering the 198.200.200.0/24 
specific route originated by R7. While the nature of CIDR allows for routing more specific prefixes 
(overriding less specific ones), R6; the neighbour speaker, can filter the route for any number of 
reasons including reducing the size of the global Internet as well as reducing the risk associated with 
de-aggregation attacks [145]. Malicious intention of BGP peers to make NLRI advertised by the 
neighbour unavailable by exhibiting Byzantine behaviour and exploiting the implicit trust relationship 
of the protocol is also possible with the aid of IP Prefix List (objective 12). As a result~ we should 
observe the removal of more specific prefixes from RS's routing table (Figure 4.10). 
172.24.0.0/24 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
R 172.24.1.0 [120/1] via 192.169.1.6, 00:00:06, Serial0/0 
10.0.0.0/24 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
R 10.10.10.0 (120/1) via 192.169.1.6, 00:00:06, Serial0/0 
192.169.1.0/30 is subnetted, 1 subnets 
C 192.169.1.4 is directly connected, Serial0/0 
B 198.0.0.0/8 [200/0] via 172.24.1.18, 00:00:03 
Figure 4.10 Removal of More Specific Route with IP Prefix List, R5 
4.6.5 Case Study C: Exploring OPNET for BGP, Adversary Effects of DoS 
against BGP on the Convergence Time 
In case study C, we simulate the impact of a DoS attack on the convergence time of BGP with 
OPNET. The following topology in Figure 4.11 made of 6 different ASes has been simulated in 
OPNET for this case study. Note that while DoS against inter-domain routing simulation results do 
not fall into the scope of this research here, we add them for completeness. Also, this does provide a 
golden opportunity to take advantage of OPNET later. 
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Figure 4.11 Simulation topology with OPNET to study detrimental effects of DoS against BGP on the convergence time 
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Figure 4.12: BGP Network Convergence Activity with/without DoS attack 
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Then we tried to simulate DoS (Saturation Attack) against Rtr4 within AS4200 and evaluate the 
impact of the attack with the aid of the number of BGP network convergence activities occurring in 
both scenarios (with/without DoS) as well as the average network convergence duration time. Figure 
4.12 shows that while before attacking there was only one convergence activity in total around one 
minute after simulation began ( duration of the simulation is set to 20 minutes), the DoS attack can 
take up to 9 minutes roughly for the whole network to converge with more convergence activity 
required. Figure 4.13 illustrates the impact of the attack on the average convergence duration time for 
the whole scenario. While without attack targeting Rtr4 in AS4200 it takes on average 0.027 sec 
around 2 minutes after the simulation starts for the network to converge, with DoS attack here, this 
amount increases continuously to reach a peak of 0.72 sec around 9 minutes after the simulation 
begins. 
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Figure 4.13: Average BGP Network Convergence Duration with/without DoS Attack 
4.6.6 Case Study D: Attacks against BGP with the aid of Exploiting Implicit 
Trust Relationship between Speakers 
The objectives are: 
1. Implementing Large Scale Inter-domain Routing Representing This Structure 
2. Implementing BGP TCP MD5 between Peers (State-of-the-art Countermeasure) 
3. Analysing the Control Plane Traffic Exchanged between BGP peers 
4. Verifying the Correct Implementation of BGP in the Large Scale Scenario 
5. Conducting Prefix Hijacking Attack against BGP (Black Hole) 
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6. Conducting De-aggregation Attack against BGP 
In this part, the aim is to conduct an actual attack against BGP to reveal the main vulnerability of 
inter-domain routing which is the implicit trust relationship between speakers, i.e. Byzantine failure. 
4.6.6.1 Implementing Large Scale Inter-domain Routing 
The topology and the address space implemented are according to Figure 4.14. 
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Figure 4.14 Case-study D, Byzantine failure in inter-domain routing with BGP 
ASl as well as AS2 are emulating Tierl ASes. Similarly, AS3, AS4 and ASS are considered Tier2 
providers. Tier3 ASes consist of AS6, AS7, AS8 and AS9. Our assumption for different tiers at this 
stage is that the higher the Tier, the more prefixes it needs to advertise. Rl owns 
174.0.0.0/8,175.0.0.0/8, ... ,179.0.0.0/8 (simulated through loopback interfaces) and delegates 
174.1.0.0/16 and 175.1 .0.0/16 to R3 and R4 respectively (lower Tier). R3, in tum, assigns 
174.1.1.0/24 as well as 175.1.1.0/24 to R6 and R7 respectively. Similarly, R8 is assigned with 
175.1.1.0/24 by R4. R2, on the other hand, owns 184.0.0.0/8,185.0.0.0/8, ... ,l89.0.0.0/8. AS2 then 
delegates 184.1.0.0/16 to R5 which in tum assigns 184.1.1.0/24 to R9. 
4.6.6.2 Implementing BGP TCP MDS between Peers (State-of-the-art 
Countermeasure) 
Upon finishing BGP implementation on Rl and R2, TCP MD5 has been implemented between 
peers. As discussed earlier, this is to ensure that BGP NLRI is not tampered with maliciously during 
transit. In this way BGP peer authentication is enabled so that the authenticity of the neighbour 
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speaker is verified before the establishment of the peering relationship. As we will see later, the 
Byzantine fai lure gap stemming from the implicit trust relationship between nodes in inter-domain 
routing will subvert this security mechanism and therefore BGP remains vulnerable although TCP 
MD5 is in place. Figure 4.15 demonstrates the captured BGP UPDATE from R2 to R1 before TCP 
MD5 is implemented between peers. 
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Figure 4.15 Captured BGP UPDATE message between Rl & R2, without TCP MD5 
Symmetric cryptography employed by MD5 requires us to utilise the same key on both ends 
("vahid" in the simulation) at the same time. The key usually is distributed out-of-band while re-
keying is provided if the modification occurs within the BGP session timeout window without the re-
establishment of the TCP flow. For each packet within the BGP TCP flow, an MD5 hash is generated 
exploiting some portion of the TCP header and payload (BGP NLRI inclusive) as well as the shared 
secret key. The created hash is carried through TCP Option Type 19 as suggested by [146] (due to 
some concerns about this standard, [88] was later proposed). The receiver will calculate the same 
MAC and then compare the result for validation. Figure 4.16 is the same UPDATE captured from the 
same pair of source and destination when BGP TCP MD5 is in place. As it is clear now, TCP MD5 
signature is flagged. 
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Figure 4.16 TCP MD5 for captured BGP UPDATE between the same pairs 
Finally, the analysis of the control plane traffic exchanged between the BGP peers with Wireshark 
is depicted below. At this stage we tried to graph the captured network packets exchanged between R 1 
and R2 to highlight the impact of various BGP message types on the load consumption of the control 
plane traffic as well as provide a benchmark. This has been facilitated with the aid of creating 
different filters in Wireshark and plotting the resulting IO graph. Figure 4.17 is the final result. Note 
that the whole IP traffic styled in black reveals the whole traffic exchanged including CDP (Cisco 
Discovery Protocol). The X axis is the timeline of the simulation starting from O and increasing by 1 
second when both routers are reloaded while the Y axis shows the Bit per Tick load at various time 
points. The red dots depict the peaks for BGP TCP flow at different times. 
X AXIS 
Tick ,nterval:I l sec 
Ptxelsper tlck: 
..:] 
F"..:J 
r '!aeW <'JS time of day 
Y Axas 
Figure 4.17 Analysing the control plane traffic exchanged between BGP peers to highlight the contribution of each type 
of BGP message 
BGP OPEN messages dotted in green are representing the establishment of the adjacency in the 
early time when the simulation just started. The navy dots are highlighting the BGP UPDATE 
messages exchanged and their share of the total traffic load transferred within the control plane. 
Lastly, KEEPALIVE messages demonstrated in pink dots show the frequency at which these 
messages are exchanged between neighbour speakers. The substantial point here is that the BGP load 
consumption and its contribution to the whole control plane traffic has the maximum peak when first 
BGP OPEN and second UPDATE messages are being exchanged in comparison with KEEP ALIVE 
messages. From a security point of view, it highlights the fact that upon the establishment of BGP 
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session adjacency, the router is more involved with the relatively high amount of control plane load to 
process which consequently opens the door potentially to being penetrated at this point in time by 
DoS/saturation attacks. 
4.6.6.3 Verifying the Correct Implementation of BGP in the Large Scale 
Scenario 
In the next stage, all the ASes according to the topology have been configured to run BOP. Figure 
4.18 is the initial routing table on ASL The observation is that not only prefixes with /8 but also /16 
as well as /24 subnets advertised by higher Tier ASes exist in the core routers. 
Existence of all the subnets based on the topology in the core routers highlights the fact that BOP 
is operating properly. Similarly, the initial routing table of R2 is demonstrated in Figure 4.19. Ping 
test has been conducted from Tier 1 ASes. to Tier 3 ASes to ensure the reachability of the subnets. 
Figure 4.20 depicts the successful test on Rl. Afterwards, R2 implements the same ping test to make 
sure that all the subnets assigned to the end users (simulated by loopback interfaces) through AS6, 
AS7, AS8 and AS9 are accessible via the core routers illustrated in Figure 4.21. 
Figure 4.18 Rl's Routing Table (Tierl) 
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Figure 4.19 R2's Initial Routing Table (Tierl) 
ASl#ping 174.1.1.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 174.1.1~1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
I I I I I 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max= 28/56/112 ms 
ASl#ping 174.1.2.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 174.1.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
I I I I I 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/ 5) , round-trip min/ avg/ma:-: = 24/ 56/ 108 ms 
ASl#ping 175.1.1.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 175.1.1.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
I I I I I 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max= 20/46/84 ms 
ASl#ping 184.1.1.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 184.1.1.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
! ! ! ! I 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max= 36/63/100 ms 
P.Sl#I 
Figure 4.20 Successful Ping Test from Rl 
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AS2#ping 174.1.1.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 174.1.1.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
I I I I I 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max= 48/79/136 ms 
AS2#ping 174.1.2.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 174.1.2.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
I I I I I 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max= 28/64/116 ms 
AS2#ping 175.1.1.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 175.1.1.1, timeout 1s 2 seconds: 
I I I I I 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max= 20/59/92 ms 
AS2#ping 184.1.1.1 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 18'!.1.l.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
I I I I I 
Success rate is 100 percent (5/5), round-trip min/avg/max= 24/60/116 ms 
AS2#I 
Figure 4.21 Successful Ping Test from R2 
4.6.6.4 Conducting Prefix Hijacking Attack against BGP (Black Hole) 
Byzantine failure as a result of implicit trust relationship vulnerability between BGP speakers can 
be better understood if one tries to inject malicious routing information into the control plane in the 
scenario. Lack of any mechanisms for BGP NLRI validation give rise to the propagation of the false 
info generated by the attacker throughout the whole routing system. While TCP MD5 ensures that the 
legitimate party is the one who sent the NLRI, the semantics of the NLRI is not validated in any way 
and therefore can disrupt routing severely in today's Internet. We add 184.1.1.0/24 to BGP on R6 to 
hijack the prefix. The NLRI will be propagated through R3 to core routers. The malicious BGP entry 
will be added to the routing table of the affected ASes. The initial BGP table of R6 is illustrated in 
Figure 4.22. 
•-=- 179.o.o.o/::: e3.Ei"3.e3.4"3 o::: 1 1. 
t :- 1e4. o. o. o/ e ::: 3 . ::: ::: . e::: . 4::: o 3 1 ::: 1. 
f> 1:::4.1.0.0 :::3.83.:::3.43 0 3 1 .":: 5 1. 
t :- H:i4. 1. 1. 0/::: 4 e 3. :::3. :::3. 43 0 3 1 ::: 5 9 1. 
· :- 1::: 5. 0. 0. 0/ ::: :::-::: . 83 . :::3 . 43 0 ::: 1 :: 1. 
Figure 4.22 R6's Initial Routing Table 
The observation is that 184.1.1.0/24 is only reachable through R3, Rl, R2, RS, and finally 
originated by R9. After injecting the malicious BGP entry, R6 is another originating source for the 
prefix as is clear in Figure 4.23. 
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~> 184.0.0.0/8 83.83.83.43 0 3 1 2 i 
~.:- H:i4.1.0.0 i:i3.i:i3,i:i3.43 0 3 1.:: 5 i 
~.:- 184.1.1.0/::::4 0.0.0.0 0 3::::768 1 
~> 185.0.0.0/8 83.83.83.43 0 3 1 2 1 
Figure 4.23 Injecting Malicious NLRI into R6 
The effect of the attack can be verified on R3. 
Figure 4.24 the Effect of the Attack on R3 
The injected and malicious entry for 184.1.1.0/24 is believed by R3. The adverse impact will be 
further propagated towards Rl as the core router. The following result firstly highlights the fact that 
the malicious entry will be believed and installed on Rl. Secondly, although the route towards the 
legitimate source, AS9, is also installed, due to shortest BGP AS-PATH, the malicious route 
dominates as the best route. Thirdly, the ping test to 184.1.1.1 while initially successful, is now failing 
since R6 is pointing to the NullO interface for the subnet and thus discards the packets. This is known 
as the black hole attack. Finally, the traceroute test has been conducted to ensure the route taken by 
ICMP packets hop by hop meets the expectation. 
Figure 4.25 Rl (Core Router) Installs Malicious NLRI 
ASl#ping 184.1.1.1 
Type escape sequence t.o ,:tl:11:,rt. 
Sending 5, 100-byte ICMP Echos to 184.1.1.1, timeout is 2 seconds: 
u.u.u 
Suc~ess rate is 0 percent (0/5) 
ASl#traceroute 184.1.1.1 
Type escape sequence t.o ,:tl:,ort .. 
Tracing t.he route t.o 184.1.1.1 
1 83.83.83.2 76 msec 60 msec 44 msec 
2 83.83.83.14 60 msec 76 msec 40 msec 
3 83.83.83.14 !H !H w 
Figure 4.26 Black Hole Attack as a Result of BGP Prefix-hijacking 
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The main observation here is that after the prefix has been hijacked, R2 via RS will still utilise the 
route towards R9 as the source for NLRI since they have shorter AS-PATH for the same subnet. 
Therefore, the effect of the attack exploiting the implicit trust relation between BGP nodes depends on 
the topological structure of the network (localisation becomes substantial under the BGP concept). 
Thence, by having only highly-connected nodes secure, the Byzantine failure and its adverse impact 
can at least be limited (if not eliminated) to small areas. The following is the BGP table of R2 
indicating that the legitimate route is in effect as the best route while the malicious attack has been 
conducted successfully. 
*> 184.0.0.0/8 
*> 184.1.0.0 
* 184.1.1.0/24 
*> 185.0.0.0/8 
AS2#ping 184.1.1.1 
0.0.0.0 
83.83.83.45 
83.83.83.41 
83.83.83.44 
83.83.83.45 
0.0.0.0 
0 
0 
0 
Figure 4.27 R2 still utilises the Legitimate Route 
Type escape sequence to abort. 
32768 i 
0 5 i 
0 1 3 6 i 
0 4 3 6 i 
0 5 9 i 
32768 i 
Sending 5, 100-byt.e ICMP Echos to 184.1.1.1, timeout. is 2 seconds: 
I I I I I 
:3uccess rate is 100 percent. ( 5/ .5) , round-t.r ip 1t1in/ av,;_f/n1ax 8/ 3 9/ 84 lc"IS 
Figure 4.28 Successful Ping Test from R2 
4.6.6.5 Conducting Sub-prefix Hijacking (De-aggregation) Attack against 
BGP 
In a de-aggregation attack attempt, as another severe vulnerability in today's BGP, we tried to 
inject more specific prefixes to de-aggregate the address space. This malicious attempt will also be 
believed by all other ASes due to the longest prefix match rule in routing. Here, R9 starts exhibiting 
Byzantine behaviour by advertising 174. 1.2.0/25 to RS. R9 then directs the traffic towards its NullO 
interface and discards it (black hole with de-aggregation rather than prefix-hijacking). The following 
result shows that while 174.1.2.1 was initially reachable, it is no longer the case since the ICMP 
packets are now en-routed towards R9 and sunk there. The route taken here is towards R9 rather than 
the legitimate originator which is R7. 
w 174.1.1.0/24 
w 174.1.2.0/25 
w 174.1.2.0/24 
W> 175.0.0.0/8 
w 175.1.0.0 
83.83.83.44 
83.83.83.43 
83.83.83.44 
83.83.83.43 
83.83.83.42 
83.83.83.44 
83.83.83.43 
0.0.0.0 
83.83.83.43 
0 
0 4 3 6 i 
0 3 6 i 
0 4 2 5 9 i 
0 3 4 2 5 9 i 
0 2 5 9 i 
0 4 3 7 i 
0 3 7 i 
32768 l 
0 3 4 i 
Figure 4.29 Rl (core) is injected with Malicious Entry (De-Aggregation) 
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Figure 4.30 Unreachable Prefix and the Route Taken for Malicious Prefix from Rl 
Please note that the state-of-the-art solution in securing BGP with regard to prefix hijacking or de-
aggregation attacks is the defensive filtering. Since the remedy has been explored previously in detail, 
we just add to this the following example from the related exhaustive list of the Rl-to-R2 script to 
demonstrate the arduous challenge of the filtering technique employed today. IP Prefix List (discussed 
in Appendix B), is addressing the requirement. The same code should be tuned for various BGP 
adjacencies in both directions inward/outward on each router. However, the focus of this research is 
now more on the relying architecture to provide such "correct" semantics to be fed into these filters. 
ip prefix-list RltoR2 seq 10 permit 172.0.0.0/6 ip prefix-list RltoR2 seq 100 deny 
ip prefix-list RltoR2 seq 15 deny 5.0.0.0/8 203.0.113.0/24 
{ ... omitted ... } 
4.7 Summary 
The main conclusion to be drawn is that the result of our analysis in this chapter indicates that 
almost all the remedies in this area are vulnerable to a Byzantine class of attacks due to the implicit 
trust relationships between BGP speakers. For this gap, there is no systematic mechanism currently in 
place to check whether the injected information into the inter-domain routing system's control plane 
is genuine or not (on a global scale). Amongst those solutions which slightly consider Byzantine 
robustness including DNS-based or SBGP, these approaches ask for use of digital signature. This 
implies a need for the PKI of which today's Internet is deprived. Other solutions such as pgBGP 
answer only the detection and thus ignore prevention. In addition, they are not deemed to provide 
online security protection (mostly offline methods). They sometimes also ask for revealing peering 
information which faces the reluctance of ASes. All other remedies clearly have overlooked 
Byzantine robustness from scratch. Byzantine failure can be thought of as the inherent deficiency with 
each distributed system where every entity puts a level of trust in the others. This in fact stems from 
the hop-by-hop characteristics of BGP which are required to be broken in our minds. The way that we 
propose to break this hop-by-hop paradigm to reach a level of Byzantine robustness, detailed in 
chapter 5, emerges from studying the topological structure of today's Internet. 
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5 Methodology & Design for Localised Overlay 
Management Plane (LOMP) 
5.1 Preface to the Upcoming Byzantine Studies 
This section describes the required foundations for LOMP' s methodology and design. 
5.1.1 Analyses Scenario and Emulated Byzantine Studies 
Figure 5.1 shows the GNS3 scenario similar to section 4.6.6. This is the baseline scenario for both 
the emulation and simulation used throughout the current chapter along with the addressing scheme; 
each router represents one AS. 
/ 
/ 
.,,--
I 
I " \ \ : 
, ... 
nehwrk 100.1.1.0 mask 2SS":"2SS.2SS.O 
I 
\ 
\ 
-----,, 
', . ·.,,,, 
network 101.1.~O;;;;k 2SS.2SS.2S5.0 
\ 
l 
rk 110.1.0.0 mask 25S.25S.0 . 
Figure 5.1 The baseline scenario along with the addressing scheme, each router represents one AS. TCP MD5 here, as 
the state-of-the-art solution, fulfils integrity as well as authenticity of the BGP information exchanged across the control 
plane. 
According to the following result, the initial BGP routing table for Rl before R6 starts exhibiting 
Byzantine behaviour is shown. The observation is that 110.1. 1.0/24 is accessible via the AS4-AS5-
AS9 path (indicated by*> under the first column on the left as the best path) while candidate paths to 
this prefix are shown (highlighted by *). R6 misbehaves by announcing 110.1.1.0/24 into BGP' s 
control plane as an attempt to hijack this BGP prefix (the real origin is already allocated to R9). The 
NLRI will be propagated further through R3 to Tierl routers. The malicious BGP entry will be 
injected and installed into the control plane of all the ASes on the way (R3, Rl and etc.). After the 
attack has been conducted, as the result below secondly depicts, although the ASl 's routes towards 
the legitimate source of the prefix, that is AS9, are still installed, due to the shortest BGP AS- PATH, 
the malicious route AS3-AS6 dominates as the best route. We also launched ping as well as 
traceroute tests to double check the adverse impact of the attack and ensure the route taken by ICMP 
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packets hop-by-hop meets the attacker's expectations. The substantial observation is that after the 
prefix has been hijacked, R2, R4 and RS will still utilise the route towards R9 as the real source for 
NLRI since they have a shorter AS-PATH for the same subnet via the genuine route (in the absence of 
any other BGP policies). To summarise, the success of the Byzantine attack exploiting the implicit 
trust relation between BGP nodes depends on the topological structure of the network with regard to 
the location of the misbehaving entity as well as the target and thus the attacker's and victim's 
location/position becomes substantial for achieving Byzantine robustness. 
~ 110.1.1.0/24 83.83.83.43 0 3 4 5 9 l 
~ 83. 83. 83, 42 0 2 5 9 l 
~> 83.83.83.44 0 4 5 9 l 
t> 110.1.1.0/24 83.83.83.43 0 3 6 l 
t 83.83.83.42 0 2 5 9 l 
t 83.83.83.44 0 4 5 9 l 
Figure 5 .2 Top: AS l's initial BGP table before R6 starts exhibiting Byzantine behaviour. Bottom: AS 1 's partial BGP 
table for 110.1. 1.0/24 after R6 starts exhibiting Byzantine behaviour. 
5.1.2 Prerequisites for the Simulated Byzantine Studies 
In the course of our analyses, methodology and design of the proposed management plane to 
achieve Byzantine robust BGP, throughout this chapter, enriched simulation results with OPNET are 
referred to. OPNET is known to have the fastest Discrete Event Simulation (DES) engine among the 
leading industry solutions for the simulation studies. DES aims at modelling over time a system 
whose state changes happen at discrete points in time. OPNET Modeller uses project-based scenario 
editor which means that the simulation starts with a project and each project contains multiple 
scenarios. Scenario is an instance of a network under study. Each project must contain at least one 
scenario to function. Modeller has three layers including Network, Node and finally Process layers 
with C code (and corresponding editors). Network and link objects which represent the network 
topology are created in Project Editor. Figure 5.3 shows our topology for studying Byzantine 
behaviour of BGP via the project editor. The topology, as with GNS3 emulation tests in Figure 5.1 
include 9 routers of ethemet4_slip8_gtwy _adv type, each representing distinct AS in addition to two 
LANs (called Sao_Paulo_LAN and Sydney_LAN) to provide the required platform for end-to-end 
demand communications tests later on. Overcoming the arduous challenge of finding a how-to 
procedure required for simulating BGP from scratch with OPNET (through much trial and error), we 
skip the simulation details at this stage and proceed to the results obtained for studying Byzantine 
behaviour. As soon as the configuration phase according to the addressing scheme has been 
accomplished, we visualize routing protocols configured within the scenario with OPNET to validate 
whether or not the intended routing protocol is in the proper operating state over the entire underlying 
infrastructure. BGP as well as Redistribution for directly connected LANs are verifiable in Figure 5.3 
underneath upon finalizing the baseline scenario. [Z; indicates the redistribution of directly connected 
networks into BGP. [[ verifies that BGPv4 is running properly. Additionally, we are interested in 
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verifying established BGP peermg adjacencies before exploring Byzantine failure. Below, we 
visualize all the established BGP peering adjacencies for our analysis with OPNET. This is deemed to 
be another validation for BGP's proper functioning in the absence of any attacks. We al o activated 
RIP to distribute routing information regarding loopback interfaces throughout the network. 
Nonetheless, RIP will also be redistributed later to BGP so that BGP remains the sole routing 
mechanism on the underlying network for all the results. 
8'--------,--------- WB'l-1 / ~' /.= 
Figure 5.3 The simulation topology remains the same as the emulation one. Visualize IPv4 Routing Protocols upon 
finalizing the baseline scenario according to the addressing scheme. Verifying BGP is operating correctly for the underlying 
~ 
network: ~ indicates the redistribution of directly connected networks, validates that BGPv4 is running properly. 
Figure 5.4 Visualizing BGP Peers, established BGP adjacencies over TCP are visualised with blue dashed bidirectional 
arrows to confirm proper BGP operation for the entire network under study. 
5.1.3 Simulation Engines and Traffic Types 
Traffic in OPNET is of two types namely Explicit or Discrete traffic versus Background or 
Analytic traffic. Explicit traffic is packet by packet traffic where each packet-related event such as 
packet_created(), packet_queued(), packet_transrnitted(), ... that happens in the course of simulation is 
generated and invoked. Therefore, with the aid of explicit traffic, the most accurate results are 
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obtained since all aspects of the protocol are modelled. However, this is at the cost of longer 
simulation time and higher memory consumption. Explicit traffic entails stream of packets generation 
and Application Traffic Models for standard applications such as http. On the other hand, OPNET 
takes advantage of analytically modelled traffic as well, called Background traffic. Background traffic 
affects the performance of explicit traffic caused by additional delays. However, unlike explicit traffic 
which merely works with DES, background traffic is supported by another simulation engine namely 
Flow Analysis (FA). FA is a specialised module within the OPNET modeller solution portfolio to 
predict and visualise the routing of network traffic flows for capacity and resiliency analysis. 
Background traffic entails Traffic Flows exploiting traffic flow objects for an end-to-end flow as well 
as Baseline Loads which assume that traffic is nothing more than loads on links (represented 
statically). Being enriched with two distinct simulation engines lets the modeller model the traffic for 
explicit traffic in purely discrete, for background traffic purely analytic and finally in hybrid fashion 
(for the combination of these two). Although DES can run both Explicit and Background traffic, FA 
merely supports analytic Background traffic. For our study here, we utilised FA which only considers 
the traffic represented by IP Demands to generate a broad range of rich FA' s reports. 
5.1.4 Rationale behind the Demands 
To run FA, we must initially create IP Demands to represent the traffic (nonetheless, FA can be 
run even without Demands because baseline loads exist by default). Traffic flows are a type of 
Demand object. Traffic flows characterise IP traffic demands to model end-to-end traffic. Unlike 
baseline loads which are quite static, traffic flows span multiple links and loads in a dynamic manner. 
We exploit demands when modelling potentially changeable relationships between nodes of the 
network under study. Studying end-to-end connectivity, performing Reachability Analysis (RA) and 
eventually troubleshooting routing concerns are other use cases for Demands. The aforementioned 
pros obviously fit into the area of Byzantine failure research here. 
Traffic flows are our first milestone now towards RA and FA. In theory, traffic flow ( as a type of 
Demand object) is a network object which connects two network objects with specifying a pair for 
traffic ends, a period of time for simulation, traffic rate and eventually traffic mix attribute indicating 
the percentage of mixture between background and explicit. In addition, Traffic Intensity as well as 
Traffic Characteristics can be tuned according to different research needs. In summary, we firstly 
created traffic flow to define demands. Secondly, we characterized demands in order to record routes 
for selected flows. We cannot characterize demands if we do not define IP traffic flows beforehand. 
Thirdly, we ran the simulation and optionally configured the start time of flows as well. The relevant 
Demand Statistics have been already chosen from Individual Statistics to collect. 
Now we are able to observe routes taken by the given demand(s) (Display Routes for Selected 
Demands) with details (number of available paths with path details). Additionally, OPNET provides 
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graphical results for "Visualise Routability of IP Flows" through operating on a "Demand 
Performance Table". The observations for such analysis include the status of each of the demands 
(successful/unsuccessful), the number of hops it takes for each end-to-end demand to traverse and 
more substantially the routing detail along with other metrics. Another analytical tool with OPNET 
for Byzantine studies is "Route Browser" under FA in which calculating and displaying inter-domain 
route details can be better investigated in a hop-by-hop scale (fine-grained). 
5.1.5 Enhanced FA Reports for the Broad Range of Studies 
Finally, over 100 various reports with FA can address different needs for many aspects of 
analysing Byzantine robustness/failure behaviour in our network scenario. The reports can largely be 
categorised under four types. Categories entail reports regarding Analysis, Configurations, Inventory 
(Roster reports for instance which list network elements and their status) and lastly Performance of 
the Byzantine network under study. Statistics collected to generate reports can be fine-tuned to be 
collected at various time intervals or when the traffic level for a given demand reaches a certain level. 
This is performed whereby different IP table sources can be used for generating reports which vary 
from DES to Operational Network (or via-FA constructed tables). We have chosen intended FA 
reports for studying the behaviour of the network under study for both before and after the attack from 
the existing exhaustive list. 
5.2 Flow Analysis & Reachability Analysis Studies Before the Byzantine 
Attack 
Flow Analysis (FA) and Reachability Analysis (RA) are discussed in this section before the 
Byzantine attack is conducted to be compared later with those after the attack in section 5.3. 
5.2.1 FA Summary Log before the Byzantine Attack; No Failed Demands 
At this point in time, it is necessary to verify the network under study' s conditions and status via 
FA so that later Byzantine failure attack can be understood and characterized better. We also later on 
conducted FA on the network with Byzantine attack and collected/contrasted the relevant statistics 
and results. According to Figure 5.5, 110 successful flows have been constructed initially amongst the 
entire 9 ASes plus two LAN nodes in a fully-meshed manner. In other words, full-mesh yields 
symmetrical distribution of flows which gives us a golden opportunity to study the modality of path 
diversity (through demarcating superhighways for dissemination of authentic BGP semantics) and to 
place our overlay remedy later since the entire links across the network are already under the load (in 
use). The substantial observation at this stage is that no failed and un-routable demand is recognised. 
For this FA, we only include End-to-End Flows (not static Link Loads) for analysis for the duration of 
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two hours. Forwarding tables for the flows are extracted from DES (not FA tables or operational 
network). On the other hand, from the beginning of the DES simulation, we need to disable BGP as 
well as RIP simulation efficiency so that protocols' messages are still sent throughout the network 
even if relevant Stop-Time Timer is reached (ARP is additionally disabled). As we can verify 
optionally from FA Executive and Settings report (of Analyses category), 9 BGP nodes in addition to 
two IP LAN nodes are successfully configured. With average link utilisation of 2.8% and maximum 
of 6.7%, all 110 demands are successfully routed across the network during the 2 hour simulation 
while FA reports are made when total traffic is highest. 
= Flow Analysis sumnary = 
Start Time: 
End Time: 
Duration: 
Interval Size: 
Number of Intervals: 
Report on: 
Reporting Time: 
Intensity Factor: 
Included traffic type(s): 
MPLS Rerouting Mode: 
Alternate BGP Routes Allowed: 
Technology selection: 
Performance Analyzer Results: 
Measure 
18:37:56.000 Jul 25 2013 
20:37:56,000 Jul 25 2013 
2 hours 
3600 sec 
2 
o (When total traffic is highest) 
18: 37: 56. 000 Jul 25 2013 
1.000000 
Flows 
Full Reroute (A 11 LSPS) 
tlO Limit 
custom Technologies 
WAN Li nl< - Number of overuti 1 i zed 1 i nl<s 
WAN Li nl< - Maximum Uti 1 i zati on (%) 
value 
0 
6.7 
WAN Link - Total Consumed BW 
WAN Li nl< - BW Effi Ci ency (U) 
LAtl - Maximum LAN Uti 1 i zati on (¾) 
Demand - Total Active Demands 
Demand - Total Ignored Demands 
Demand - Failed-Unroutable Demands 
34.94 Mbps: 
2.5 
0.000000 
110 
0 
0 
Figure 5.5 FA summary log verifies the construction of 110 successful flows across nodes before Byzantine attack (11 
nodes * 10 demands for every other nodes = 110); no failed & un-routable demand is seen. 
5.2.2 1Pv4 Subnets & Router Address FA Reports; Who Owns What 
Figure 5.61Pv4 Subnets FA Report, assigned addressing scheme is verified. Note that 110.1.1.0/24 is initially owned by 
AS9. 
To contrast upcoming routing tables for the ASes before/after the Byzantine attack, the assigned 
addressing scheme is verified at this stage through IPv4 Subnets FA Report in Figure 5.6. The victim 
subnet, 110.1.1.0/24, originally belongs to AS9 as can be seen. We additionally verified each address 
within each subnet assignment according to our addressing scheme through IPv4 Router Address FA 
Report. 
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Router! lnletfacej. Is I IP Address 15; IF10 :Yes 
Nam~ Name i..:cC=onn=ec:c..:.le::..:d:.:..?:; ______ 11 16: IF11 Y,es __ . 
1 lASl LBO N/A 1.1.1.1/24 17! IF4 ... Yes 
_?] IF10. Yes ·"' __ 183,_83.83.9/30.,.. 1s1 IF5_ ,Yes_ 
_;J_j IF11 Yes 83.83.835~. ... 19! IFS Yes 
!J IF4 .. 'l'es '83.83.83.1/30 2oiASS uo N/A 
~jAS2 LBO r-l/A. .. 2.2,2?124 . ...... ... ·2fl .. . 
~J IF10 ..... Yes .. ~3,83.83.10/30_ .. 22~ 
.Li IF11__ '.Yes _ '.83.83.83.30/30 ii 
8 I IF4 __ ..... Y,es .... 8~,83.83_.101~0__ 24!AS6 
9!AS3 LB_().. . ... _N/:6,. 3.3.3.3/24 257 . 
1·0l IF10 Yes__ 83.83.8l2/30. 261 :rn IF11 Yes 183.83.~3.21/30_ i?]AS7 
12l IF4 Yes 83.~3.8113/30_. ?~; 
iJ! IFS. Yes 83.83.83.17/30" 29:Ass 
!F10_ 
IF11 
IF4 
LB0 
IF10 
_ IFO. 
LB0 
lfl0 . 
LBO 
:Ye_s__ 
Yes __ 
JI/A_ 
Yes 
Yes 
Wt-. .. 
_,,Yes .. 
_N/A . 
_83.83.83.6/30 
83.83.83.29/30 
83.83.83.22/30 
83.83.83.25/30 
,83.83.83,34/30 
. 5.5.5.5/24 
83,83.83,102/30 .. 
83.83.83.37/30 
. 83.83.83.33/30 
· 6.6.6,6/24 
83.83.83.14/30. 
100.1.1.2/24 
'7,7.7.7124 
83.83.83.18/30 
8.8.8.8/24 
i!]AS4 LBO NIA . 4.4.4.4/24 30i ~ IF10_ .. ·Yes '83.83.83.6/30 __ . . ~_f!AS9 IFlO 'l_'e:___ ... 83.83.83.26/30 LBO WA . · 9.9.9.9/24 
J!] IFn _ Yes _83.8183.29,130_ . ~
3 
.. ?
3
) 
17i IF4 Yes ·83.83.83.22/30 __ 1 
IF_10_ .... Yes ............... 83.83.83.38/30 
IFO (Y~t 11Cl1.1.2/24 
Figure 5.71Pv4 Router Address FA Report, confirming the proper allocation of IP addresses according to the scenario 
scheme. 
5.2.3 BGP Peer FA Report; Verification on the Expected EBGP Adjacencies' 
Proper Establishments 
BGP Peer FA Report is then explored underneath to validate the EBGP adjacency sessions 
established. The absence of any type of filter is observed. As we will discuss later, the management 
plane specifies the way that these filters need to be fed globally for the Byzantine robust BGP. 
Router Router; Confederation·. Peer l Peer' Peer Addieu i Peer i.Addren'I Reachable'_. Route : __ Mulli. Default' .. Default i_ Send 
-~::LAS I ID :Namj_~J I Type/ Family! !Rtlli:~!or: Hop!Weigh\Originate:Label 
L)AS1 . 1 lAS3 3 8183.812/30 EBGP IJ:v4. 'No .. :No . :No _:O No :No 
2 ; ~~~- 4 83.83.83.6/30 EBGP 1Pv4 No . . . 'tlo. No O tlo _No 
3": f>:S2 .... 2 83.83.rfr,oiJo EBGP IP~4 tlo ... :tlo_ .. i10_. 0 'tfo_ .. No 
4-)AS2 2 2AS1 ·1818383.9/30 -EBGPIP~4 · _'No_ ... :No_ tlo ;Q tlo_ . tlo 
5 j .l§L 5 8383.83.102/30 EBGP 1Pv4 · No t_lo ~lo O. No_ No 
s·i AS4_ .. . 4 83.8183.29/30 EBGP IP~4-· No tlo ;tlo .:O__ No_... tlo . 
7 .. lAS3 3 . 3~6 ..... ·s 83.83.83.14/30 EBGP 1~4--- 1No No...... ..Jlo_ .o . Jl(). No 
s1 AS_L ·78183.83.18/30 EBGP0 iP~4 · · )10. . % ....... tie>__ o_ N~.. tlo .... 
9-i AS4 . ~ 83,83.83.22/30. : EBGP IP~f · No . tlo. No O .' No . Ho 
):~] AS1 1 83.83.83.1/30 EBGP 1Pv4 No tlo ..... tlo _O__ . No .. tlo 
11 jAS4 4 ASS 5 83.818133/30 EBGP :tPv4 , tlo tfo . No O tlo No . 
121 ~3, .. 3 83.83.83.2i/30 EBGP 1Pv4 _'No . .. tlo. No O .'~lo_ No 
lli ASl .. f83.83.83.5/30 EBGP.IP~4 _'No_ ...... No_ tlo O . No . 'No 
141 AS2 ·283.8J83.30/30 'EBGPJi>;.,4 'No :No__ tlo. o.. .t!o. No __ 
15! ASS 8 8183.83.26/30. EBGP:IF'v4 : . No.. tlo.. . No O . No Jlo. 
16jASS 5 SAS4 4 83.8183.34/30 iEBGF)IPv4 No tlo _)lo . 0 . t!o _ :No 
Jij i,si, ...... 283.83.83.101/30EBGPIPv4 Ng tlo _·No ___ O tlo No __ 
18' AS9 ·9 8183.83.38i30 ;EBG'i> lf\14 .. ~ :No __ ... ___ No ______ tlo . 0 ]No No 
19!AS6 6 . __ Gt.SJ_' •·38183.83.13/30·:EBGP)~v4· !No No_ tfo. .. 0 itlo No 
ifilAS7_ ... 7 7AS3 38183.83.17/301EBGPIPv4 ~-!No_ 1tlo tlo __ :o ,No __ :No .. 
~JASS _8 .. .. _8AS4 483,83.83.25/30_ 1EBG~P_,1Pv4. No Ho_ 'tlo O_ 'No No .. 
22iAS9 9 9 ASS 5 8183.83.37/30 EBGP 1Pv4 ·No tlo No O iNo tlo 
Figure 5.8 BGP Peer FA Report, verifying proper establishment for the EBGP adjacency sessions. 
5.2.4 BGP Node Config & IP Route Redistribution FA Reports; BGP Solely 
Operates & Is Left with the Default Policy 
The full reachability has so far been provided by the underlying routing mechanisms for enrouting 
the demands. Nevertheless, since we only focus on BGP protocol operation, while RIP is by default 
configured in the background, we then decided to redistribute RIP into BGP to let the inter-domain 
routing protocol solely operate as the only underlying routing infrastructure. This lets us characterize 
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and narrow our research studies for Byzantine robust BGP itself in the absence of any other intra or 
inter domain routing mechanisms. 
BGP Node Config as well as IP Route Redistribution FA Reports are depicted underneath. The 
first is supposed to reflect the fact that BGP is still left without any particular policy in place with all 
the default values for its attributes across the network under study. The second report informs us that 
at this stage, RIP is successfully redistributed into BGP and as such BGP is operating solely as the 
only underlying layer three routing mechanism. In other words, IP Route Redistribution FA Report 
yields the relevant result for the source protocol (i.e. RIP) which has been redistributed into 
destination protocol (i.e. BGP). LANs attached to R6 as well as R9 have been already redistributed 
into BGP where source protocol is indicating "Connected". 
Router: AS j Confederation: Auto l Default; Always l External! Internal l local i Default i 
Name l Numberi ID l Summary• Local : Comparej Distance; Distance; Distance; Information 
: 1 Pref i MEO l !____j ! Originate / 
2iAS2 
3!AS3 
41AS4-
s·:As5· 
6lAS6 ·-· 
11As7· 
81AS8. 
:s.)AS9 
1 _,. .. ,..,.J0 No_ 1_00 :fa!sf! .. 20 200 ?00 _ . No. 
2 _ 2tlo_ 100_ False_ 20 _. _200 _200 ___ t~o 
.. 3 .. 3 No 100 Fabe _i20 . ?0O _200 :No 
4 
5 
... 6 
7 
8 
9 
.. "· ·--~-~o·····~·· 100 __ 'False .... 20 _200 ?(JO __ No 
!>No _____ 100 ·Fa!se 20 _21)() 2_00 t_Jo_ 
.. 6 No___ 1_00 ..... False 20 __ :2()1) ,200 ..... No 
7tlo 1~ __ Fabe 20 . . ?OO__ _ ?09_ No 
8 No 100 False 20 200 200 No 
9 No 100 False 20 '200 · 200 No 
RoulerJ Destination: Address/ Default Metric IS-1S/OSPFj Source 
Name I Protocol l Family l Path Type I Protocol 
! l I! 
l____ !----~----' 
JjAS1 __ ,BGP 1Pv4 RIP 
2 !AS2 - ;BGP. 1Pv4 RIP 
·flAfr- _'_BCiP :1Pv4 RIP 
4JAS4-- BGP ·tf'.v4 RIP 
!nAS5 BGi:> _ _ 1Pv4 RIP 
GIASS ·· BGP 1Pv4 (0, 100,lncomplete,) Connected 
1·1 RIP 
i]AS7 __ B1:i~ .. .,. 1Pv4 RIP 
9 iAS8 _:BG!' 1Pv4 RIP 
1-0lAS9. BGP 1Pv4 ,(0.100.lncomp!ete.J Connected 
11·1 RIP 
Figure 5.9 Top: BGP Node Config FA Report ensures that no particular BGP policy is in place while all the BGP nodes 
are left with their default values for BGP attributes. Bottom: IP Route Redistribution FA Report yields the relevant result for 
the source protocol (RIP) which has been redistributed into the destination protocol (BGP). 
5.2.5 ASl & AS2 Forwarding Tables FA Reports; Verification for the Expected 
Reachability & AS-wide Views towards the Victim 
Figure 5.10 displays the resulting forwarding tables for ASl and AS2 as an example (after 
conducting redistribution of RIP into BGP). Subsequently, it can be verified that the source protocol 
for all the subnets including loopbacks as well as those owned by each AS in addition to LANs are 
now set to BGP either directly or indirectly through redistribution. For later studies, the substantial 
observation is the viewpoint that each AS has towards 110.1.1.0/24. 
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Destination ! Source i Route i Metric/ Next Hop I Next l Outgoing 
l Protocol Preference, l Address i Hop l Interface 
------"i l , ,Node, 
.!Jl.1.1.0/24 Direct . _ ;0 .. 0 1.1.1.1 __ ASL. ,LB0 
_2j2.2.2.0/24 iBGP_ 20 0 83.83.83J0 A_S2 . Unresolved 
.~J 3.3.3.0/24 . _ · BGP 20. . . _ '0 .. 83.83.83.2 JAS3 _ Unresolved 
!_J4.4.4._0/24 . BGP 20 . . __ ·0 83.83.83.6 _ AS4 Unresolved 
5 15.5.5.0/24 BGP 20 .. 0 83.83.83.10 AS2 ;Unresolved 
~J 6.6.6.0/24 BGP_ 20 '0. -~ ·: 83.83.83.2 _• AS3 : Unres()fved 
_7___j7.z.7.0!24 BGP 20. 0 _ '83.83.83.2 AS3 Unresolved 
!3_J8.8.8,0/24 · · · BGP 20 0 _83.83.83.6 AS4 _:Unresolved 
9 19.9.9.0/24 BGP 20_ .. . '0 , ~.83.83,!Q.6.S_2 . Unresolved 
l~?J-~.83.()/31) :Direc! 0 0 83,83,83.!_ AS1 'IF4 
!1!83.83.83.4/30. D_irect :o :o· ,83.83.815 A?} IF11 
!_?j83,83.83.8/30 'Direct 0 . 0 .. 83.83.83.9 AS_1 IF10 
Destination ; Source / Route / Metric; Next Hop / Next i Outgoing/ 
i Protocol; Preference: I Address , Hop : Interface I 
!____j ___ ! !Nodet I _________ _J 
!...Jl.1.1.0/24 BGP 20 0 83.83.83.9 AS1 Unresolved 
_2__]2.2.2.0/24. Direct 0 0 2.2.2.2 AS2 LB0 
1.._j3.3.3.0/24 BGP ·20 ·o 83.8183.9 ASl Unresolved 
-C I 4.4.4.0/24 BGP 20 0 '83.83.83.29 ·AS4 Unresolved 
5-7 5.5.5.0/24 BGP 20 0 83.83.83.102 ASS Unresolved 
sl6.S:6.0124 ·•• 'BGP 20 0 83.83.83.9 ASl Unresolved 
:i]7.7.7.0!2( ,BGP 
.. 20 .. 0 83.83.819 AS1 Unresolved 
~J 8.8.8.0/24 _ BGP 20 __ 0 83.83.83.29 _ AS4 Unresolved 
_9-_.19.9.9.0/24 ........ BGP 20 
• « ~ 
0 83.83.83.102 ASS Unresolved 
l!JJ83.83.83.8/30_ . Dir~ct :o 0 83.83.83.10 AS2 IF10 
llJ83.83.83.12/30 _. :BGP 20 :o 83.83.83.9 ASl Unresolved 
gj 83.83.83.28/30 :D~ect_ 0 
.. 
0 83.83.83.30 AS2 IF11 
.!~_!8_3.8183.J~ ,sGP 20 ______ :0 ____ 8183._83._2_ A~3_ 'Unresolved 
.!.'!!~,83.83.3§.gl BGP __ .... 20 0 _ _83.83.83.l0_AS?. Unresolved 
151100.1.0.0/16 ,~Gp .. _ ,20 _ 0 '83.83.83.2 AS3 'Unresolved 
161100.iioh~ 8GP . :20_ . iQ 8183.83.f 'AS3 Urmolved 
.!l.J!00.1.2.0/24__ 'BGP . 20 .. 0 __ "':83.83.83.2_ AS3 . Unresolved 
)}j 83.83.83.36/30 BGP 20 0 83.83.83.102 ASS Unresolved 
1-C l 83.83 83.100/30 
.. 
[)!ect 0 0 83.83.83.101 AS2 IF4 
I~},00.0.0018 __ 'B_GF'_ 
-•·' 
20 _o 83.83.83.9 ___ ASl : Unresolved 
~Jl00.1,0.0(16_ .. ... .. 'BGP :20 ... 
.... 
0 83.83.83.9 ... ASl _Unresolved 
]J.:jlOO,tl.0/24 .... __ BGF' '20 
.. 
0 
-··• 
83.83.83,9. ASl .. _U_nresolved 
_!~J1Q1.1.0.0/16__ 'BGP '20 0 .. 83.83.816 AS4 _'IJni~solved 
1ru1otl1,0/24 . 8GP _ 20___ 0 83.83.83.6 AS_4 _U_nresolved 
201110.0.0.0/8 BGP_ 20 ___ · ... ;ll· '83.83.83._10 t-52 __ :Unresolved 
_2H110.l0.0/16 ,BGP ... 20_ :o 83.83.83.10 AS2 IJnresolved 
_?.~110.1.1.0/24 ,BGP _·20 :o '83.83,83)0 .652 Unresolved 
_2_=!)111.0.0.0/8 BGP 20 ·o 83.83.83.10_AS2. Unresolved 
2-4!112.0.0.0/8 . :BGP __ 20 0_ 83.83.8110 AS2 Unresolved 
251113.0.0.0/8 BGP 20__ _ Q__ _ 83.83.83.10 AS2. Urmolved 
j~]114.0,0.0/8 . BGP 20__ 0 . 83.83.83.10 AS2 _,Unresolved 
J!J.Jl00.1:2.0/24 __ ... B_GP 20 o __ 83.83.83.9 _ ASl ·unresolved 
~1101-0.0.0/8 __ .... BGP_ _20 0 83.83.83.9 _ 'ASl Unre:olved 
20\101.1.0.0/16 BGP 20 
... 
0 83.83.83.29 _AS4 :Unresolved 
ifj 101.1.1.oh( __ ·sGP 20 0 83.83.83.29 AS4 Unresolved 
221102.0.0.0/8 :BGP_ 
.. 
20 
.. 
,o 83.83.83.9 AS1 
.. 
Unresolved 
23!103.0.0.0/8 ... 
_:BG!' 20 0 83.83.83.9 AS1 Unresolved 
'2ii 104.o.o:ois . :BGP ,20 0 · 83.83.83.9 AS1 Unresolved 
2s] 1os.o.o.0/8 .BGP 20 0 83.83.83.9 AS1 Unresolved 
jfil110.1.0.0/16 ___ BGP 20 0 83.83.83.102 ASS. Unre:olved 
.?1]115.0.0.0/8 BGP 20 ,o 83.83.83.10 AS2 Unresolved .??] 110.1 .1.0/24 :BGP 20 0 83.83.83.102.ASS · Unresolved 
Figure 5.10 ASl 's & AS2's Forwarding Tables from FA Report (after RIP has been redistributed into BGP), all the AS-
owned subnets plus loopbacks are reachable through BGP solely. The viewpoint that each AS has towards 110.1. 1.0/24 is 
considerable. 
5.2.6 Demand Performance Table; Drilling Down to the Paths Taken by each 
Demand 
The Demand Performance Table below confirms that all the demands designed between nodes are 
successfully traversed through underlying routing infrastructure (from the 110 successful demands 
routed, we only display a partial result here). The observations include Status of Demands, Hop 
Count, and Average Delay pertaining to each demand. More substantially, Definition Detail as well as 
Routing Detail drill-down links for Demand Performance FA Report reveal source as well as path 
information required for Byzantine studies for given demand(s). 
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Demand Name Address Family Status , Hop Count Average Bits Per Sec Average Delay (msec) End lo nd Jilter [msec) 
1 Sao_Paulo_LA.N ··> Sydney_LA.N IPv4 Successful 6 l 20,000 109.924 0.008 
2 Sydney_LAN ··> Sao_Paulo_LAN IPv4 Successful 6 120,000 109.924 0.008 
3 ASS ··> Sao_Paulo_LA.N IPv4 Successful 5 120,000 103.968 0.008 
4 AS9 ··> Sydney_LAN IPv4 Successful 1 120,000 5.956 0.001 
5 Sao_Paulo_LAN ··> ASS IPv4 Successful 5 120.000 103.968 0.008 
6 Sydney_Lo.N -> ASS IPv4 Successful 1 120,000 5.956 00 
7 AS8 --> ASS IPv4 Successful 3 120,000 65.948 0.006 
8 ASS ··> Sao_Paulo_LAN IPv4 Successful 4 120,000 91 .423 0 006 
9 ASS ··> Sydney_LAN IPv4 Successflil 4 120,000 71 .905 0.006 
10 AS9 --> AS8 IPv4 Successful 3 120.000 65.948 0.006 
11 Sao_Paulo_LAN ··> ASS IPv4 Successful 4 120,000 91 .423 0.006 
.!.? Sydney_LAN ··> AS8 IPv4 Successful 4 120,000 71 .904 0.006 
13 AS? --> ASS IPv4 Successful 3 120,000 110.201 0.006 
Demand Name Maximum Packet loss (%)1 Volume Definition Detail Routing Detail 
1 Sao_Paulo_LAN ··> Sydney_lAN 0.0 51 .498 MB Details Route S_ydney_LA.N 
2 Sydney_LAN ··> Sao_Paulo_LA.N 0.0 51 .498MB Details Route Sao_Paulo_LAN 
!.. ASS ··> Sao_Paulo_LAN 0.0 51 .498 MB Details Route Sao_Paulo_LAN 
4_ ~ A.S9 ··> Sydney_LAN 0.0 51 .488 MB Details Route Sydney_LAN 
_5 Sao_Pau!o_LAN ··> AS9 0.0 51.498 MB Details Route AS9 
-6 Sydney_L6.N ··> AS9 0.0 51 .498 MB Details Route AS9 
7 AS8 --> ASS 0.0 51 .498 MB Details Route A.S9 
-
8 A.SB ··> Sao_Paulo_L6.N 0.0 51 .498 MB Details Route Sao_Paulo_LAN 
~ . ASS ··> Sydney_L6.N 0.0 51 .498 MB Details Route Sydney_LAN 
1.Q_ A,S9 -·> AS8 0.0 51 .498 MB Details Route ASB 
11 Sao_Paulo_LAN ··> ASB 0.0 51 .498 MB Details Route ASS 
12 Sydney_LAN ··> ASS 0.0 51 .498 MB Details Route ASS 
13 A.S7 --> ASS 0.0 51.498 MB Details Route ASS 
Figure 5 .11 Demand Performance FA Report, all demands have been traversed successfully across all nodes; Status of 
Demands, Hop Count & Average Delay corresponding to each demand are shown. More importantly, Routing Detail & 
Definition Detail drill-down links reveal source as well as path details taken by each demand required for Byzantine 
failure/robustness studies. 
In the absence of any other routing protocol except BGP as well as any other traffic types rather 
than the designed traffic demands, maximum interface utilisation is equal to 6.7% (average 2.8% ). 
Next, if we dig more into the routing traffic info for the demand sourced from Sao_Paulo_LAN and 
destined to Sydney_LAN for instance (victim subnet), by selecting Definition Detail from Demand 
Performance FA report, then in addition to source and destination IP addresses as well as demand 
duration, routing details for the specified demand can be highlighted as in Figure 5 .12 (Demand 
Roster FA Report verifies the same result). 
Demand Name Source Node Source Destination Destination Start Time 
Address Node Addreu 
------- ·------ -------------, Sao_Paulo_L6.N ··> Sydney_LAN Sao_Pau1o_LAN 100.1.1 .1 Sydney_LAN 110.1.1.1 18:37:56.000Jul252013 
Stop Time Routing Detail Average Average Average Pkt 
Pkts/Sec Bits/Sec Size (bytes) 
0:37:56.000 Jul 25 2013 Sao_Paulo_LAN ··> Sydney_LAN 100 120,000 150.0 
Figure 5.12 Sao_Paulo_LAN ➔ Sydney_LAN demand, Definition Detail chosen from either Demand Performance or 
Demand Roster FA Reports; Routing Detail for given demand is illustrated. 
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Status j Element j Splitj Queuei Traffic! Fwding Pkt_ j Propa_ gation j Transmission 
________ _, ___ _,_ ______ ___,! {%)J ! Cl~yela.v(mm)_J DelayJmsec). Delay(msec) 
Demand Name 
,LjSao_Pau!o_LAN •·> Sydney_LAN!Successfull~~~e.:.~a~_F'~u!o_½r,,i ;100.0 
2 i Link: Sao Paulo I.AN <·>AS6:100.0'Defau!t :Default :5.775 
~ N-~d~~ ~si .. ~-~ -= .- ....... -~~-.. :.:Hoo.a__ . q:[:_"_~". _____ _,_ .. 5.763 
10.012 
!J Link:.6S35->AS6 .. J0_0:0"Default :Default ;!9.~6_5 19.236 ·0.020 
!U Node:_AS3 ---·-··· ............ :100.0 0.0 ____ .............. . 
6 l ~~r~_~S}~:?J§.~. __ :tO.P:0 Default iDefau!t_i_3-~:6-~L .. _. ____ .. :39.653 .0.028 
IJ Node: AS4 _ ....... _ :1_00.()_ 0.0 
!.J LlrikiAs4·<·>·As5· _________ J00.0'.Default ;Default ;18.114 18.086 0.028 
~ ~~ode.:.~~-5.... : 100.0 0.0 
.!!] ~in~_~S5_~·?.AS~. :~_00~O.:Default_:Defau!t :.?1~3~-- :21.103 0.028 
11 ! f:lg~e._:_e,~~----··--- ------~-- .. :190.:.o_. 9:P. ___________ . Ul Link:_ Sydney_LAN<•> ASS_ : 100.0 Default \ Default : 5.956 ........................ . 
131 Node: Sydney_L.6.N \100.0 0.0 
15.944 0.012 
~ 1~ 
15! 
1 ·· · Status I Element Queueing · ! Jitter j Packet j VPN l Protocol Stack! Routing! 
-------~;---~-------11 Delay (msec) (msec);J .. out¾t I Protocol; Demand Name 
Metric 
1 ISao_Paulo_LAN ::> Sydney_lAN :successful Node: Sao_Pauk>_LAN Inferred 1 f.J (~~~~;_p;~;_!Aif</ASG o.o_ _ _p._o _____ :0:9. __ IPv4/HDLC/DS1/_ 
!J Node: AS6 0:_0_ i 0.0 .: 0.L BGP . (0, 100. IGP, I 
4 I ~k--AS3 <:~~~~::«.·: . - 0.001 - .. :!!c0_(lt_,q,o_ 51 Nod~: AS3_ __ 0.0 0.0 __ · _0.0 ___ _ 
!U Lir]k:AS_3_<:>.!':?.~ .. --- __ 0.001 ....•.. _'.O,Q04 __ ,o.o 
"?J No_d~:_AS4. 0,_(l ..... _ ~0.0 ___ . 10.0 !LJ Lii11-:AS4_~:> -~-s~_ . 0.001 0.004. _ 1 o,Q 
9 l Node:AS~-----------·· . ___ 0.0 ___ . •. i0,0 ... :0.0 
101 ~~: ~s~<:>~S9 0.001 0.004 _:o.o 
!!l 1'lo~e: ~9 0.0 !,0.0 0.0 
12i Lin~ SydneyJ.~_~<:>..6S9 0.0. 0.001 _j0._(l 
13l Node: Sydney_lAN 0.0 :0.0 0.0 
!!J 0.007 0.0 
151 
_ IPv4/HDLC/DS3/ 
BGP 
IPv4/HDLC/DS3/ 
BGP 
IPv4/HDLC/DS3/ 
BGP 
IPv4/HDLC/DS3/ 
_Direct 
IPv4/HDLC/DS1 / 
; (0. 100, IGP.) 
(0.100.IGP,) 
1(0, 100, IGP, J 
Figure 5.13 Sao_Paulo_LAN ➔ Sydney_LAN demand, Routing Detail, chosen from either Demand Performance or 
Demand Roster FA Reports; path information shows that the traffic goes to AS6 which knows through BGP to direct traffic 
for Sydney_LAN to AS3, and then from AS3 in tum through BGP, traffic will be directed to AS4, afterwards AS5 and 
finally AS9. 
The Routing Detail from Figure S.12 then can verify the route taken by this demand hop-by-hop 
as well as the routing protocol where the intended prefix has been advertised. This is displayed in 
Figure S.13. Propagation Delayffransmission Delay/Queuing Delay for each hop are also shown. In 
view of this result, for Sao_Paulo_LAN to Sydney_LAN, AS6 becomes aware through BGP that 
110.1.1.1/24 is reachable through AS3. By the same token, AS3 then forwards the traffic to AS4. AS4 
in tum knows that the prefix is reachable via BGP through ASS. ASS, afterwards, is aware that the 
110.1.1.0/24 subnet was initially advertised by AS9 and thus routes the traffic to that AS. AS9 lastly 
receives the demand addressed for its directly connected subnet and hence forwards it to the 
Sydney _LAN as the victim. 
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5.2.7 Visual Analytics via RA Studies before the Byzantine Attack 
Sao_Paulo_LAIJ 
-
ma 
Alttibut• 
.J?.<t~/.!l.il')_ 
Pirig P.at"ameter,s 
Figure 5.14 The result of RA before Byzantine attack is conducted. The route from each AS towards AS9, i.e. 
Sydney_LAN as 110.1.1.0/24 originator, is calculated and graphically displayed with green arrows via RA's graphical 
interface. Additionally, the underlying routing mechanism for the given subnet on each node is highlighted (B stands for 
BGP). 
We then gain an advantage from another essential technique for Byzantine studies simulated by 
OPNET called Reachability Analysis (RA). Recall that demands are generally exploited when we 
model potentially changeable relationships between nodes of the network under study. Other use 
cases for demands include studying end-to-end connectivity, performing RA and eventually 
troubleshooting routing issues. The aforementioned pros obviously fit into the area of Byzantine 
failure research here. To anatomise a routing failure, route propagations on each node along every 
possible physical path should be verified. RA facilitates this for a given destination over every 
existing path in the network in one step. In this way, highlighting routing failures to specific 
destination(s) is straightforward. RA performs the analysis by looking into the routing tables created 
as a result of DES or FA and then visualises the result of this analysis through its rich graphical user 
interface (GUI). rn_] discusses how visual analysis can assist in understanding BGP hijacks and other 
routing anomalies in routing data. RA reveals the next hop for a given destination by an arrow for 
instance. These arrows contribute to form the paths data will take to reach a specific destination. 
Missing arrows/gaps which are easy to spot raise the alarm and disclose the problematic node(s) for 
further investigations. RA does not need next hops to be necessarily physical neighbours. Also, 
optionally, RA can show next hops for aggregated addresses which encompass the destination 
address . RA is best used for analysing what-if scenarios in which a mechanism is required to verify 
whether or not a new address is propagated properly across the network. 
The above result simply indicates graphically the paths all nodes should take to reach 110.1.1.0/24 
subnet in a green dashed arrow before the Byzantine attack launches. 00 according to RA legend 
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implies the ASes that have heard of this victim subnet via BGP. ~ illustrates the originating source 
for this subnet which is AS9. Subsequently, by implementing Byzantine failure scenarios we expect 
more than one node with originating source for the victim subnet displayed by duplicated ~ in the 
RA results. 
5.3 Flow Analysis & Reachability Analysis Studies After the Byzantine 
Attack 
FA and RA results are discussed here whereby the Byzantine attack has been already conducted. 
The results should be compared with those before the attack shown in section 5.2. 
5.3.1 AS7's Misbehaviour; Impact of the Byzantine Attempt on the Failure of 
Demands 
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Figure 5.15 FA Summary result whereby AS7 starts exhibiting Byzantine behaviour by hijacking AS9's 110.1.1.0/24. In 
contrast to when the attack had not been conducted, 12 demands now fail. 
For each AS as the prefix hijacker for the network under study, we already explored the adverse 
impact of the Byzantine failure in detail. Partial results whereby AS7 misbehaves and hijacks AS9's 
110.1.1.0/24 are discussed here for instance. The FA summary revealed above implies that out of 132 
total active demands generated for the Byzantine attack when AS7 conducts BGP prefix hijacking, 12 
routes are considered unroutable and thus fail (all 12 nodes send flows in a fully meshed graph, i.e .. 12 
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* 11 =132 demands in total). Additionally, average and maximum WAN link utilisation falls from 2.5 
Mbps and 6.7 Mbps to 2.4 Mbps and 6.1 Mbps respectively as an adverse impact of the unroutable 
demands stemming from the Byzantine behaviour (opposite the result in Figure 5.5). We then stepped 
further to investigate the exhaustive list of the failed and unroutable demands for this specific case 
study with the aid of the relevant FA report. Figure 5.15 also displays 12 failed demands. 
Accordingly, the demands destined for Sydney_LAN from ASl, AS3, AS4, AS6 and AS8 are 
considered unreachable after they reach AS7's IF0 (the attacker). This is deemed to be an obvious 
Byzantine failure instance in our view. 
Similar studies have been done whereby every other AS is also trying to conduct BGP prefix 
hijacking against AS9's 110.1.1.0/24 in the course of this research. 
5.3.2 The Impact of the Byzantine Misbehaviour on the BGP Control Plane 
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Figure 5.16 Demand Performance FA report where AS7 misbehaves for the failed Sao_Paulo_LAN to Sydney_LAN 
demand; along with Definition Detail Demand Roster report as well as the drilled down Routing Detail report. Accordingly, 
the Byzantine failure cannot be justified from a pure routing viewpoint since the layer 3 system is operating expectedly. 
We need to look into the details of each failed demand with the aid of the Demand Performance 
FA report to look for the justification regarding these failures. Above, firstly the demand performance 
table for the scenario when AS7 misbehaves is depicted (partial table). Afterwards, the relevant 
Demand Roster Inventory FA report for Sao_Paulo_LAN to Sydney_LAN is displayed as the result of 
drilling down into the demand's Definition Detail. More importantly, Demand Routing Detail 
Performance FA report is then revealed. Accordingly, the traffic leaves the Sao_Paulo_LAN to AS6 
expectedly and AS6 through BGP is already aware of the destination/next hop and thus traffic is then 
forwarded to AS3 as the next hop. AS3 believes that the next hop towards the destination ( or the 
destination itself) is AS7 and subsequently delivers the traffic to the attacker. The observation is that 
the Byzantine failure cannot be reflected with the pure inter-domain routing analyses since the 
insecurity of the semantics of the BGP's control plane does not seem disruptive to the normal 
operation of layer three. 
102 
Methodology & Designfor Localised Overlay Management Plane (LOMP) 
5.3.3 Visual Analytics via RA Studies after the Byzantine Attack 
Below, the results for the RA studies on the Byzantine failure scenarios whereby each AS from 
ASl to AS8 in turn endeavours to hijack AS9's 110.1.1.0/24 subnet are shown. BGP hijacks cannot 
always be identified by automated algorithms [.8_]. These are best understood when the RA test before 
the attack shown in Figure 5.14 is considered first. We define the Byzantine attack success rate as the 
number of (percentage) the affected ASes of any type (marginal, forwarding & core ASes) whereby 
one AS exhibits Byzantine behaviour by hijacking the target subnet of the victim AS. Thus, the 
significant observations we have had can be categorised according to the following criteria: 
• The success rate of the Byzantine attack based on the closeness of the attacker to the 
victim 
• The success rate of the Byzantine attack based on the out-degree of the attacker node 
AS9 
Figure 5. 17 Results of the RA tests whereby AS 1 & AS2 are mi sbehavi ng with 85 % and 100% Byzantine attack success 
rate respectively. The analysis shows that the closer the attacker is to the victim, the higher the success rate of the attack. 
We have intentionally chosen our victim subnet to be a stub AS not only because the vast majority 
of the ASes are stub ASes in practice but also since if the victim AS is a stub then it results in the 
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largest number of the affected ASes (marginal compared to forwarding or core ASes), which 
constitutes the worst case scenarios for the Byzantine studies [147]. 
When AS 1 misbehaves, except ASS, the traffic from all the other ASes towards the victim subnet 
is hijacked and therefore the attack success rate is around 8S%. With AS2 as the attacker, we should 
not lose sight of the fact that since the attacker is now closer to the victim, the success rate of the 
attack rises dramatically (here 100%) and therefore any traffic destined for the Sydney _LAN is now 
enrouted to AS2. 
The abovementioned observation is of immense significance since according to studies 8S% of the 
ASes across the Internet are stub ASes (similar to our victim AS) [62, 122]. Based on our RA test 
observations here, launching Byzantine attacks from the closest ASes to the victim namely AS2, AS4 
and ASS (which are only either one or two hops away from the target) results in a 100% attack 
success rate. 
When AS3 misbehaves, similar to AS 1 's Byzantine failure behaviour, the success rate is 8S%. 
Here, ASS still utilises the legitimate route to reach the victim subnet due to its shortest path (in the 
absence of any other policies). However, due to the hearsay nature of BGP, ASS still installs the 
poisoned BGP UPDATE originating from AS3 into its BGP routing table. AS4, as the hijacker, is 
analogous to AS2, as the attacker, in that they are both located only two hops away from the victim. 
Similarly, the success rates are 100%. AS4 as the most highly connected node in our studies forms 
one of the anchors of trust for the overlay solution. 
The adverse impact of a misbehaving node which is highly connected is also fatal as will be seen 
later with FA studies as well. This is because such nodes contribute more in the creation of BGP 
UPDATE messages and the underlying poisoned origin-to-prefix bindings. Despite this, the closeness 
of the attacker to the victim in contrast to the attacker with richer out-degree has more detrimental 
impact in terms of the increased attack success rate as the observations point out. In other words, 
when AS2, AS4 and ASS, which are only either one or two hops away from the victim, misbehave, 
100% of the traffic addressed to the 110.1.1.0/24 will be hijacked. Having said that, for AS3 with out-
degree=4 and ASl with out-degree=3 as the second and third most highly connected nodes in the 
ordered list, the attack success rate declines to 8S% as ASS still utilises the correct route owing to its 
shortest path to the genuine origin. 
ASS as the attacker validates the same observation as before in that the success rate is 100% due 
to its closeness to the victim. According to our studies here, if the attacker is the immediate hop to the 
victim (ASS) and the victim is the stub AS (AS9- recall that 8S% of all the ASes across the Internet 
are stubs in reality), then the hijacking attempt is 100% successful. 
Next, where AS6 as the stub AS misbehaves, the attack success rate decreases to 71 %. Simply 
put, unlike core or forwarding layers (i.e. nodes which are richer in connectivity than stub ASes), the 
lower the attacker is in the hierarchy, the less the attack success rate will be (additionally, as already 
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observed with our results the closer the attacker is to the victim, the larger the attack influence will 
be). 
AS9 
Figure 5.18 AS3's Byzantine failure behaviour is similar to that of ASI with 85% success rate. AS4 as the attacker can 
hijack 100% of the traffic destined for the victim subnet. AS3 with out-degree=4 is the second most highly connected AS in 
the ordered list. 
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Figure 5.19 Misbehaving ASS (immediate hop to the victim) affects the traffic for 100% of the ASes towards the victim. 
Where AS6 as stub AS misbehaves, the attack success rate degrades to 71 %. Two significant observations include: the lower 
the attacker is in the layered hierarchy, the lower the success rate of the attack; the closer the attacker is to the victim, the 
larger the adverse impact of the attack. 
Figure 5.20 AS7's misbehaviour leads to 71 % of the success rate of the attack and its adverse influence on the affected 
nodes. When attacking stub AS approaches the target, as with AS8, the Byzantine attack success rate again goes up to 85%. 
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Lastly, AS7 as the hijacker validates the same observations as before. As a stub AS, AS7's 
misbehaviour degrades the success rate of the Byzantine attack to 71 %. When misbehaving stub AS 
gets closer to the victim AS, as with AS8, then the adverse impact of the attack steps up to 85% again. 
5.4 Methodology behind the Integrated Management Plane 
5.4.1 Need of the Integrated Management Plane for Byzantine Robust BGP 
According to ~], NLRI can still be modified or forged by either an outsider or BGP peer source. 
No matter which, they can disrupt routing, overwhelm a router along the advertised router, end up 
with DoS or data loss where the advertised route will not forward traffic to the expected network and 
finally enroute the traffic through a sub-optimal route. As [17-25] highlight, the vulnerability in which 
a legitimate entity in the middle of conversation simply misbehaves is called Byzantine failure. While 
BGP with huge install base remains the sole inter-domain routing protocol in extensive use [1], faulty, 
misconfigured, or deliberately malicious sources can disrupt overall Internet behaviour by injecting 
bogus routing information into the BOP-distributed routing database (by modifying, forging, or 
replaying BGP packets) [5.]. The current Internet has no secure way of validating the correctness of 
the routing information [Q]. In other words, there is no systematic way to validate claims of address 
ownership or location at the Internet scale [62]. [11] summarises the problem of existing BGP security 
solutions with inefficiency and insufficiency of deployment for both control-plane as well as data-
plane based approaches to detect hijacking attempts. 
In addition to withdrawn routes or prefix hijack threat models [2], Lill] implies that with BGP sub-
prefix hijacking (also called BGP de-aggregation attack) in which a more specific (longer) prefix of 
the victim prefix is announced, a manipulator can hijack traffic from 100% of the ASes. No matter 
how BGP attacks are launched, even partial outages which last for only a few hours constitute the 
primary factor in a large portion of the Internet's overall end-to-end downtime [H]. Even AS-Path 
prepending as an inter-domain traffic engineering mechanism can be exploited and result in BGP 
prefix interception attack [U]. According to [1fil, BGP makes half of AS es vulnerable to a prefix 
hijack, and 100% vulnerable to a sub-prefix hijack. 
To summarise, prefix hijacking remains the major area of vulnerability in the current inter-domain 
routing system [148]. Since security is a chain, the inter-domain routing system is as secure as it is 
vulnerable to prefix hijacking (its weakest point). There is no currently-practised method for 
determining whether the information received from an unknown AS is true or valid [.8..Q]. Also, there 
is no consensus on where and how the filtering should be applied [119]. As with [21], more resilient 
Internet infrastructure requires "additional verifications and validations" to not blindly accept all BGP 
message exchanges. [27.] even goes further by arguing that no single defensive mechanism can be 
strong enough to defend against the diverse range of BGP attacks vector and thus emphasises the 
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necessity to the added line of protection even in the presence of crypto-based solutions. This 
highlights the significance of the current research as well. Overcoming these challenging obstacles 
forms the cornerstone for the proposal of the integrated management pl~ne. ·We aim at securing the 
semantics of BGP through our proposed method. Also, while comprehensive frameworks were 
previously considered too elusive for BGP, whether or not one can think of a less comprehensive but 
secure enough SIDR remedy is the main question to answer here. 
Returning to section 5.3.2, while we could not characterize the attack using various layer three 
analyses, we finally listed in a non-systematic manner all the IPv4 subnets obtained from the relevant 
configuration FA report below. The list however, reflects the fact that 110.1.1.0/24 is not onl~ 
associated with the router address of AS9 (the true owner) but also belongs to AST s router interface 
unpredictably. The absence of such a global, shared, accurate and not-AS-wide view of the subnet 
ownerships across the Internet is what current inter-domain routing lacks in our minds. Therefore, the 
integrated management plane is needed to provide such a global view to confront Byzantine failures. 
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Figure 5.211Pv4 Subnets Configuration FA report whereby AS7 misbehaving is assembled in a non-systematic manner. 
Accordingly, 110.1.1.0/24 has unexpectedly two owners: AS7 (the attacker) as well as AS9 (the valid originator). The lack 
of such a shared global (not AS-wide) view in our minds jeopardises the inter-domain routing security with regard to 
Byzantine failures. · 
5.4.2 Summary of the Shortfalls for the Current Remedies 
In the previous chapter, our analysis of the state of the art solutions emphasises the lack of 
Byzantine robustness in almost all remedies. Even a promising comprehensive security architecture 
like IRV lacks Byzantine robustness since IRV cannot detect forged AS attacks [.Ll]. However, our 
work additionally clarifies how trusted IRV servers can be located and communicated securely with 
each other. 
All the centralised security solutions such as offline registries are prone to exhibiting Byzantine 
failure behaviour since the centralised nature does open the door to a single point of failure for the 
inter-domain routing. Most current crypto solutions are limited to the immediate neighbourhood (not 
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long-term measure) or suffer from the lack of PKI. PKI-based solutions are quite difficult to build due 
to the fact that no centralized infrastructure for tracing changes in IP prefix assignments exists at the 
moment as rn2] highlights. Also, at the Internet scale, clearly, pure crypto based solutions are not 
feasible for deploying cost-wise as [LlJ points out. They also potentially expose BGP to DoS due to 
the high processing load as well as massive storage requirements. Cryptographic remedies between a 
pair of BGP speakers demand PS Ks (Pre-shared Keys) which raises the alarm in terms of scalability 
issues (key management). While IPsec is the most comprehensive fix for BGP security currently, it is 
not intended to cope with extensive attacks like prefix hijacking which is the main focus of this 
research. 
On the other hand, for non-crypto solutions, [119] reveals that the most aggressive filtering 
policy leaves about 0.3% of the address space uncovered by any remaining prefix in the routing table. 
However, ISPs are reluctant to implement this. Defensive filtering of BGP malicious announcements 
is a modem technique highly bound to heuristics. Furthermore, recall that as LIi voices, route filtering 
and registry authentication have proved only moderately effective. This is due to the lack of 
consensus on "where" and "how" the filtering should be applied [119]. Our work in this chapter 
additionally clarifies these ambiguities. The main conclusion to be drawn is that there is no systematic 
approach currently in place to check whether the injected information into the inter-domain routing 
system's control plane is genuine or not at a global scale [ 149]. 
5.4.3 Related Byzantine Studies Exclude BGP 
Regarding related works, as Perlman in [25_, 150] in October 2013 points out, providing Byzantine 
robustness merely addresses link state routing protocols (i.e. not BGP) in flat networks through a 
Network Protocols with Byzantine Robustness (NPBR) proposal (NPBR also requires the source to 
specify the entire path which is not applicable to the Internet). In the next step, she tries to reach 
Byzantine robustness for a hierarchical network with HBR protocol (Hierarchical Byzantine 
Robustness) which is built on NPBR methodology utilising digital signature and hashing functions 
( crypto solution). The main focus of her work is on the Byzantine robust data plane forwarding 
system (rather than control plane). Also, she initially excludes BGP security from HBR design and 
then argues that protecting BGP against Byzantine failure requires a different approach to HBR which 
is reliant on the PKI. However, her work then clearly states that the end-to-end authentication as well 
as integrity falls outside of HBR design and thus must be provided by other mechanisms. The current 
work is therefore considered to be novel to the best of our knowledge by providing such an 
authentication mechanism for the semantics of BGP which is crypto independent. 
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5.4.4 Design Requirements 
As with [21], more resilient Internet infrastructure requires "additional verifications and 
validations" to not blindly accept all BGP message exchanges. [21] steps further arguing that no 
single defensive mechanism can be strong enough to defend against the diverse BGP attacks vector 
and thus emphasises the necessity to the added line of protection even in the presence of crypto-base 
solutions. This highlights the significance of the current research as well. 
We argue that owing to the huge industrial install-base of BGP, the de facto protocol is still 
increasingly going to serve the community broadly while any attempt which dictates any changes in 
the protocol itself and its operational message types will face with reluctance from the operators for 
adoption in the real world. While PKI and crypto based solutions with associated computational 
overhead confront serious adoption challenges at the global scale (strong security incurs costs and 
hence some proposals fail in terms of real-world deployment), our analysis in the previous stage 
emphasises the fact that incrementally deployable designs (including our design) seem more 
promising [130]. In other words, similar to Jennifer Rexford in [112], it is envisaged that the 
wholesale deployment of a secure BGP is impossible in practice as opposed to an incrementally-
deployable approaches for SIDR such as IRV, pgBGP or our proposal. Butler in [113] also speaks 
about the lack of any incrementally deployable solutions as the major difficulty in SIDR. Recall that 
as another substantial outcome of our analysis on the state-of-the-art issues and solutions, we found 
out that the only promising remedy proposed so far with regard to the incremental deployment design 
element which performs security out-of-band (and thus places the security burden on the application 
layer rather than IP, i.e. no change to BGP) is IRV. Note that the origin authentication proposals 
mostly operate with offline methods to shift memory burden from BGP speakers [.21]. 
Next, any steps towards new architecture by altering BGP itself to fit security within the protocol 
is prohibited by business unwillingness due to the protocol's huge install base (for near future at 
minimum). In other words, adopting changes to BGP in today's Internet encounters resistance even 
with uptaking 32-bit AS numbers. Therefore, long-term piecemeal deployment without protocol 
alterations is most likely the future direction for BGP security. 
Any systematic solution which requires collaboration of different parties across the global Internet 
must take into account the fact that BGP security is underestimated by telecom operators. If we 
simplify the BGP decision making process, discussed in the early chapters, into 8 distinct criteria, 
namely: 
1. Highest Local Preference 
2. Lowest AS Path Length 
3. Lowest origin type 
4. Lowest MED 
5. eBGP-learned over iBGP-learned 
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6. Lowest IGP cost to border router (i.e. hot-potato routing) 
7. If both paths are external, prefer the path that was received first (the oldest path) 
8. Lowest router ID (as tie-breaking criterion) 
then according to [110], only 9% of the telecom operators prioritise security first and therefore 
local preference attribute maintains its dominant role for policy decision. Hence, the "realistic" 
assumption should be this: the wide portions of the Internet will not adopt any solutions at all and thus 
the potential solution should not be left as an option. Consequently, collaboration amongst a few 
parties should be enough (not all of them) for a "working secure solution" to provide Byzantine 
robustness. 
Our findings for potential Byzantine robust BGP remedy are summarised as follows: 
1. Given the vital role of the Internet in today's critical infrastructure, insecurity of BGP still 
stands out as the Achilles heel [ 100]. 
2. No single defensive mechanism is protective enough against the entire range of attacks 
(need for added line of protection for Byzantine failure attacks). 
3. The security burden should be removed from BGP speakers (consequently proposals for 
origin authentication are mostly offline). 
4. No costly solution is acceptable and deployable (as a consequence crypto failed). 
5. No BGP alterations are tolerated due to the business resistance. 
6. Wholesale deployment is too elusive (no Flag Day); need for incrementally deployable 
solution. 
7. Remedy must not be an option. 
8. A few entities (not all of them) will collaboratively help solely to incorporate the solution. 
5.4.5 Methodology Foundations for the Integrated Management Plane 
As with [ll], the methodology for the diverse range of countermeasures we take against 
Byzantine failure is of three types: 
1. Prevention (before the attack) 
2. Detection ( during the attack) 
3. Reaction (after the attack) 
Simply put, the broad range of BGP security solutions discussed earlier can also be classified 
from these three methodology category perspectives as well. SBGP as the most comprehensive 
solution is of the prevention methodology type for instance. The substantial point here is that 
prevention type methodology for countermeasures in general results in changes on all BGP speakers 
and their infrastructure along with the added computational as well as memorial overhead, which 
places major barriers for their deployment in reality. Detection can conjointly work with the reaction 
if through our proposal malicious NLRI injection is discovered (in a similar way to the current 
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practice, genuine origin AS advertises more specific prefix and then contacts the attacker to withdraw 
the malicious route). Detection plays a complementary role to prevention as well as reaction and 
therefore the majority of the proposals in this field fit into this type. 
Similar to [1 51 ], we argue that although the AS-level topological structure of the Internet has 
grown tremendously in the past few years, the key topological characteristics still remain stable 
including: 
I. Hierarchical Structure 
2. Power-law degree distribution 
These characteristics form the methodology of our design. We build our model based on this 
hierarchical structure which fits very well with the power-law structure of the Internet [147]. 
5.4.5.1 Hierarchical Structure Property of the Internet 
By the first stable property we mean that nodes at the Internet scale graph constitute a hierarchical 
structure in which customer-provider relationships (commercial) establish a hierarchy from the root 
(i.e. top provider) all the way down to the end customer (i.e. stub AS for instance). The hierarchy also 
is formed in a way in which there is no loop between providers. The topological structure of the 
Internet is simplified in Figure 5.22. Circles in red indicate Tier3 ASes. The substantial point here is 
that the higher the Tier, the richer the AS in connectivity. These Tiered INPs (IP Network Providers) 
are widely known as ISPs (Internet Service Providers) . Tier3 ISPs (Local) aggregate the prefixes for 
Tier2 ISPs (Regional) which in tum summarise the IPs further for Tierl ISPs ( considered the 
backbone of the Internet). This summarisation or aggregation is based on the premise that IANA 
(Internet Assigned Numbers Authority) dedicates contiguous address blocks in IP address space to 
different regions. Figure 5.22 also contrasts the semi-hierarchical view versus the mesh view of the 
Internet. This highlights the fact that only a few ASes (those we want to make security-conscious 
against prefix hijacking) are largely responsible today for much of the path diversity in the Internet. 
Semi-Hierarchical View The Internet's Mesh View 
Figure 5.22 Semi-hierarchical view (logical) versus the mesh vjew (real) of the Internet 
Tierl , Tier2 and Tier3 ASes can interchangeably be called the core layer, forwarding layer and 
marginal layer respectively. According to section 5.3 analyses, the magnitude of the effect of 
112 
Methodology & Design for Localised Overlay Management Plane (LOMP) 
accepting false or malicious NLRI is reliant directly on its origin (Tierl, Tier2 and Tier3) and thus the 
attacker's and victim's location/position (and their relative position with each other) becomes 
determinative. Similar to [147], our results proved that the higher the location the attacker is in (and 
the closer to the victim), the larger its influence will be. 
5.4.5.2 Power-law Structure Property of the Internet; the Rich-Club 
Phenomenon 
Laws of the form y oc xa ➔ log(y) oc a- log(x) are called Power Laws in which y is proportional 
to x to the power of constant a. Back in 1999, [152] proved that AS-level graph at the Internet scale 
exhibits a power law degree distribution. Assume dv indicates out-degree of node v and rv or rank is 
the index in the sorted list in decreasing order. R or rank exponent is defined as the slope of the plot 
indicating out-degree of the ASes versus the rank of the ASes in log-to-log scale. [152] summarises 
the plotted Rank Exponent for the entire Internet as follows. 
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Figure 5.23 Plotted Rank Exponent for the Internet in log-to-log Scale; accordingly, there are many ASes categorized as 
Stub ASes in the whole Internet while only a few ASes are highly-interconnected. [ 152, 153] 
Simply put, dv of an AS, here v, is proportional to the rank of the AS rv to the power of a constant, 
R (dv oc r/). Note that R<O in this case. The main observation here is that there are many ASes 
categorized as Stub ASes in the whole Internet while only a few ASes are highly-interconnected. 
According to the aforementioned study, frequency (fd) of an out-degree (d) is proportional to the out-
degree to the power of a constant, 0, called Out-degree Exponent (fd oc cl°). Figure 5.24 from this 
study additionally describes this Out-degree Exponent Power Law in log-to-log scale. As shown, the 
number of ASes decreases as ASes become richer in terms of the connectivity. 
The early study was later completed in 2003 by [153] in which the same authors observe less than 
10% variation for the degree-based power law over the next five-year interval. Following these major 
milestones, numerous studies have exploited/proven the idea of a close relationship between the 
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distribution of node degree and a power law at the AS level including [154-158]. For instance, back in 
2012, [159] demonstrated that the Chinese Internet at the AS-level topology using graph theory obeys 
the power law at the global scale for the AS degree distribution of its 192 ASes. 
In summary, the power law structure property of the Internet constitutes the cornerstone of our 
design in which a small number of ASes with large number of links are very well connected to each 
other at the Internet scale. This is known as the rich-club phenomenon as named by [160] also. 
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Figure 5.24 Out-degree Exponent Power Law in log-to-log scale; the number of ASes decreases as ASes become richer 
in connectivity; rich-club phenomenon from another view. [152, 153] 
5.4.5.3 Beyond the Rich-Club Phenomenon 
5.4.5.3.1 Byzantine Failure as a result of the Falsifications of BGP UPDATES' AS-
Path Attributes 
The experimental results can display two distinct routing tables namely common forwarding table 
as well as protocol-specific routing table. The former is extracted from different instances of the latter 
based on the administrative weights. In section 5.4.5.3.2, we will disclose the viewpoint of each AS 
towards the victim subnet from the common routing table before Byzantine attack to reflect the 
impact of the flat BGP structure on the distribution of malicious/authentic NLRI. Below, in table 5, 
we observe the BGP specific routing table which entails the relevant BGP attributes. More precisely, 
AS-Path UPDATE attributes of immense value for our analysis for the victim subnet from the 
viewpoint of each individual AS are illustrated. Accordingly, 110.1. 1.0/24 is bound to the genuine 
owner which is AS9 under the AS-Path UPDATE attribute before the attack. Unlike table 5, table 6 
gathers the viewpoints of all the individual ASes towards the victim subnet where AS6 starts 
exhibiting Byzantine behaviour by hijacking 110.1.1.0/24. Based on the BGP-specific routing tables 
collected in table 6 after the attack, the hijacking attack successfully enroutes the traffic destined 
initially for AS9 and disseminated from AS 1, AS3, AS4, AS7 & AS8 towards AS6 instead. Despite 
this, AS2 & AS5 remain invulnerable since they have shorter routes to the genuine 110.1.1.0/24 
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(AS9) which wins the BGP path selection competition in the presence of the longer route to the rouge 
subnet (AS6). 
Table 5 BGP-specific routing table before the Byzantine attack; all the BGP attributes are shown for the advertised 
victim from the viewpoint of each individual AS. The victim subnet is bound to the valid origin AS through BGP AS-Path 
attribute. Accordingly, for all the ASes below, AS9 is the genuine owner of the prefix. 
AS Number / Row Number Source Next Hop Outgoing Local UPDATE within the Destination Preference/ AS-Path Origin 
Attributes Original Table Protocol Address/Node Interface Weight 
AS1 25 110.1.1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.10/AS2 IF10 100/0 AS2-AS6-AS9 Incomplete 
AS2 25 110.1.1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.102/AS5 IF4 100/0 AS6-AS9 Incomplete 
AS3 25 110.1.1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.22/AS4 IF11 100/0 AS4-AS6-AS9 Incomplete 
AS4 25 110.1.1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.33/AS5 IF6 100/0 AS5-AS9 Incomplete 
AS5 25 110.1.1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.38/AS9 IF11 100/0 AS9 Incomplete 
AS6 25 110.1.1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.13/ASJ IF10 100/0 AS3-AS4-AS6-AS9 Incomplete 
AS7 25 110.1.1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.17/AS3 IF10 100/0 AS3-AS4-AS6-AS9 Incomplete 
ASS 25 110.1 .1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.25/AS4 IF10 100/0 AS4-AS5-AS9 Incomplete 
AS9 25 110.1.1.0/24 Direct 110.1.1.2 IF0 100/32768 Not Applicable Incomplete 
Table 6 BGP-specific routing table after the Byzantine attack whereby AS6 hijacks 110.1. 1.0/24; all the BGP attributes 
are displayed for the victim subnet originally advertised by AS9 from the viewpoint of each subnet. ln contrast with Table 5, 
traffic for AS9 dispatched from ASl, AS3 , AS4, AS7 & ASS are hijacked as a result of poisoned AS-Path attributes. AS2 & 
ASS remain safe. The main observation is that Byzantine vulnerability is the result of the falsification of the semantics of 
this AS-Path UPDATE attribute. 
AS Number / Row Number Source Next Hop Outgoing Local UPDATE within the Destination Protocol Address/Node Interface Preference/ AS.Path Origin Attributes Oriqinal Table Weight 
AS1 25 110.1.1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.2/AS3 IF4 100/0 AS3-AS6 Incomplete 
AS2 25 110.1.1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.102/AS5 IF4 100/0 AS5-AS9 Incomplete 
AS3 25 110.1 .1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.14/AS6 IF4 100/0 AS6 Incomplete 
AS4 25 110.1.1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.21/AS3 IF4 100/0 AS3-AS6 Incomplete 
AS5 25 110.1 .1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.38/AS9 IF11 100/0 AS9 Incomplete 
AS6 25 110.1.1.0/24 Direct 110.1.1.2/Attacker IF1 100/32768 Not Applicable Incomplete 
AS7 25 110.1 .1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.17/AS3 IF10 100/0 AS3-AS6 Incomplete 
ASS 25 110.1 .1.0/24 EBGP 83.83.83.25/AS4 IF10 100/0 AS4-AS3-AS6 Incomplete 
AS9 25 110.1 .1.0/24 Direct 110.1.1.2 IF0 100/32768 Not Applicable Incomplete 
In summary, any Byzantine failure incident such as BGP prefixes hijacking or de-aggregation 
attempts are in fact the falsification of the semantics of this AS-Path UPDATE attribute. Values for 
such attributes are distributed through the control plane while there is no systematic solution to ensure 
whether or not the provided semantics are authentic. Hence, our integrated management plane offers a 
global (not AS-wide), shared, online (real-time), consistent and correct (authentic & non-stale) view 
towards the originator-to-prefix bindings- for confirming the veracity of the prefix ownerships 
across the Internet. Note that with originator we mean the given AS listed as the last element in the 
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AS-Path vector. Any violations from the integrated management plane's resultant view under the AS-
Path attribute triggers the alarm for possible malicious Byzantine behaviour (or misconfiguration). 
5.4.5.3.2 Traversing the Span of the Entire Network for Malicious/Authentic BGP 
Semantics; Need for Breaking BGP's Flat Structure 
Recall that BGP's main purpose is to spread out the current NLRI-to-AS bindings amongst ASes. 
Our work here proves that the Byzantine vulnerabilities of BGP are caused by the hop-by-hop 
paradigm of the protocol. As [161] highlights, routing messages in BGP traverse the span of the entire 
network in a hop-by-hop fashion and as such can easily jeopardise the safety of the global IP space by 
malicious semantics. Since 110.1.1.0/24 is the target for our hijacking attack scenario as an instance 
of Byzantine failure at the end, we aim to show the initial viewpoints for ASes towards the victim 
subnet before conducting the attack at this stage. Table 7 summarises the point of view each AS has 
towards the victim before the attack ( each row is extracted from different AS' s BGP routing tables to 
divulge its viewpoint towards 110.1. 1.0/24 prior to the attack). This is of enormous importance to 
contrast changes in viewpoints before with after the attack. 
Table 7 All ASes' viewpoints towards victim subnet AS9's 110.1.1.0/24 before Byzantine attack conducted (from 
common forwarding table); the impact of the propagation delay of the NLRI through gossip-like hop-by-hop hearsay BGP 
routing protocol is observed, accordingly ASS, AS2, AS4, ASl, AS8, AS3, AS7 and lastly AS6 in order are sequentially 
hearing of the victim subnet (as shown below the table). As simulation time goes by, BGP is disseminating the NLRI further 
hop-by-hop. Thus, the earlier we stop the propagation of the malicious NLRI, the less ASes are adversely affected. 
#AS Source Route Next Next Outgo. Outgo. Insertion Destin. Metric Hop Hop Time /FT Protocol Pref. Adds. Node lntrf. LSP (sec) 
AS1 110.1.1.0/24 BGP ... 20 .. . 0 83.83.83.10 AS2 .. IFl0 NIA .... _70.132 
AS2 110.1.1.0/24 ;BGP ;20 ... '0 
--·-
.. :83.83.83.102 ;ASS dF4 ti/A 
... 
70.113 
AS3 110.1.1.0/24 
.. 
:eGP 
.... 
- -- --
20 
--·~-·-•-•· .... - -~- - ., 
83838322 AS4 IF11 ti/~ 70.172 
AS4 110.1.1.0/24 , - ~ lBGP 20 ;o 83.83.83.33 ASS :1F6 :NIA 70.119 
AS5 110.1.1.0/24 ;BGP 20 ·o . , .. :83.83.83.38 :A59 ... IF11 'N/A 70.102 
ASS 110.1.1.0/24 :eGP :20 .. ~-" :o '. 83.8183.13 .. .. IF10 . . 100.163 AS3 
. 
NIA 
AS7 110.1.1.0/24 BGP '20 0 '83.83.83.17 AS3 IF10 NIA 70.219 
ASS 110.1.1.0/24 BGP . :20 ·o 83.83.83.25 AS4 IF10 ti/A 70.150 
AS9 110.1.1.0/24 Oiiect ;o 0 110.1.1.2 'AS9 .IF0 N/A 0.000 
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AS6 A57 ASS ASS 
At time 0 of the simulation start time, AS9 knows about the victim subnet through its directly 
connected network. By the start of the BGP process on all nodes at a constant time of 70.000 seconds 
after simulation start time, AS5 through hop-by-hop BGP protocol hears about this subnet and installs 
it in the corresponding forwarding table at time 70.102. AS2 is the next person who learns about the 
victim subnet at time 70.113 from AS5. AS4 in turn hears of the subnet from AS5 at time 70.119 of 
the simulation. The substantial observation is that as simulation time goes by, we can verify how later 
through gossip-like hop-by-hop hearsay the BGP routing protocol NLRI is propagated across more 
nodes. AS4 at time 70.119 of the simulation is the next AS which NLRI reaches. At this point, AS2 
has already heard of the subnet and thus has already started informing his neighbours of this address's 
route. Subsequently, earlier than ASes away from AS4 hear from the victim subnet, ASl now at 
70.132 is notified of this NLRI. Afterwards, from AS4's side, it is in fact AS8 who next is informed 
of the subnet at 70.150 simulation time by AS4. AS4 informs also AS3 then at 70.172 who in turn 
notifies AS7 at 70.219 of the AS9's 110.1.1.0/24 subnet. Lastly, AS6, at time 100.163 of the 
simulation, is the final AS who hears of this network existence and how to reach it through the reverse 
path. 
To summarise, AS5, AS2, AS4, ASl, AS8, AS3, AS7 and lastly AS6 in order were sequentially 
hearing of the victim subnet. This means that as simulation time goes by, BGP distributes the 
authentic/malicious NLRI further. Therefore, the earlier we stop the propagation of the malicious 
NLRI, the less ASes are adversely affected. 
5.4.5.3.3 Dominant Role of the Rich ASes in the Distribution of much of the 
Malicious/Authentic BGP Semantics 
The next experimental results are of vast significance for the proposed design later to achieve 
Byzantine robustness. In section 5.4.5.3.1, our findings proved that the Byzantine behaviour is the 
result of the falsification of some of the BGP UPDATE attributes. Then in 5.4.5.3.2, we discussed 
how the hop-by-hop paradigm allows the poisonous semantics to traverse the span of the entire 
network gradually. Therefore, we want now to highlight ASes which have more contributions to the 
creation of BGP UPDATE messages and therefore are more responsible for much of the 
malicious/authentic path diversities (by generating/disseminating more NLRI associated attributes). 
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We then design a systematic solution based on the trusted filters (implemented similar to section 4.6.6 
filters) which are placed upon these ASes. This is due to the fact that while rich ASes are few in 
quantity (and as such more feasible for our mechanism to be implemented in terms of the 
convenience, scalability and ease of incrementally deployment/maintenance), they are actually largely 
responsible for much of the overall valid/invalid BGP NLRI propagations across the entire network 
(not ASes which have more prefixes to advertise). Recall that Rexford in [119] discusses the lack of 
consensus on where and how the filtering should be applied which is one of the driving motives of the 
current research which will be addressed additionally here. 
According to our experimental results, OPNET Packet Info DES Report - Module Centric gathers 
statistics for generated packets after the simulation for various modules as follows: 
Module Name !JT otal)jl!_gJ!_,...keepalive. _packet 1 .. l!.9-8.. notification.,..._packet l _i!9.e.,..!J>en,,,,,packet I E_9P-,... update...,packet I 
!J[T~tal] ---··----- .. '._l.?,~~1' 1,501' 22· 4_4. 525 
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Figure 5.25 Packet Info DES Report - Module Centric, Number of Packets Created for the entire network under study; 
out of the 2092 BGP messages created, 1501 are KEEP ALIVE, 22 are NOTIFICATION, 44 OPEN and finally 525 
UPDATE messages have been issued by 9 ASes. 
The key comment here is that the contributions of different BGP message types in the 2092 BGP 
messages in total have been determined by the abovementioned result. The simulated results confirm 
to a large extent those of the emulation shown in Figure 4.17. However, more importantly for the 
research work here, we are further interested in the BGP UPDATE message type and thus the 
contribution of each AS into the creation of this BGP message type in particular. This is because we 
propose that those ASes which contribute more to the creation of BGP UPDATE messages are the 
best candidates to be fed in with the latest authentic #AS-to-Prefix non-stale semantics by the 
management plane (and to filter based on this info) from IANA to reduce risks pertaining to prefix 
hijacking with either malicious or non-malicious intentions (i.e. misconfigurations). Therefore, these 
candidates form a few vantage points with the aid of the management plane which afford a global, 
shared and valid view over authentic prefix ownerships and can filter malicious UPDATES from 
further propagations accordingly. These vantage points are called trust anchors. 
Packet Info DES Report - Node Centric which follows highlights the number of different BGP 
message types generated per AS and as such reveals the best possible candidates for anchors of trust. 
Accordingly, AS3 with 110, AS4 with 187 and finally AS5 with 80 are the top three ASes in the 
sorted list that contribute more than the rest of the nodes in the creation of BGP UPDATE messages 
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across the network (while ASl, AS2 and AS3 had more local prefixes to advertise via BGP). From an 
experimental results viewpoint, the top three ASes with more contributions in the creation of BGP 
UPDATE message are the same ones as the Node Port Summary FA Report result (which implies 
AS3, AS4 and finally ASS are the most highly connected ASes). 
#AS/Types Sub-Total KEEPALIVE NOTIFICATION OPEN UPDATE 
AS1 1688 202 3 6 71 
AS2 1678 204 3 6 67 
AS3 2284 273 4 8 110 
AS4 3066 342 5 10 187 
ASS 1736 206 3 6 80 
ASS 566 68 1 2 3 
AS7 534 69 1 2 2 
ASS 530 68 1 2 2 
AS9 572 69 1 2 3 
Total 12841 1501 22 44 525 
Figure S.26 Packet Info DES Report- Node Centric, partial view, AS3 with 110, AS4 with 187 and finally ASS with 80 
are the top three ASes that contribute more than the rest of the nodes in the creation of BGP UPDATE messages across the 
network (while ASl, AS2 and AS3 had more local prefixes to advertise via BGP). Recall that Node Port Summary FA 
Report implies that AS3, AS4 and finally ASS are the most highly connected ASes. These three ASes contribute much to the 
BGP UPDATE exchanges as well as path diversity and thus are the most appropriate locations for the placement of anchors 
of trust. 
The latest analogy can be explored further from the Interface and Link Utilisation viewpoint and 
due to its important implications on the placement of anchors of trust. In other words, highly 
connected ASes are deemed based on our results to construct superhighways for dispatching NLRI in 
comparison with other portions of the network with sparse interconnections; as such, we ultimately 
aim to achieve Byzantine robustness by securing these superhighways against propagation of the 
falsified routing info stemming from malicious misbehaviour of other ASes. 
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Figure S.27 Interface Utilisation FA Report; AS3's Interface 11 with 6.7% Utilisation of Link Bandwidth is the first AS 
interface which contributes much to the creation of superhighways for distribution of the NLRI in the sorted list. Afterwards, 
AS4's Interface 4 with 6.14% is the second, AS4's Interface 6 with S.3% and finally ASS's Interface 4 with S.02% are the 
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top four ASes' Interfaces with the highest interface utilisation amongst all nodes across the network under study (further 
proof that AS3, AS4 and AS5 are the best candidates for the overlay network construction). 
Interface Utilisation FA Report above for instance, highlights the fact that out of 26 active 
interfaces for the network under study, AS3's Interface 11 (facing AS4) with 6.7% Utilisation of Link 
Bandwidth is the first AS interface to contribute much to the creation of superhighways for 
distribution of the NLRI and underlying data in the sorted list. Afterwards, AS4's Interface 4 (facing 
AS3) with 6.14% is the second, AS4's Interface 6 (facing ASS) with S.3% and finally ASS's Interface 
4 with S.02% (facing AS4) are the top four ASes' Interfaces with the highest interface utilisation. 
Analogous to Packet Info DES Report - Node Centric as well as Node Port Summary FA Report, 
with Interface Utilisation FA Report again it is validated that AS3, AS4 and ASS are the top three 
candidates with much contribution to the overall BGP UPDATE exchanges (and path diversity) along 
with forming superhighways across the network and as such they can clarify the ambiguities 
regarding where to place anchors of trust. 
To summarise, we proved that Byzantine failure as an inherent flaw in SIDR stemmed from the 
implicit trust relationships amongst BGP speakers in a flat structure. It was caused by the falsification 
of the semantics of BGP UPDATE messages. It was shown that malicious BGP UPDATEs can 
traverse the span of the entire network and thus there was a great need in preventing them from being 
propagated as early as possible. We introduced the power law structure property of the Internet and its 
hierarchical structure property (which fit well with each other [147]) as our initial methodology 
foundations. We then revealed the dominant role of the highly connected ASes in contributing much 
more to generating BGP UPDATE messages (that in tum includes sensitive AS-Path attributes). We 
now propose a management plane to be established amongst these ASes as the trusted vantage points 
to share valid BGP semantics and to filter out accordingly. 
5.5 Design & Discussion for the Integrated Management Plane 
5.5.1 Initial Design Considerations for the Management Plane 
It was discussed that the decisions made by a few very large ASes have extreme effects on the 
routes provided to other ASes as well as the robustness of the whole routing system. To put it another 
way, the vast majority of path diversity provided to other ASes is from these large ASes which are 
quantitatively few as shown in the previous section. This can be proven by the topological and 
geographical structure of today's Internet. We concluded that the authentication of prefixes can be 
done either via validation of signed attestations which in tum requires PK.I infrastructure (that does 
not exist in today's Internet), or by means of a repository of authentic information provided for ASes 
to request and perhaps feed their filters base on. Mitigating the threat of prefix hijacking relies on the 
existence as well as the quality of route monitoring databases utilised for routing registries and 
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Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS). This requires a global and systematic view of #AS-to-IP bindings 
which are cleansed and accurate to share. This is provided through the integrated management plane. 
We evaluated that IRV, psBGP and pgBGP are the most promising solutions under the-state-of-
the-art remedies which make the foundation for our hybrid design here. IRV suggests moving towards 
the application layer for distributed security solution ( our first design component which relaxes the 
BGP's layer three burdens), while we borrow the PALs comparison element in a centralised manner 
rooted to IANA from psBGP (comparison against the authentic integrated vision leads to specifying 
inconsistencies; the second design component) and finally, partial implementation by ASes as pgBGP 
offers but localised to specific LOMP vantage points solely (the third design component, unlike other 
remedies which are inapplicable to the current BGP' s huge install base due to their countless need for 
either protocol alteration or crypto functions as the prerequisites). In other words, our method 
subsequently benefits from the decentralised security architecture which is independent of the BGP 
specifications with a piecemeal deployment option. Figure 5.28 summarises the proposed initial 
design components borrowed from the most promising state-of-the-art solutions so far. 
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toPKI Little Solution overhead I 
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Figure 5.28 Initial design components for our proposal borrowed from the most promising state-of-the-art solutions 
The aim here is to set up a novel method whereby a hierarchy of anchors of trust made of a few 
highly-connected ASes for querying in the IRV manner is established to provide an integrated 
management plane. The major defect of IRV was that the receiver will query the originating AS for 
the veracity of the route/origin while the alien can exhibit Byzantine behaviour. Instead of asking the 
given IRV server in an AS (can be the attacker's) to testify for the veracity of a given announced 
prefix, we propose a few large ASes to be merely queried in a similar way (requester could be in tum 
an anchor of trust or even an ordinary AS; no matter which, they seek a consistent view of the #AS-
to-IP bindings that is authentic, unlike IRV). Large ASes/ISPs are generally deemed to care far more 
about security and thus are better equipped. In the worst case scenario, through our method, we can 
query a subset of higher-tiered trust anchors for origin validation to impose a two-entity control 
instead of one (two-person control is a method within the Separation of Duties (SoD) security 
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principle). To improve performance, we can also cache the previous queries as well as employ 
periodic/partial queries/responses. 
The integrated management plane can be enhanced by moving from Intrusion Detection System 
(IDS) to Intrusion Prevention System (IPS) by routing around the misbehaving AS(es) or limiting the 
damage by compartmentalization of the affected subnet from the whole Internet via defensive filtering 
implemented earlier. However, topology authentication is not our concern. By focusing merely on the 
origin authentication, we leave the flexibility for traffic engineers to address routing itself independent 
of the origin security (This additionally respects the local policies). Last but not least, securing the 
router management for the border routers as well as any attempts towards protecting TCP itself, adds 
another layer of robustness to the future of inter-domain routing but falls outside of our scope here. 
5.5.2 Design Foundations for Integrated Management Plane 
We already disclosed the integrated management plane for Byzantine robustness in the inter-
domain routing in [149]. Our solution is an overlay remedy which is built up with the aid of a set of 
anchors of trust consisting of ASes which are rich in connectivity but few in quantity. A small number 
of very large ASes are responsible for much of the path diversity at the Internet scale according to 
l]_Q]. The premise behind our proposal is that the power-law structure property and hierarchical 
structure property of the Internet fits each other very well [147]. In addition to that, we leverage our 
previous experimental results shown in section 5 .4.5 .3 which proved that a few rich ASes by forming 
superhighways can directly police the distribution of the authentic BGP semantics and cleanse other 
ASes visions from malicious NLRI through filtering. 
5.5.2.1 Role of the Overlay for the Integrated Management Plane 
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Figure 5.29 Anchors of trust are best placed over the highly connected ASes (quantitatively few) since these ASes as the 
vantage points are in fact responsible for much of the path di versity across the Internet. 
Initially we assumed that the anchors of trust should be located on the ASes which have more 
prefixes to announce. Despite this, our simulation analysis in section 5.4.5.3.3 revealed another 
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unseen angle of how hearsay gossip-like protocol functions: that is the richer the AS is in 
connectivity, the more impact it has on the security of inter-domain routing addressing space with 
regard to the Byzantine behaviour. This is mainly due to the fact that such ASes (known as the 
backbone) are largely responsible for the path diversity of inter-domain routing as a whole. Simply 
put, they generate more BGP UPDATE messages and subsequently have a more significant role in 
providing genuine/malicious #AS-to-IP bindings info whereby the positive/devastating effects can 
reach across multiple domains (that might spread over quite a large geographical area). Such a logical 
view for the placement of trust anchors via an overlay is shown above. 
5.5.2.2 Role of the Trusted Third Party (ies) for the Provisioning of the 
Authentic BGP Ownerships Semantics 
We argue that all the efforts so far have been dedicated to securing either BGP' s control plane or 
data plane. Nevertheless, BGP remains vulnerable to Byzantine attacks as we observed in section 
5.1.1. We propose an integrated management plane sitting on top of the control plane of the inter-
domain routing with the aid of an overlay network to reach a level of consistency for the semantics of 
BGP. The reasoning behind the integrated management plane requirement is that even in the presence 
of the PK.I-based solutions, the malicious and inconsistent view of the network is avoided only if an 
ultimate umbrella entity like ICANN/IANA provides the shared global database of the address 
ownership [fil!]. Our design must take into account the fact that prefix lists may change significantly 
over time and therefore any trusted third party such as ICANN/IANA is needed as the ultimate entity 
which knows the real owner of the prefix. As a result, similar to IRRs, we need a shared global view 
of valid and up-to-date address ownership integrated before being fed into the inter-domain's control 
plane. This can be performed with the addition of a management plane required in our mind to 
integrate the semantics of BGP (sitting on top of both the control plane as well as data plane) across 
the network which is missing from today's Internet. Nevertheless, while [12] states that the majority 
of IP address allocations across the Internet is performed by only 16 organisations and 90% of these 
prefix delegations are stable, authenticating whether the origin AS is authorised to advertise an IP or 
not imposes high resource load on the router if performed at the network layer ( control plane) and 
thus is not deployable on a large scale (varies by the approach taken for validation). Lastly, mitigating 
the threat of BGP prefix hijacking as an instance of Byzantine failure mostly relies on not only the 
existence but also the quality of route monitoring databases utilised for the added plane. Since 
Byzantine failure is a managerial issue inherent to distributed systems like BGP, our management 
plane formed by an overlay network addresses this requirement with having an always-cleansed, 
accurate and shared view for #AS-to-IP bindings which works globally in a systematic way under the 
trusted third party. 
123 
Methodology & Design for Localised Overlay Management Plane (LOMP) 
5.5.2.3 Role of the Multicast as the Communication Mechanism amongst 
Trust Anchors 
Each of these designated anchors (a server) can communicate with each other via 
unicast/multicast mechanisms to constitute the required management plane and query/respond to/from 
other trust anchors (only a few) in an IRV manner. We prefer multicast conduits amongst anchors of 
trust over unicast mechanism owing to the fact that simulcast is interchangeably used instead of 
multicast if simultaneous delivery for a group of receivers is intended [lli. The simulcast ensures the 
online and consistent view of all the ASes towards the prefix ownerships at all times. The reasoning 
behind this simultaneous receipt is that in multicast, unlike unicast, multiple streams of packets are 
substituted with a single transmission minimizing the consumption of valuable resources such as 
network bandwidth like expensive WAN connections as well as processing power. Furthermore, not 
only is provisioning support for real-time distributed applications gained (exploiting multicast instead 
of a unicast mechanism) but also enhanced performance due to the fact that not many copies of data 
need processing or en-routing- as with multicast there is no need to add traffic redundancy [lli. 
The way that these anchors of trust communicate can be similar to how IRV is functioning and 
thus policy as well as peering information remain in ASes' confidence which is in their interest (local 
policy is respected). However, to fulfil the need for a consistent and online view for the address 
ownership, we propose multicast architecture to take advantage of the simulcast characteristic of such 
architectures which is required now. Defensive filtering (implemented earlier) is deemed to be 
complementary to our proposal since it addresses prevention after we are able to detect Byzantine 
violations. 
5.5.2.4 Role of the Application Layer Remedy & Secure Group 
Management Protocol (via GDOI) over the Overlay 
While 112] states that the majority of the IP address allocations across the Internet is performed by 
only 16 organisations and 90% of these prefix delegations are stable, authenticating whether the origin 
AS is authorised to advertise an IP or not requires different resource load from the router at the 
network layer and thus is not deployable on a large scale (varies by the approach taken for validation). 
That is why we place the security premium with respect to Byzantine robustness in the application 
layer rather than the network layer. A set of anchors of trust (each anchor of trust is a server 
associated with the core router of the corresponding domain) which communicate with each other 
keeping themselves updated about the latest valid prefix ownership changes in a secure manner, must 
share this database. Unlike IRV, only a few anchors (not ordinary ISPs, typically large Network 
Providers) serve the Byzantine robustness purpose. Unlike IRR, which focuses on centralized 
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architecture (a single point of failure), we propose migrating towards a distributed architecture 
suggested by the management plane if Byzantine immunity is questioned. 
Each of these designated anchors (a server) can communicate with each other via 
unicast/multicast mechanisms to constitute the required management plane. No matter which 
conduits, secure group management protocol like GDOI with IPsec as the heart ensures that the 
communication is invulnerable. One of the major defects of IRV is that the receiver would query the 
originating AS for the veracity of the route/origin while the remote other party can exhibit Byzantine 
behaviour in a flat structure of the Internet. Nevertheless, our method asks for querying of/responding 
to anchors of trust (a few merely) in an IRV manner instead of an alien in a semi-hierarchical 
structure obtained by breaking the hop-by-hop paradigm of the BGP (with the aid of ASes which are 
rich in connectivity as discussed earlier). Furthermore, a subset of these anchors can also be queried 
(instead of one) to increase the confidence in Byzantine robustness; while for improving performance, 
we can cache the previous queries or employ periodic/partial queries/responses. The goal of the 
management plane formed with the aid of these servers is to eliminate any inconsistencies existing in 
the semantics of BGP before any routing information becomes injected into the inter-domain routing's 
control plane. If BGP security countermeasures are for guarding inter-domain routing space then 
Byzantine robustness is guarding the guard and as such we claim that a separate plane established 
over the control and data planes of inter-domain routing is required to protect the veracity of NLRI. 
Due to the indeterminate nature of address ownership in IP space, the added plane is of a managerial 
type which fulfils the coordination required amongst these anchors of trust all the time ( online 
approach unlike pgBGP) to ensure the genuineness of the repository of NLRI information. 
To summarise, our architecture is considered a distributed security remedy (to avoid single point 
of failure, similar to pgBGP) for BGP integrated at management level which imposes little overhead 
to the routing system. This is because it uses IPsec with lightweight/tuneable crypto in the heart of the 
proposed architecture which imposes no changes to the current Internet infrastructure for one thing, 
and the cryptographic group management protocol with GDOI operates at the application layer (and 
thus displaces the burden from the network layer which is already heavy enough) for another. This, in 
our view, meets the future demand of BGP security as well as is welcomed by businesses due to 
having a robust remedy with no or low cryptographic involvement on one hand ( does not need any 
changes of infrastructure), and the piecemeal deployment option on the other (respects current BGP's 
huge install base and does not require any protocol changes). 
5.5.2.5 Proposed Design for the Integrated Management Plane 
Recall the emulated network scenario with Byzantine failure discussed in section 5.1.1. Moving to 
the proposed architecture displayed at the bottom of Figure 5.30, we now break the hop-by-hop 
paradigm of BGP after studying the topological structure of the Internet, power-law structure and 
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analysing beyond the rich-club phenomenon to demonstrate which nodes are the best candidates a 
the trust anchors and to establish the management plane amongst them. 
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Figure 5.30 Top: The baseline scenario similar to section in 5.1.1. Bottom: Proposed design, the addition of BGP' s 
management plane sitting on the top of the control plane implemented by an overlay network consisting of anchors of trust 
over highly-connected ASes (solely) ensures Byzantine robustness to a large extent with compartmentalization of the 
Byzantine affected subnets. The online, consistent and correct view of #AS-to-IP Prefix bindings across these subnets is now 
shared with the integrated management plane. 
According to this figure, R3 and R4 are the richest nodes in connectivity and thus the most 
appropriate trust anchor candidates. Back to the design below, it was discussed that the decision made 
by a few very large ASes which are rich in connectivity have extreme effects on the routes provided 
to other ASes as well as the robustness of the whole routing system. To put it another way, the vast 
majority of path diversity provided to other ASes is owing to these large ASes which are 
quantitatively few. The resulting overlay network, as shown, benefits from piecemeal deployment and 
therefore requires no change in the course of the development for the underlying BGP network. R3 
with out-degree = 4 and R4 with out-degree = 5 are the highly-connected ASes which form the 
vantage points required to break BGP' s flat structure here. Through our overlay network, servers 
associated with AS3 and AS4 are communicating with each other in a query/response manner ( or 
latest updates on the address ownerships disseminated in a multicast manner to other anchors) to reach 
a shared view of the address ownerships (under !CANN). Defensive filters (implemented earlier) on 
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the core routers of AS3 and AS4, are then fed via the management plane established between the 
ASes' servers with the latest view of the address ownership at all times. Except these two ASes, other 
ASes remain untouched. The unicast/multicast conduits for exchanges required between servers for 
reaching the online consistent view (the latest updates) can use the underlying network and thus cause 
no change in the infrastructure. Even crypto employed by GDOI as the group management protocol 
between trust anchors is addressed via IPsec which is the de facto standard network layer protocol for 
end-to-end security. 
Now if R6 in section 5.1.1 starts exhibiting Byzantine behaviour, since AS3 had been told that 
110.1.1.0/24 belongs to AS9 (either by the trusted third party or by the updates attained from AS4's 
server) and has not been informed of any changes by the management plane (deployed by the overlay 
network), R3 disregards the received malicious BGP UPDATE through filtering. In this way, Rl and 
all further ASes remain safe from attack (unlike the results shown in section 5.1.1). The semi-
hierarchical view of the network through the overlay network is now governed by an integrated 
management plane which limits the damage of the Byzantine failure to direct neighbourhood only. 
Compartmentalization of the affected subnet opens the door for routing around the misbehaving AS. 
However, topology authentication is not our concern. By focusing merely on origin authentication, we 
leave the flexibility for traffic engineers to address routing itself independent of security. Last but not 
least, securing the router management for the border routers as well as any attempts towards 
protecting TCP itself, adds another layer of trust to the future of inter-domain routing. 
5.5.3 Complementary Design Discussion 
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Figure 5.31 the shifted perspective, the same topology from anchors of trust viewpoints. AS3, AS4 & ASS are the most 
appropriate candidates for our overlay solution. While ASl, AS2 & ASS are of the same out-degree (3), ASS still has more 
contribution to the generation of BGP UPDATE messages. 
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The perspective of the network under study can be shifted further as seen below to observe the 
overall topology from the viewpoints of anchors of trust thanks to the experimental results achieved in 
Figure 5.26. Hence, AS3, AS4 and finally ASS are the most appropriate candidates for the proposed 
overlay solution due to their high connectivity richness (and the subsequent role in the diversity of the 
paths) as well as the more contributions they have in the generation of UPDATE messages (and the 
implicit impact on the safety of the underlying origin-to-prefix binding lists). 
5.5.3.1 The Integrated Management Plane Design Features 
5.5.3.1.1 Incrementally Deployable & Scalable Remedy; What If ASes are of the 
Same Out-degree? 
The FA studies were still needed since although ASl, AS2 and ASS are all of the same out-degree 
(=3), according to the FA study, ASS contributes more to the BGP UPDATE generation and therefore 
is a better option than AS 1 & AS2 for the overlay solution inclusion. This is essential to consider as, 
based on our observation, the contribution of each node varies depending on where each AS is located 
and its relative distance with other ASes (and not only how rich the AS is in terms of the connectivity 
to its neighbours as ASl, AS2 and ASS have the same out-degree while ASS generates more 
UPDATE messages). 
5.5.3.1.2 Novel, Cost-effective & Backward Compatible Application Layer Solution 
via Overlay 
The reasoning behind the overlay solution is that as [~ correctly points out, overlay is thought to 
provide a cost-effective solution which adds new functionality while preserves the backward 
compatibility. Our design requirements from scratch avoid any BGP protocol changes or PKI-based 
involvements (such as secure DNS remedy) since they lack backward compatibility to the current 
BGP and therefore are too illusive. Subsequently, [95] sees the better potential solution for 
determining benign/malicious MOAS conflicts in terms of detection as well as mitigation techniques 
through an overlay which is built upon the incremental deployment characteristics (the wholesale 
deployment is impossible [112]). Nevertheless, it does not specify "where" and "how" this overlay 
should be established. Our contribution in the next chapter reveals an industrial as well as 
architectural solution for the system realisation of this overlay. 
Our proposal for securing the semantics of BGP is considered as an application layer overlay 
solution. [162] provides a thorough survey on the different applications of overlay designs. 
Accordingly, security overlay is a new research area which has gained appreciation recently. Thanks 
to the open nature of the unicast Internet today, providing security in the higher layers via overlays 
offers a wide range of techniques for tackling different vulnerabilities (from lower layers for 
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instance). While the major focus of the research has been put on tracing back the DoS flood [ 163] via 
overlays, authentication as another potential application is also possible [ 162]. The main conclusion to 
be drawn is that our overlay solution for Byzantine robustness in inter-domain routing is novel to the 
best of our knowledge. 
5.5.3.1.3 Feasible/Deployable Method which Addresses BGP Root Cause 
Localisation 
We also consider our overlay proposal adaptable to the current inter-domain routing. The 
feasibility/deployability stems from the fact that the integrated management plane proposed by us 
needs to be implemented amongst 16 nodes at most to cover 80% of the address delegations across the 
global Internet [62]. This study emphasises that 85% of the ASes are stub ASes (see also [1221) and 
therefore as quantitatively few as 16 nodes perform as much as 80% of the delegations. This small 
number of nodes yields the scalability as well as adaptability of our management plane for Byzantine 
robustness in our minds. In other words, the consistent global-view (as opposed to today's AS-wide 
view) offered through our solution needs to be shared among as few as 16 entities to cover 80% of the 
address delegations in the Internet. 
On the other hand, one might argue that the Big-Brother-like solution offered here can make a 
single point of failure and what if one of these quantitatively few ASes misbehaves? Note that if BGP 
security is all about policing the inter-domain routing space, Byzantine robustness deals with policing 
the police. While theoretically this concern might seem valid, similar to [164], it is envisaged that 
ASes with large out-degree are typically huge service providers which are extremely unlikely to 
announce false BGP announcements (as opposed to 85% of the ASes which are stub [1221). 
Additionally, one might claim that the proposed overlay architecture ignores the changeable IP 
address ownerships over time. While the assumption of this work was to achieve the Byzantine 
robustness to the largest possible extent at the Internet scale (fixed network with globally delegated 
mutable permanent prefixes), in reality, the growing evidence observed by the networking research 
community proves that the inter-domain routing paths for the popular destinations are highly stable 
[97, 113] as well. Recall the YouTube hijacking attack discussed in chapter 1, we want to mitigate the 
risk of such attacks where nodes herein are large ASes which form the Internet backbone and thus the 
address delegations are deemed to be highly stable (especially for the popular ends like YouTube). 
This stability is in fact misused by the attacker to convince the infectors to forward the traffic to him 
instead of the victim. The prefix hijacking risk mitigation means that we aim to localise the attacker(s) 
to as few ASes as possible ( depending on where and how many anchors of trust are located) and 
prevent the attack from affecting the rest of the network. This is known as root cause localisation as 
discussed in chapter 1. Localising the origin of an attack packet to few candidate ASes has also been 
129 
Methodology & Design for Localised Overlay Management Plane (LOMP) 
considered by other approaches such as [115] to thwart the impact of the IP spoofing-based DDoS 
class of attacks. 
5.5.3.2 Trust Anchors Operational Process 
To guarantee all-the-time online, shared, up-to-date, valid and consistent global-view (in contrast 
with the current AS-wide view), multicast solution for conduits amongst anchors of trust over unicast 
mechanism is preferred since multicast fulfils perfectly the simultaneous ·delivery of a group of 
receivers (simulcast as a term is interchangeable with multicast) [W. The simulcast ensures the 
online and consistent view of all the ASes towards the prefix ownerships at all times. The reasoning 
behind this simultaneous receipt is that in multicast, unlike unicast, multiple streams of packets are 
substituted by a single transmission minimizing the consumption of valuable resources such as 
network bandwidth like expensive WAN connections as well as processing power. The distribution of 
software is better with multicast than unicast [165]. To summarise, the real-time and consistent view 
(ensured by simulcast) towards prefix ownerships over diverged parts of the Internet (distribution of 
software) have made multicast architecture the preferred solution for system realisation. 
To maintain the trustworthy view and the enclosing valid ownership semantics in the proposed 
solution, our overlay design can rely on the following for its integrated management plane: 
a) The announcements from IANA: the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) is the 
umbrella organisation which delegates prefixes to the RIRs, which in turn assign the 
addresses to the local Internet registries or national Internet registries and finally to the 
end-users [122]. Subsequently, IANA is the ultimate entity which identifies the 
trustworthy #AS-to-prefix bindings and thus feeds this into our proposed management 
plane. 
b) The announcements from other trust anchors: each anchor of trust can additionally rely on 
the announcements obtained from other trust anchors in a similar way to IRV and uncover 
the inconsistencies pertaining to #AS-to-prefix bindings from their responses (for instance 
if a prefix is delegated to another entity rather than the initial owner). However, our 
solution differs fundamentally from IRV (quantitatively few nodes over determined 
breakpoints unlike IRV) as elaborated before (IRV deficiencies such as response 
validation ambiguities mentioned in [98]). 
c) The information kept in authoritative registries or whois services: The semantics supplied 
for our design can optionally be checked against the information provided in the 
authoritative routing registries as well as services such as whois at all times (recall that 
popular destinations across the Internet have highly stable paths). While [8_Q] pinpoints 
these registries as the active field of research which have gained popularity recently, it 
correctly argues that since the information stored in such databases is not updated 
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frequently, systemic verification for determining the truly authentic advertisements can 
add an extra degree of confidence. 
d) Implementing the pgBGP algorithm based on [111]: 
I. Each trust anchor records #AS-to-prefix bindings to construct the history of BGP 
UPDATES for a short recent period (last 10 days for instance). 
IL Any stored info older than this period is frequently cleansed (for inactive 
UPDATES). 
III. A new BGP UPDATE is flagged as suspicious by trust anchor if its #AS-to-prefix 
binding is not found in the historical information. The value for its LOCAL-PREF 
attribute is lowered and then propagated. 
IV. A sub-prefix announcement with/without the same origin AS which its covering 
prefix has, is always marked malignant and thus quarantined to avoid de-
aggregation attacks. The quarantine period is usually less than a day until the 
announcement is either withdrawn or distributed. 
Either a subset or all of the aforementioned options can cooperatively be incorporated into the 
proposed management plane amongst trust anchors to uncover the inconsistencies pertaining to the 
given malicious #AS-to-prefix binding. Taking (a), (b) & (c) into consideration, if the decision has not 
been made yet, pgBGP (d) can take over (but upon the deduced vantage points based on our analyses). 
Trust Anchors 
Operate based on the 
Trusted Third Parties 
such as IANA/ICANN 
Announcements 
1 
Trust Anchors 
Implement pgBGP 
Algorithm (Tie-
breaking) 
Counterpart Anchors 
are Invoked in IRV 
Manner 
The Decision can be 
Further Verified with 
Authoritative Routing 
Registries or WHO IS 
Services 
Figure 5.32 Proposed trust anchors operational process for validating the veracity of the new BGP UPDATE. 
In summary, one might argue that the proposed method is likely to add some delays to the BGP 
UPDATE propagations for the new routes. However, similar to what Rexford in [lfil proves, this 
delaying for the acceptance of new advertisements is a safe and effective way of preventing the 
propagation of rouge routes. On the other hand, our solution requires no change to the current BGP 
with huge install base (like IRV and pgBGP approaches). It solely asks for changing the trust anchor 
router' decision making rules. Our method is straightaway beneficial (no need for the Flag Day for 
our design) due to its piecemeal deployment nature even if the vast majority of ASes have not 
deployed it yet (as quantitatively few as 16 core ASes are enough for anchors of trust). While the 
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proposed scheme shares some characteristics with the IRV approach since they both support 
incremental deployment, our method is more energy efficient since unlike IRV, we do not depend on 
every AS's server for testifying the authenticity of its UPDATES (but far fewer trust anchors located 
in the analysed vantage points instead). However, our method is deemed to be highly scalable (recall 
that hierarchy is typically imposed for scaling reasons as Perlman in [150] elaborates) since the 
power-law structure property and hierarchical structure property of the Internet fit each other very 
well according to [ 14 7]. 
5.6 Summary 
In chapter 5, we stepped beyond the state-of-the-art countermeasures arguing that more resilient 
Internet infrastructure requires "additional verifications and validations" to not blindly accept all BGP 
message exchanges. Studying the hierarchical structure as well as the power-law structure properties 
of the Internet, a novel method was proposed to move towards a more Byzantine robust Internet. 
Accordingly, the proposed method was elaborated demonstrating that having a few security-conscious 
ASes (i.e. trust anchors), interconnected in a hierarchical manner, and placed over the highly 
connected vantage points, as the repositories for the route attestations for the origin veracity ( & 
check-in), can add Byzantine robustness to BGP to a large extent. Our basic design was a synthesis of 
IRV, psBGP and pgBGP- the most promising solutions under the-state-of-the-art remedies. IRV 
suggests moving towards application layer for distributed security solution, while we borrow the 
PALs comparison element in a centralised manner rooted to IANA from psBGP and finally, the 
partial implementation that pgBGP offers. 
While fortunately the hierarchical structure and the power-law structure properties fit each other 
very well (aided by breaking the BGP's hop-by-hop paradigm), there was no accurate consensus on 
"where" the trust anchors need to be located and "how" they should architecturally interact with each 
other in a systematic manner. These two arduous questions were fundamentally the reasons for why 
the contemporary solutions such as Defensive Filtering or Byzantine robust IRV have not succeeded 
so far and thus set our next objectives. Thorough Byzantine studies have been conducted with OPNET 
over different scenarios. The take-away lessons are concluded as follows: 
1. We have intentionally chosen our victim subnet to be a stub AS not only because the vast 
majority of the ASes are stub ASes in practice but also since if the victim AS is a stub then it is 
envisaged that the largest number of the affected ASes is the outcome, which constitutes the worst 
case scenario for the simulation results. 
2. FA studies implied that out of 132 total active demands generated when AS7 for instance 
conducted BGP prefix hijacking (the same results were attained where every other AS attacks), 12 
routes were considered unroutable and thus failed (all 12 nodes send flows in a fully meshed 
graph). The network layer sole observation was that the average and maximum WAN link 
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utilisation falls from 2.5 Mbps and 6.7 Mbps to 2.4 Mbps and 6.1 Mbps respectively as an adverse 
impact of the unroutable demands stemming from the Byzantine behaviour. Otherwise, as all the 
other FA studies proved, the Byzantine failure cannot be reflected by the pure inter-domain 
routing analyses since the insecurity of the semantics of the BOP' s control plane does not seem 
disruptive to the normal operation of layer three. 
3. All the ASes' viewpoints in each corresponding routing table towards the victim subnet before the 
Byzantine attack were collected and compared. Accordingly, ASS, AS2, AS4, ASl, ASS, AS3, 
AS7 and lastly AS6 in order were sequentially hearing of the victim subnet (refer to Table 7). The 
contrasts of the propagation delays for the NLRI proved the hearsay, gossip-like and hop-by-hop 
characteristics of the BOP. In other words, as simulation time goes by, BOP was distributing the 
NLRI further. So we concluded that the earlier we stop the propagation of the malicious NLRI, 
the less ASes are adversely affected (need to break BOP's flat structure). 
4. The BOP specific routing tables were compared in Table 5. Accordingly, before the attack, the 
victim subnet in each AS was bound to the genuine owner that was AS9 under the associated AS-
Path BOP attribute. After the attack, we evidenced that any Byzantine failure instances such as 
BOP prefixes hijacking or de-aggregation attempts were in fact falsification of the semantics 
under this AS-Path attribute. Hence, we offered an integrated management plane over the control 
plane to provide a shared, online (real-time), consistent and correct (authentic & non-stale) view 
of originator-to-prefix bindings under this attribute across the Internet. 
5. The vantage points by which we proposed to break BOP's hop-by-hop paradigm to reach a level 
of Byzantine robustness emerged from studying not only the power-law/ hierarchical structure 
Internet properties but also stepping beyond the rich-club phenomenon. We demonstrated that 
AS3 with 110, AS4 with 187 and finally ASS with 80 (ASS in the presence of two more nodes of 
the same out-degree=3) of the total 2092 BOP messages are the top three ASes in the ordered list 
that contribute more than the rest of the nodes to the creation and exchanges of BOP UPDATE 
messages as well as network's path diversity (while ASl, AS2 and AS3 had more prefixes to 
advertise). These three nodes were thus the best candidates for the placement of the trust anchors 
and to be fed in via the aforementioned integrated management plane with the latest #AS-to-
Prefix non-stale information. The added plane was therefore an overlay type placed over highly 
connected ASes (unlike IRV) which contribute much more to generating BOP UPDATE 
messages (and thus the path diversity), which in turn include authentic AS-Path bindings. 
6. Complementary to the previous finding, from the Interface and Link Utilisation simulation results 
viewpoint also, highly connected ASes were observed to construct superhighways for dispatching 
malicious/genuine NLRI in comparison with other portions of the network with sparse 
interconnections. Out of 26 active interfaces for the network under study, AS3's Interface 11 
(facing AS4) with 6.7%, AS4's Interface 4 (facing AS3) with 6.14% , AS4's Interface 6 (facing 
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ASS) with S.3% and finally ASS's Interface 4 with S.02% (facing AS4) are the top four interfaces 
with the highest link utilisation. AS3, AS4 and ASS are again the top three candidates which form 
the superhighways across the network and as such they can clarify the ambiguities regarding 
where to efficiently position trust anchors as the guard. 
7. Hijacking attack successfully enrouted the traffic destined initially at AS9 and disseminated from 
AS 1, AS3, AS4, AS7 & ASS towards AS6 as the attacker (refer to Table 6). Despite this, AS2 & 
ASS remained invulnerable since they had shorter routes to the genuine 110.1.1.0/24 (AS9). This 
validates two of our findings: firstly, number 4 mentioned here and secondly the fact that the 
magnitude of the adverse effect of accepting false or malicious NLRI is reliant directly on the 
location of the origin and the attacker's position in relation to the victim's location. 
8. Active probing amongst diverged trusted vantage points can help the overall network to adhere to 
a consistent, valid and global view (as opposed to the current AS-wide view) such as for the 
prefix ownership on all the time. To guarantee all-the-time online, shared, up-to-date, valid and 
consistent global-view of prefix ownership (in contrast to the current AS-wide view), the 
multicast solution for conduits amongst trust anchors over the unicast mechanism was preferred. 
This was largely due to the simulcast characteristics of multicast which ensures the simultaneous 
delivery for a group of receivers, minimising the consumption of valuable resources such as 
network bandwidth like expensive WAN connections as well as processing power and lastly the 
fact that the distribution of software is better dealt with in multicast architecture. 
9. The proposed detection method bridges prefix hijacking prevention and reaction techniques and 
thus needed to be complemented by defensive filtering. 
10. From the Visual Analytics via RA studies developed in this chapter, the closeness of the attacker 
to the victim in contrast to the attacker with richer out-degree has a more detrimental impact in 
terms of the increased attack success rate as the observations pointed out. 
11. The FA studies were still required since although ASl, AS2 and ASS are all of the same out-
degree (=3), according to the FA study ASS contributes more to the BGP UPDATE generation 
and therefore is a better option than AS 1 & AS2 for the overlay solution. It is essential to consider 
that based on our observation, the contribution of each node varies depending on where each AS 
is located and its relative distance with other ASes (and not only how rich the AS is in terms of 
the connectivity to its neighbours as ASl, AS2 and ASS have the same out-degree while ASS 
generates more UPDATE messages). 
12. LOMP architecture will be implemented in the next chapter. The objective of the upcoming 
system realisation and evaluation for LOMP is as follows: a few LOMP nodes should be able to 
securely exchange authentic BGP semantics in a multicast architecture over (private) WAN links 
while centralized cryptographic key/policy management protocol is in place. 
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6 LOMP Architecture Realisation and 
Evaluation 
We have seen as a result of our analyses in chapter 4 that many proposals for BGP security have 
faced reluctance from the industry so far due to their massive reliance on the new infrastructure (Flag 
Day) or lack of any existing (and thus feasible) deployments in practice. Due to the huge install base 
for BGP today, such businesses need to be persuaded that the added management plane, elaborated in 
chapter 5, can be developed without any or with the minimum costs at the industrial scale and with no 
change to their current infrastructure. Therefore, we decided to provide a prototype for the 
deployment of our management plane architecture through the industrial-based (Cisco) emulation 
testbed with GNS3. Trust anchors as we explored in chapter 5, needed to have always-on, dynamic, 
tunnel-less, transport (and thus scalable) and fully meshed connectivity for extremely integrated sites 
spread over diverged geographical domains (i.e. amongst anchors) over precious WAN links. Such 
implementation for the proposed management plane is additionally required to be infrastructure-
independent (not bound to a particular core technology). In such a management plane, the end-to-end 
security for any-to-any network connectivity is desired to be fully encrypted, authenticated and 
globally scalable for the multicast-based software distribution amongst anchors. We realise this 
system in chapter 6 and evaluate the deployment critically in terms of the overhead and protocol 
message signalling. The secure group management purpose here is met by the GDOI standard with 
IPsec at its heart to manage the trusted group members (trust anchors). Partial outcomes of the 
deployment has also been presented in [166]. 
Localised overlay Management Plane (LAMP) Architecture 
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Figure 6.1 the system realisation scenario for the proposed management plane between anchors of trust obtained from 
the resul ts shown in Figure 5.31 
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Figure 6.1 discloses the shifted perspective for the same topology from anchors of trust 
viewpoints discussed in Figure 5.31. AS3, AS4 & AS5 are the most appropriate candidates for our 
overlay solution. While ASl, AS2 & AS5 are of the same out-degree (3), AS 5 still has more 
contribution to the generation of BGP UPDATE messages according to the achieved simulation 
results from the previous chapter and thus is a better choice for the trust anchor. 
To better benchmark our implementation and the relevant evaluation, we simplify the above 
scenario and assume that the management plane architecture needs to be deployed amongst three 
nodes solely. However, these three nodes represent the same trust anchors as displayed above namely 
AS3, AS4 and AS5. This is feasible since our industrial solution implemented here does not rely on 
either the topological structure of the rest of the network nor the underlying routing technologies. 
Application layer cryptographic (and thus secure) group management protocol, that is GDOI, is 
placed upon our managerial plane. This is because the recent study on the multicast authentication 
scheme reveals that GDOI remains the standard for the automation of data acquisition, control, 
protection, diagnostics and monitoring functions within wide-area substations as well as smart grids 
[167]. With background materials already discussed in the early chapters, only the main results are 
explained here and the full system realisation is elaborated on in Appendix C. 
6.1 Implementation Scenario & Reachability Objectives 
Figure 6.2 illustrates the topology implemented for our proposed method utilising GDOI as the 
cryptographic group management protocol along with the defined addressing scheme in GNS3 
emulator considering~, 51, 64, 65, 132, 168-171]. 
According to this figure, the switch in the middle (SWl) implies that regardless of what the core 
technology and underlying networking infrastructure namely IP or private WAN, MPLS, ATM or 
Frame Relay is, GDOI meets the expectations properly. Multicast group for the network under study 
is 239.1.2.3. Rl as we will see later on acts as the key server (KS) here. R2, R3 and finally R4 are our 
GMs which are required to share the same SA under one group to communicate securely. R5, R6 and 
R7 are routers on which we disabled routing functionalities and thus act like end-machines to perform 
basic tasks such as the ping test. Since there is a switch in the middle which represents the core 
network, we assigned IPs within the same subnet for all the interfaces facing the core network from 
the range 10.0.0.0/24. Loop back interfaces are required to represent the subscribers into IGMP for the 
multicast group and thus 10.100.0.1/32, 10.100.0.2/32 and finally 10.100.0.3/32 are configured on 
loopback interface number O on R2, R3 and R4 respectively. 
For the aforementioned scenario, the initial objectives include: 
1. Configure devices according to the IP Addressing Scheme 
2. Achieve Full Connectivity with the aid of OSPF unicast Routing 
3. Configure PIM Sparse Mode on all routers 
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4. Configure R2 to act as RP 
5. Configure IGMP to listen to the multicast group 239.1.2.3 on R2, R3 and R4 (Subscribe 
Loopbacks into the group through IGMP) 
6. Send multicast traffic from RS through the extended ping (ICMP Packets) 
7. Whether we receive ICMP echo replies from the loopback interfaces subscribed to this group 
via IGMP (the loopback interfaces are topological leaves) 
-
• Validate GMs 
• Manage Policy & Group Keys 
• Distribute them 
• Rekey 
Localised Overlay Management 
GDOI-KS ,,.,,,.------, ,,,., .... -
/ ', / 
/ LAMP1 \ /LAMP2 
I AS3 \ I 
\ I 
KS: Key Server 
G-1: Q-oup Member 
RM: Routing Member 
OSPF: Open Shortest Path First 
GOOI: Q-oup Domain of Interpretation 
IG>iP: Internet Group Management Protocol 
PIM-SM: Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode 
LAMP1(GM1/RM1): 10.0 .0.1/ 24 
LAMP2(GM2/RM2): 10.0.0.2/ 24 
LAMP3(GM3/RM3}: 10.0.0.3/24 
GOOI-KS: 10.0.0.254/ 24 
Figure 6.2 GNS3 emulation scenario for GDOI implementation, topology and addressing scheme are displayed. Rl acts 
as KS for three group members namely R2, R3 and R4. 
6.2 Reachability Configurations & Results 
Note that on R2, we also added 200.0.0.0 to OSPF to be advertised. As soon as OSPF adjacencies 
are established, on the console of R2, R3 and R4 we can verify these adjacencies as Appendix C. 2 
reveals. Full is the normal state for an OSPF router. If a router is in another state, this can be a 
symptom that there are problems in forming OSPF adjacencies. 
On R3 , the routing table is displayed in Appendix C. 3 after OSPF verification. This is before as 
well as after, on R2, we added 200.0.0.0/24 to OSPF. Confirming the correct distribution of 
reachability information here, C stands for directly Connected networks while O indicates subnets 
advertised through OSPF. 
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We then explore the result of show ip pim rp mapping on each router. This is to confirm that the 
RP assignments by multicast group range as well as the source of RP learning (static or auto-RP) and 
the mapping are valid. As we expect, R2's loopback 0 is the RP on all three routers. 
In the next step, the aim was verifying the PIM neighbour discovery on all R2, R3 and R4. For 
this, PIM messages on the console of each router confirm that as soon as the relevant code was 
executed for PIM Sparse Mode, PIM Adjacencies are established. Through %PIM-5-NBRCHG: 
neighbour [IP _address] [chars] on interface [chars] (vrf [chars]) [chars] PIM message we ensure 
that on a specific interface a PIM neighbour has gone up or down. 
Using IGMP, we then subscribe each of the loopback interfaces on the three routers to the 
multicast group 239.1.2.3 according to the scenario. This is verifiable in Appendix C. 5. Through 
show ip igmp groups we highlight which multicast groups are directly connected to the router, and 
which are learned via Internet Group Management Protocol (IGMP). The result verifies that a source 
or receiver has actually joined the target group on the router interface. The "Last Reporter" column 
displays only one IGMP host, which indicates that it has sent either an unsolicited IGMP Join or 
IGMP Report in response to an IGMP Query from the PIM router for that particular group. We expect 
only one "Last Reporter" per Group Address. 
We then explore the result of show ip pim rp mapping on each router. This is to confirm that the 
RP assignments by multicast group range as well as the source of RP learning (static or auto-RP) and 
the mapping are valid. As we expect, R2's loopback O is the RP on all three routers. 
We next listened to R2's link to the switch through Wireshark. Appendix C. 7 is the result of this 
while we are filtering IGMP traffic solely. Note that since there is one switch representing the core 
network, all the connected links are on the same subnet from the IP layer viewpoint and as such we 
may eavesdrop on other conversations as well. According to the result, IGMP sends periodically the 
initial IGMPv2 query to the multicast group 224.0.0.1 source from R2, R3 and R4 referencing all 
devices on the subnet. 
Afterwards, we filtered PIM traffic to verify the correct operation of PIM by sending periodic 
Hello messages to PIM-enabled neighbours. Recall that PIM attempts to make adjacencies out of 
interfaces on which it is enabled. The multicast packet to 224.0.0.13 equates to a PIMv2 Hello packet 
to all PIM enabled routers on the subnet sourced from R2, R3 and R4. 
We then through show ip pim interface highlight information regarding interfaces configured for 
PIM. Additionally, this result validates whether the correct PIM mode Sparse/Dense is in place on the 
interface or not. Also, the designated router (DR) is of immense value for SM and as such can be 
verifiable here. For Ethernet (any multi-access segments), DR is elected based on ·the highest IP 
address (i.e. 10.0.0.3 here). Nevertheless, Point-to-Point links do not show DR information. The result 
is shown in Appendix C. 9. 
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PIM neighbours discovered by each PIM router are then listed under the show ip pim neighbour 
result. Opposite Uptime, with Expires- displaying the time before a neighbour expires and until the 
next PIM Hello is obtained is shown. Ver for Version reveals the PIM version of the neighbour's 
interface. According to 1:1:Q], "a shared-media LAN like Ethernet may have multiple PIM-SM routers 
connected to it. A single one of these routers, the Designated Router (DR), acts on behalf of directly 
connected hosts with respect to the PIM-SM protocol. DR election will happen on all interfaces, 
LAN or otherwise using Hello messages". Based on the following result, the DR is 10.0.0.3 on R4. 
1:1:Q] also emphasises that DR on a LAN is responsible for forwarding traffic to that LAN on behalf of 
any local members. DR is also responsible for register-encapsulating to the RP any packets originated 
by hosts on the LAN. The default DR priority is set to 1 (refer to Appendix C. 10). 
Afterwards, DR sends a PIM Join message towards the RP for that multicast group. This Join 
message is known as a (*, G) Join because it joins group G for all sources to that group. The (* ,G) 
Join traverses hop-by-hop towards the RP for the group; and on each router it goes through, the 
multicast tree state for group G is constructed. Finally, the (*, G) Join either reaches the RP or 
reaches a router that already has (*, G) Join state for that group. When many receivers join the group, 
their Join messages converge on the RP and form a distribution tree for group G that is rooted at the 
RP (RPT or shared tree). Join messages are re-sent periodically so long as the receiver remains in the 
group. When all receivers leave the group, the DR will send a PIM (*, G) Prune message towards the 
RP for that multicast group. However, if the Prune message is not sent for any reason, the state will 
eventually time out. 
In the next step, through mrinfo, we examine multicast neighbour router information, router 
capabilities and code version, multicast interface information, TTL thresholds, metrics, protocol, and 
status. 
R2tmrinfo 
10.0.0.l [ver:non 12.•:J [flag!l: PHA]: 
10.100.0.1 -> 0.0.0.0 [1/0/pirrJq,._.erier/leafJ 
10.0.0.1 -> 10.0.0.3 [1/0/pim] 
10.0.0.l -> 10.0.0.2 [1/0/pim] 
R2*[j 
R3#mri:-ifc 
10.0.0.2 [ver!3icn 12.4] [flag!3: PHA]: 
10.100.0.2 -> 0.0.0.0 [1/0/pim/querier/leaf] 
10.0.0.2 -> 10.0.0.3 [1/0/pim] 
10.0.0.2 -> 10.0.0.1 [1/0/pim] 
R4trr.r:i.nfo 
10. O. O. 3 [ver:31.on 12. 4] [flag!3: PHAJ: 
10.100.0.3 -> 0.0.0.0 [1/0/p:i.m/querier/leaf] 
10.0.0.3 -> 10.0.0.2 [l/0/p:i.m/querier] 
10.0.0.3 -> 10.0.0.1 [1/0/p:i.rr✓ querier] 
Figure 6.3 Result of mrinfo, for R2 for instance; 10.100.0.1 has no pair indicated by the 0.0.0.0. The 1/0 implies that the 
interface has a metric of 1 and that there is no TTL threshold set. PIM is running on the interface and the router is an IGMP 
querier for the attached subnet. Finally, the subnet is a leaf network meaning that no multicast traffic will go through the 
network to another multicast enabled router. 10.0.0.1 has a peer at address 10.0.0.2 as well as another peer at 10.0.0.3. 
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The first line of the result on each router reveals the address used as the source of the query, the 
IOS version running on the router, and a number of flags. Flags associated with mrinfo stand for: P for 
Prune-capable, M for mtrace-capable and A for Auto-RP-capable. The next three lines on each router 
display multicast interfaces on the router and any peers that each router may have. For R2 for 
instance, 10.100.0.1 has no pair indicated by the 0.0.0.0. The 1/0 implies that the interface has a 
metric of 1 and no TTL threshold set. PIM is running on the interface and the router is an IGMP 
querier for the attached subnet (IGMPvl requires the multicast routing protocol to elect a querier on a 
multi-access network). Finally, the subnet is a leaf network meaning that no multicast traffic will go 
through the network to another multicast enabled router. 10.0.0.1 has a peer at address 10.0.0.2 as 
well as another peer at 10.0.0.3. 
We then verify the contents of IP multicast routing tables on R2, R3 and R4 through show ip 
mroute. We expect from the contents of the multicast routing table to verify states for (S, G) and(*, 
G) from the flags, whether valid incoming as well as outgoing interfaces are assigned and if not, to 
troubleshoot through checking either unicast routing table for incorrect incoming interface or 
downstream router's state for incorrect outgoing interface. 
According to [ 168], RP acts for multicast sources like a network receptionist aware of the location 
of all the sources. PIM-SM then constructs a shared tree represented by (*, G) in each multicast 
routing table. For each multicast group, exploiting the RPF upstream interface to RP for this group, a 
shared tree is being formed. Hence, the shared tree in fact acts as a shortest-path tree towards the RP 
at the end. Using (*, G) shared tree entries, the amount of the multicast state across the network which 
routers need to keep track of is largely decreased within PIM-SM architecture whereby not many 
sources are disseminating traffic for G ( the reasoning behind the SM choice for the system 
realisation). If a node is already subscribed into a multicast group, its upstream router is responsible 
for registering with RP and also forwarding down the traffic via the shared tree to the receiver. Later 
on, when the router becomes aware of a shorter path to the source through the unicast routing table, it 
might prune the stream from the shared tree and start receiving the stream through its own shortest 
path (learnt by unicast routing) towards the source which is shown by its (S, G) entry. Therefore, 
when every subnet does not necessarily need to be flooded with multicast data, PIM-SM is widely 
used. 
We firstly analyse the result on R2's multicast routing table in Figure 6.4. We only expect to 
observe (*, 239.1.2.3) so far since there is no multicast traffic yet to construct (S, G). Notice that R2 
has 0.0.0.0 as the RPF neighbour of the (*, 239.1.2.3) entry, indicating that it is the RP for the 
239.1.2.3 multicast group. RP is the loopback O of R2. Flags SJCL suggests that S for Sparse has 
switched over to the shortest path (J for Join SPT) while Connected (C) Local (L) router has joined 
the group as well. The results for R3 and R4 are displayed in Appendix C. 13. 
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In all the multicast routing tables displayed, 224.0.1 .40 is observable. According to IANA, this 
address is known as Cisco multicast router Auto RP Discovery address which is reserved as the 
destination address for messages from the RP mapping agent to discover candidates. 
At this point, as an attempt to generate a stream of multicast data for the group 239.1.2.3, we issue 
extended ping repeated 100 times from R5 and obtain the result in Appendix C. 14. As we expect, all 
active multicast receivers namely 10.0.0.2 and 10.0.0.3 reply through the ICMP reply. 
To validate the existence of the active multicast receivers of the group 239.1.2.3, we also sniff R2, 
R3 and R4's link connected to Fal/0 s respectively by Wireshark as Appendix C. 15 highlights. Based 
on this output, on the first link connected to R2, only a reply from R3 (10.0.0.2) and R4 (10.0.0.3) is 
observed. On the second link connected to R3, only a reply from R3 Fa 1/0 (10.0.0.2) is seen. Finally, 
on the third link connected to R4, only a reply from R4 Fa 1/0 (10.0.0.3) is detected. Nonetheless, all 
the links are on the same subnet and interconnected through the switch in between. 
IP Multicast Routing Table 
Flag3: D - Den3e, S - Sparse, B - B1d1r Group, 3 - 55!1 Grcup, ~ - ~c- ~e=~~d, 
Local, P - Fra~ed, R - RP-bit 3et, F - Register flag, 
~ - SPT-bit set, J - Join SPT, M - MSDP created encry, 
X - Frcx1· Vc1.:1 Time= Running, A - Car-~didate fc:= HSDP Ad.-.e-wl._,._rr._ ••. .,, 
U - URD, I - Received Scu=ce Specific ~cet Reper~, 
Z - Mult1ca2:t Tunnel, z - MDT-data group 3er.der, 
Y - Joined MDT-data group, y - Sending tc MDT-data group 
Ou.tgc-1.:1.g interface flag!3: H - Harct~,1are 3•,1i tched, A - A.e.!5e!."t ·,.·1:-;.::er 
Timers: Uptime/Expires 
Interface state: In~erface, Next-Hop er VCD, State/Mede 
(•, 239.1.2.3), 00:11:12/00:03:00, RP 10.100.0.l, flags: SJCL 
Incoming interface: Null, RPF nbr 0.0.0.0 
Outgoing interface l.1.st: 
FastEthernetl/0, Forward/Sparse, 00:10:17/00:03:00 
LcopbackO, Forward/Sparse, OO:ll:12/00:02:17 
(•, 224.0.1.40), 00:11:38/00:03:12, RP 10.100.0.1, flags: SJCL 
Incom.1.ng interface: Null, RPF nbr 0.0.0.0 
Outgoing interface list: 
FastEthernetl/0, Forward/Sparse, 00:11:38/00:03:12 
RU[] 
Figure 6.4 The result of show ip mroute on R2, for(*, 239.1.2.3), flags SJCL suggests that Sparse switched over to the 
shortest path ( J for Join SPT) while Connected (C) Local (L) router has joined the group as well. 
(*, 239.1.2.3), 00:37:25/00:03:13, RP 10.100.0.1, flag.'!: SC-CL 
I:1com1:-,g interface: Null, RFF :-,br O. O. O. O 
Outgoing 1nterface list: 
Fa.'!tEthernetl/0, Forward/Sparse, 00:36:31/00:03:13 
LcopbackO, Forward/Sparse, 00:37:25/00:02:53 
(200.0.0.1, 239.1.2.3), 00:02:20/00:03:13, flags: LT 
Incoming i:-iterface: FastEthernetl/1, RPF nbr 0.0.0.0 
Outgoing interface list: 
LoopbackO, Forward/Sparse, 00:02:20/00:02:Se 
FastEthernetl/0, Forward/Sparse, 00:02:20/00:03:13 
(*, 22'1.0.1.'10), 00:37:51/00:02:58, RP 10.:.oG.O.l, flags: SJC:. 
I:1com..1ng interface: Null, RPF nbr O. O. O. O 
Outgoing interface list: 
FastEthernetl/0, Forward/Sparse, 00:37:51/00:02:37 
R2tO 
Figure 6.5 Multicast routing tables of R2. Now we can verify (200.0.0.1, 239.1.2.3) states on each router. In all routers, 
T flag for SPT-bit set reveals that packets have been received on the shortest path source tree. Except for R2 with LT flags 
(L for Local router which has joined the group), R3 and R4 are illustrating LJT flags set for (200.0.0.1, 239.1.2.3) meaning 
that R3 as well as R4 have joined SPT (J for Join SPT) as shown in the appendix. 
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Now that multicast traffic has been generated, we can expect to see the (S, G) states in the 
contents of the multicast routing tables; not losing sight of the fact that in the previous result (full 
results in Appendix C. 16), the SPT-bit set indicated by T flag for SPT-bit set reveals that packets 
have been received on the shortest path source tree. In all the tables for (200.0.0.1, 239.1.2.3), RPF 
points to 10.0.0.1 meaning that the current source (200.0.0.1) is reachable through R2 ( except R2 in 
which 0.0.0.0 implies that R2 is RP in fact). Also, except for R2 with LT flags (L for Local router 
which has joined the group), R3 and R4 are illustrating LJT flags set for (200.0.0.1, 239.1.2.3) 
meaning that R3 as well as R4 have joined SPT (J for Join SPT). 
6.3 Main Objectives & GDOI Implementation 
Having successfully implemented multicast architecture so far, we then move onto GDOI here as 
the heart of the proposal for secure group management of the anchors of trust. R 1 as discussed before 
will act as KS here and three GMs namely R2, R3 and R4 will need to register with it. The GDOI 
implementation involves the following workflow: 
1. Configure ISAKMP/IKE session between each GMs and KS 
2. On KS: 
a. GM Authentication (Admission Control) 
i. ISAKMP/IKE Peer Authentication ➔ either PSK or PKI 
11. Scalability of PSK is not an issue since a limited number of IKE sessions are 
required ( only for each GM to each KS) 
b. Traffic Protection Policy ( definition of IPsec SA parameters) 
i. Which traffic needs encryption ➔ Policy defines it ➔ through definition on 
KS by ACL to be downloaded by authenticated GMs ➔ This constructs a 
trusted domain of communication 
c. Rekeying Policy (unicast, multicast, key lifetimes, retransmissions) 
3. Configure GMs to register into a group 
4. GMs' local policies can optionally override those of KS which were downloaded 
Before moving on, note that Cisco recommends using a private subnet addressing scheme to 
represent all the network interfaces (subnets) behind each GM which require protection. It is 
recommended that they all become represented by a contiguous network block. This is because one 
ACL is merely defined and therefore GMs only install one summarised SA in their DB (different 
blocks need separate SAs to be installed for each subnet block). Ultimately, an untrusted GM's 
interface will not permit any user traffic through unless the GM has successfully registered to KS. 
6.3.1 Required Workflow for the KS 
The following steps are required to be implemented on KS: 
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1. Configure an ISAKMP/IKE policy (higher than default): see Appendix C. 17 & 18. 
2. Generate authentication credentials for all GMs & KS (PSK is used here) for each peer in the 
subnet (tied to the address): see Appendix C. 19. 
3. Generate RSA keys on KS to authenticate Rekeys: see Appendix C. 20. 
4. Configure a traffic protection policy: see Appendix C. 21, 22, 23 & 24. 
a. IPsec Profile ( define transform sets & specify encapsulation/crypto settings/session 
key lifetimes) 
b. IPsec Transform set (specify algorithms for IPsec settings for IPsec protected-traffic) 
➔ during negotiation both KS & GMs agree to utilise a particular transform set for a 
certain traffic flow 
c. Traffic Flow Specification ➔ ACL (Deny statement for unencrypted traffic; Permit 
statement for encrypted traffic) ➔ during negotiation this ACL will be pushed to 
GMs 
5. Configure/Enable KS Function: see Appendix C. 25, 26, 27 & 28. 
a. Set the identity of the group to distinguish different groups 
b. Assign IPsec profile 
c. Assign already defined ACL 
6. Tune optionally the rekeying policy to use unicast rekeying (multicast is default): see 
Appendix C. 29, 30 & 31. 
a. Rekey options 
b. Source address for rekeys 
7. Create a crypto map and apply it on a KS interface (KS then listens for registration and 
performs the subsequent traffic protection policy distribution): see Appendix C. 32 & 33. 
a. Create Crypto map with the same name as the GDOI group name 
b. Apply Crypto map to relevant KS's interface 
For the details of the implementation for the KS as well as the GMs, please refer to Appendix C. 
Required Workflow for the KS & the GMs Configurations. 
6.3.2 Required Workflow for the GMs 
In short, the following steps are required to be taken with each GM (R2, R3 and R4 here). 
1. Configure an IKE policy ( or use the default one) 
2. Generate authentication credentials for all GMs (PSK is used here) for each peer in the subnet 
(tied to the address). These credentials must match IPsec configuration on KS. 
3. Configure/Enable GM Function 
a. Set the identity of the group to distinguish different groups 
b. Specify Address of the Server 
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4. Create a crypto map and apply it to an untrusted GM's interface (KS then listens for 
registration and performs the subsequent traffic protection policy downloading to GM) 
a. Create crypto map with the same name as the GDOI group name 
b. Apply crypto map to relevant GM' s interface 
An untrusted GM' s interface will not permit any user traffic through unless the GM has 
successfully registered to KS. The complete code on each router (R2, R3 and R4) is as follows: 
• 
• crypto isakmp policy 1 
o authentication pre-share 
o group 2 
• 
• crypto isakmp key O SECRET address 10.0.0.254 
• 
• crypto gdoi group GDOI-GROUPl 
o identity number 1 
o server address ipv4 10.0.0.254 
• 
• crypto map MYCRYPTOMAP 10 gdoi 
o set group GDOI-GROUPl 
• interface fastEthernet 1/0 
o crypto map MYCRYPTOMAP 
• 
6.4 Security Verification Results 
6.4.1 Successful GM-to-KS Registration 
As soon as we configure GM on R2, it starts the registration to KS 10.0.0.254 using R2's Fa 1/0. 
We are notified by this according to the information log message received on R2's console . 
... - ,._-··---':l' .- ... , . 
*Oct 14 21:05:13.959: %CRYPTO-5-GM_REGSTER: Start registration to KS 10.0.0.254 fer group GDOI-GROUPl using ad 
dress 10.0.0.1 
R2(config-if)t! 
*Oct 14 21:05:13.975: %CRYPTO-6-ISAKMP ON OFF: ISAKMP is ON 
R2 (ccnfig-if)f !I - -
Figure 6.6 as soon as crypto map configuration on R2 is done, R2's 10.0.0.1 starts registering into 10.0.0.254 for the 
GDOI group; the output shows this on the R2's console. 
The same results have been obtained on R3 and R4 according to Appendix C. 34. Note that the log 
message numbered 5 is of notification message type. According to Figure 6.7, on each GMs' console 
we are notified that GDOI registration to KS for the group completes upon finalising the configuration 
workflow on GMs. Additionally, the distribution method for rekey retransmission is also changed to 
Unicast which is verifiable from the notification log messages on each GM's console. 
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Figure 6.7 Later on, on each GMs' console we are notified that GDOI registration to KS for the group completes. 
Additionally, the distribution method for rekey retransmission is changed to Unicast which is verifiable now. 
6.4.2 The First ESP-Protected Packet Captured 
No. Time Source 
4504 6551. 74 06310 . 0. 0 . 2 
4 505 6551. 79364 ca:0.!:05:a4:00:lc 
4 506 6552.63072 ca :05:01:60:00:lc 
4507 6553. 56081 ca:06:01 :60:00: lc 
4508 6553 . 6108210. 0 . 0 . 3 
4509 6553 .8258410.0.0.1 
4510 6560.4785110.0.0.1 
4513 6561. 73263 10. 0 . 0. 2 
4514 6562 . 6 3272 ca:05:01:60:00:lc 
4515 6563.6038210.0.0.3 
451 6570 . 14847 ca :03:05 :a4:00:lc 
4518 6570 . 4685010 . 0.0.1 
4519 6571.1685710.100.0.1 
4 520 65 71.1 858 10.100. 0.1 
4521 6571. 7 86310. 0 . 0. 
4522 6572.62872 ca:05:01 : 60 :00:lc 
4 523 6573 . 59882 10. o. 0. 3 
4524 6 580.4625010 . 0 . 0.1 
452 5 6581. 2963 10. 0 . 0 . 2 
4526 6582. 62972 ca:05:01 :60 :00:lc 
4 527 6583. 57982 10. 0. 0. 3 
4528 6583. 58982 10. o. 0. 3 
4 529 6583. 59282 10.100. 0.1 
4531 6590. 46550 10. 0 . 0 . 1 
4534 6591 . 7226310. 0 . 0. 2 
4535 6592.64272 ca: 0 5: 01:60: 00 : lc 
4 536 6593. 46580 ca:04 : OS: a4 :00:lc 
4 537 6593. 59282 10. 0 . 0. 3 
4 540 6600. 44950 10. 0 . 0.1 
4541 6601. 74 56310 . 0.0. 2 
4542 6602.64572 ca:05:01:60:00:lc 
4543 6603. 54681 ca : 03 :OS: a.! :00: le 
4544 6603.5968210.0.0. 3 
4 5.t s 6605. 63002 ca:05 :01: 60 :00: le 
Destination Protocol 
224 . 0.0. 5 OSPF 
CDP / VTP/ DTP/ PAgP / UDCDP 
ca :05 :01: 60:00:lc LOOP 
CDP / VTP/ DTP / PAgP / UDCDP 
224 . 0 . 0. 5 OSPF 
224 . 0 . 0 . 1 I@Pv2 
22<1.0.0.5 OSPF 
224 . 0 . 0. 5 OSPF 
ca: OS :01: 60:00: le LOOP 
224 . 0 . 0. 5 OSPF 
CDP/ VTP/ DTP PAgP I UOCDP 
224 . 0.0 . 5 OSPF 
224 . 0 . 0 . 2 Pil' Vl 
224 . 0 . 0 . 2 PD-Vl 
224.0.0. 5 OSPF 
ca :05 :01: 60 :00 :le LOOP 
22.1 . 0 .0.5 OSPF 
224.0.0. 5 OSPF 
224 .0 . 0.S OSPF 
ca:05 :01 : 60: 00 :le LOOP 
10.100. 0.1 PIMv2 
224.0 . 0.5 OSPF 
10.0 . 0. 3 PI~v2 
224 . 0.0 . 5 OSPF 
224.0 . 0 . 5 OSPF 
ca :05 :01: 60:00 :le LOOP 
Broadcas1: ARP 
224 . 0 . 0 . 5 OSPF 
224 .0.0. 5 OSPF 
224 . 0. 0 . 5 OSPF 
ca:05 :01 :60:00 :le LOOP 
Broadcast ARP 
224.0 . 0.5 OSPF 
CDP , VTP DTP 1PAgP UDCDP 
Length Info 
98 Hello Packet 
360 Device ID: R2. lab . local Port ID: Fast:Et:her net:1/ 0 
60 Reply 
360 Device ID : R3 . lab . local Port: ID : Fast:Et:hernet:1/ 0 
98 Hello Packe 
60 Membership Query, general 
98 He 11 o Packet: 
98 Hello Packet: 
60 Reply 
98 Hello Packet: 
360 De ·ce ID: Rl. lab . local Port: ID : Fast:Et:hernet:1 / 0 
98 Hello Packet: 
60 RP-Reachable 
60 RP-Reachable 
98 Hello Packet: 
60 Reply 
98 Hello Packet: 
98 Hello Packet: 
98 Hello Packet: 
60 Reply 
60 Regiscer 
98 Hello Packet: 
60 Register - stop 
98 Hello Packet 
98 He 11 o Packet 
60 Reply 
60 Who has 10. 0. 0. 254? Tell 10. 0. 0.1 
98 Hello Packet 
98 Hello Packet 
98 He 11 o Packet 
60 Reply 
60 ,ho has 10. 0. 0 . 1., Tell 10. 0 . 0. 25'1 
98 Hello Packe 
360 De ice ID: Ro!. lab. local Port ID: Fas Et:hernetl 0 
Figure 6.8 The first ESP packet captured by Wireshark sequenced 4547 sourced from R2, just before and just after 
fin alizing the GDOI registration on R2 (but not R3 & R4 yet). While the packet used to be unencrypted (like packet 
sequenced 45 31), with correct GDOI implementation between KS and R2, now traffic leaving GM destined for multicast 
addresses including 224.0.0.5 (OSPF Hello Packets) is encrypted (cryptographically protected). 
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As R3 and R4 had not registered yet onto KS (once R2 had merely registered), we eavesdropped 
on R4's link with Wireshark. The captured result shown in Figure 6.8 is of immense importance since 
it exactly indicates the first ESP packet sequenced 4547 sourced from R2 upon finalising the GDOI 
registration (more precisely, just before and just after GDOI on R2 is configured). 
The first ESP Packet is sent from R2'2 10.0.0.1 and destined for 224.0.0.5 and thus is OSPF Hello 
Packet. Just before the first ESP packet, for sequence number = 4531, the same packet type sourced 
from R2 used to be unencrypted. Nevertheless, the packet is now encrypted as GDOI dictates. Correct 
GDOI configuration between R2 and Rl asks for any packets leaving GM and destined for either 
other GMs or Multicast IP Addresses to be encrypted according to our encryption policies previously 
defined. R2 therefore successfully downloaded the ACL which reflects the interesting traffic and 
provides encryption services accordingly (we did not define such ACLs on any GMs). 
6.4.3 ESP Protection for the GM-to-Multicast Addresses Traffic 
Later on, with R3 and R4 still not registered onto GDOI (and only R2 already registered), we 
continued eavesdropping on R2's sourced communication. As expected, not only traffic destined for 
224.0.0.5 (OSPF hello packets), but also periodical packets dispatched to 224.0.0.1 for IGMPv2 
(General Membership Queries addressed to all hosts) as well as to 224.0.0.13 (PIMv2 Hello packets 
addressed to all PIM routers) are ESP protected when GDOI is properly in place. However, they used 
to be in plaintext before GDOI was implemented. 
4548 6611 . 7206310 . 0 . 0 . 2 
4549 6611 . 80264 ca:04 :05:a4 :00 : lc 
4550 6612 . 65172 ca:05:01:60:00:lc 
4551 6613 . 58182 ca:06:01 : 60 :00:lc 
4552 6613. 59182 10. 0. 0. 3 
224 . 0 . 0 . 5 OSPF 
COP / VTP / DTP / PAgP / UO COP 
ca : 05:01:60:00 : lc LOOP 
COP / VTP / OTP / PAgP / UO COP 
224. 0. 0. 5 OSPF 
98 Hello Packet: 
360 oevice 10: R2 . lab. local 
60 Reply 
360 Device IO: R3 . lab. local 
98 Hello Packet 
Por 10: FastEthernet:1 / 0 
Pon 10: Fast:Et:hernet:1/ 0 
4 553 6613. 90385 10 . o. 0 . 1 224 . 0. 0 . 1 ESP 102 ESP (SPI=Oxe53e8356) 
4557 6621. 7426310.0. 0.2 224 . 0.0 . 5 OSPF 
4 558 6622.62772 ca:05:01:60:00:lc ca:05:01:60:00:lc LOOP 
4559 6623.5978210.0.0.3 24.0 . 0 . 5 OSPF 
4561 6630 . 1474 ca:03:05 :a4:00:lc COP P/ OTP/ PAgP UOCDP 
98 Hello Packet: 
60 Reply 
98 Hello Packet: 
360 De ice 10: Rl. lab . local Por 10: Fast:Et:herne 1 / 0 
Figure 6.9 all communications sourced from R2 and destined for multicast address range are secured with GDOI ESP 
(while R3 & R4 are not configured with GDOI yet) including: IGMP v2 (destined for 224.0.0.1) , OSPF Hello Packets 
(destined for 224.0.0.5) and PIM v2 Hello Packets (destined for 224.0.0.13) 
6.4.4 GDOI Protocol Message Signalling Whereby R4 Registers 
Recall that we left GDOI traffic for protocol signalling unencrypted (and thus readable) on 
purpose. After finalising R3's registration, we next captured GDOI communications from R4 to KS 
over UDP (disseminated in clear text as the ACL for interesting traffic suggests) during R4 ' s 
registration by listening to R4's link. In this way, the first ESP packet sourced from R4 (4670) which 
is PIM Hello message destined for 224.0.0.13 is captured. This result is displayed in Figure 6.10. The 
key observation in the result below is that before R4 joins the group (before packet sequenced 
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( 4670) ), ten GDOI protocol UDP messages in plaintext m total are transited between GM that 
10.0.0.3 and KS that is 10.0.0.254 as the figure implies. 
4657 6740 . 5695110 . 0. 0 . 3 
4658 67 o. 59952 ca:03: 0 5:a :00 : lc 
4659 6 0.6095 2 ca:05:01:60:00:lc 
4660 6741. 62062 10 . 0 . 0 . 25 
4 661 6741. 66462 10. 0. o. 3 
4662 6741. 1263 10. 0 . 0. 25 
4663 6741. 74463 10 . 0 . 0. 2 
4664 6741. 77763 1 0 . o. 0. 3 
4665 6741. 80864 10. 0 . o. 254 
4 666 6741. 83764 10. 0 . o. 3 
4667 6741. 86864 1 0 . 0 . 0 . 254 
4 668 6741. 91 765 10. 0. 0 . 3 
4669 6741. 94865 10 . 0 . 0 . 254 
10.0.0.254 UDP 186 source port : gdoi oestinatio port: 
Broadcast ARP 60 ,TIO has 10. 0.0 . 3? Tell 10. 0 . 0. 25.; 
ca:03:05:a4 :00 :lc ARP 60 10.0 . 0 . 3 is at c a :05 : 01 : 60 : 00 : lc 
10 . 0 . 0 . 3 UDP 1 6 source por t: gdoi Destinatio port: 
10.0. 0 . 254 UDP 346 source port: gdoi oesti at ion por·t: 
10. 0.0.3 UDP 3 6 source port: gdoi Destinatio port: 
... ESP 166 ESP (SPI=Oxe53e8 356) 
10.0 . 0 . 254 
10. 0 . 0.3 
10. 0 . 0.254 
10. 0.0 . 3 
10 . 0 . 0 . 25 
10. 0 . 0 . 3 
UDP 
UDP 
UDP 
UDP 
UDP 
UDP 
142 source 
110 source 
1 34 sour ce 
382 source 
102 sour ce 
542 source 
port: gdoi oestinatio port : 
port: gdoi oestinatio port: 
port: gdoi Destination port: 
port: gdoi oestina1:io port: 
port : gdoi Dest inatio por t: 
port: gdoi Destinatio port: 
4670 6742 . 0276&10.0 . 0 . 3 224.0 . 0.13 ESP 134 ESP (SPI=Oxe53e8356) 
gdoi 
gdoi 
gdoi 
gdoi 
gdoi 
gdoi 
gdoi 
gdoi 
gdoi 
gdoi 
Figure 6.10 In the course of R4 ' s GDOI registration (after R2 and R3 have joined the group), we listen to R4 ' s link to 
capture GDOI communications to KS over UDP (in clear text as the ACL suggests) . Then we captured the first ESP packet 
sourced from R4's 10.0.0.3 (4670) which is PIM Hello message destined for 224.0.0.13 . As the result depicts, 10 GDOI 
protocol messages have been communicated between R4 and Rl before 10.0.0.3 securely dispatches ESP protected data. 
6.4.5 Secure GM-to-GM Plus GM-to-Multicast Addresses Traffic 
No. Time Source 
4682 67 3. 7288310 . 0 . 0 . 2 
4683 6743 . 75883 10. o. o . 3 
4684 674 3. 76883 10. o. o. 2 
4685 6743 . 77883 10. 0. 0 . 3 
4686 674 3. 78884 10. o . o. 3 
4687 6743. 78884 10. 0. o. 2 
4688 6743 . 9884 10 . o . 0 . 3 
4689 674 3. 7988 10. 0 . 0 . 2 
4690 6743 . 80884 10. 0. 0 . 2 
Destination 
10 . 0 . 0 . 3 
10.0 . 0 . 2 
10. 0 .0. 3 
10. 0.0. 2 
10. 0.0 . 2 
10. 0.0.3 
10. 0 .0 . 2 
10 . 0 .0 . 3 
10.0.0.3 
10.0.0.1 
Protocol Length Info 
. . 
ESP 246 ESP (SPI=0xe 53e8356) 
ESP 198 ESP (SPI=0xe5 3e83 56) 
ESP 150 ESP ( SPI=0Xe53e8356) 
ESP 150 ESP (SPI=0Xe 5 3e8 3 56) 
ESP 166 ESP (SPI=Oxe53e8 356) 
ESP 13 ESP (SPI=0xe53e8356) 
ESP 1 82 ESP (SPI=0xe53e8356) 
ESP 150 ESP ( SPI=0xe53e8356) 
ESP 294 ESP (SPI=0xe53e8 356) 
356) 
ESP 166 ESP 
ESP 
ESP 
166 ESP (SPI=0xe53e8356) 
134 ESP (SPI=Oxe53e8 356) 
166 ESP (SPI=Oxe5 3e 8 356) 
Figure 6.11 Later on, as we expect from GDOI, all the GMs are communicating securely with each other with ESP 
protection. All the traffic leaving the group 10.0.0.X and destined for either other GMs ( 10.0.0.X) or multicast address range 
including periodical OSPF Hello messages (224.0.0.5) as well as PIMv2 Hello messages (224.0.0.13) are ESP protected 
(while all the traffic used to be in plaintext before GDOI was implemented in Figure 6.8). 
147 
LOMP Architecture Realisation and Evaluation 
Finally, once the registration for all GMs namely R2, R3 and 4 has been accomplished, as 
expected, all the communications heard from any of the GMs destined for either other GMs or 
multicast address range must be protected with ESP if GDOI is correctly functioning. This can be 
verified by listening to the R4's link for instance in Figure 6.11. 
6.4.6 Secure Group Management Protocol Verification 
To display basic secure group management related information, on the KS we issued show crypto 
gdoi. The result is highlighted in Figure 6.12. The observation is that there is one group called 
"GDOI-GROUPl" defined on the KS with identity number 1 which has 3 active GMs registered so 
far; the group rekey lifetime is 86400 seconds (KEK lifetime), the current IPsec SA operates 
bidirectionally; 85874 seconds remain until the next rekey and upon the rekey over a period of 10 
seconds the rekey is dispatched twice (ensures reliability); the current IPsec SA number is one (TEK) 
while its associated lifetime is 1800 seconds defined under the GDOI-PROFILE; currently there is no 
replay attack countermeasure in place ( can be optionally tuned) and 1257 seconds is left before the 
current IPsec SA (TEK) expires. Finally, local router (Rl) is providing the means for the KS for the 
moment and the access control list numbered 101 is associated with the group to define interesting 
traffic for the encryption service. 
Rlfshow crypto gdoi 
Group Inforrr~tion 
Group Name 
Group Identity 
Group Members 
IPSec SA Direction 
Active Group Server 
Group Rekey Lifetime 
Group Rekey 
GDOI-GROUPl 
1 
3 
Beth 
Local 
86400 secs 
Remaining Lifetime 85874 secs 
Rekey Retransrr~t Period 10 secs 
Rekey Retransrr~t Attempts: 2 
Group Retransrr~t 
Remaining Lifetime 
IPSec SA Nurrber 
0 secs 
1 
IPSec SA Rekey Lifetime: 1800 secs 
Profile Name 
Replay method 
SA Rekey 
Remaining Lifetirr.e 
ACL Co=-ifigured 
Group Server list 
GDOI-PROFILE 
Disabled 
1275 secs 
access-list 101 
Local 
Figure 6.12 Result summarises the basic information pertaining to the current GDOI settings on the KS including KEK 
& TEK lifetimes as well as remaining time until next rekey retransmission. 
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6.4. 7 Rekey Status Verification 
Rlt!'lhow crypto gdoi ks rekey 
Group GDOI-GROUPl (~nica!'lt) 
Number of Rekeys !'lent 
Number of Rekey!'l retran!'l:mitted 
KEK rekey lifetime (sec) 
Remaining lifet.1me (!'lee) 
Retransrr~t period 
Nwr.ber of retran!'lmi!'lsion!'l 
IPSec SA 1 lifetime (sec) 
Remaining lifetime (sec) 
0 
0 
36400 
85346 
10 
2 
1300 
747 
Rltshow cryptc gdci k!'l rekey 
Group GDOI-GROUPl (Un.1ca!!t) 
Nurr.ber of Rekey.3 !'lent 
Nurr.ber of Rekey!'l retran!'lmitted 
KEK rekey lifetime (!lee) 
Rerr~ining lifetime (!'lee) 
Retransrr~t period 
Number of retran!'lmi!'lsions 
!PSec SA 1 lifetime (!'lee) 
Remaining lifet.1.me (sec) 
.J. 
1 
86-100 
8-4665 
10 
2 
1800 
66 
Figure 6.13 Rekey information on KS before the first rekey (left) and after the first rekey (right). Retransmission Rate 
for Rekey which is tuneable (period as well as number of retransmissions) is observed. Additionally, it is verifiable that 
Unicast is merely providing a distribution mechanism for rekeying which is more reliable. 
As an attempt to determine the rekey status like how many rekeys so far and when the next rekey 
will occur, we then issued show crypto gdoi ks rekey just before as well as just after the first rekey 
occurred. The output is displayed below. The observation is as we expect, only Unicast operates there 
as the distribution mechanism for rekeying. 
As soon as the lifetime of the first SA expires (the first 1800 seconds elapses), on KS's console, 
we are notified that the first Rekey is sent with sequence number 1. This informational syslog will 
also indicate the SPI which will be shared amongst the GDOI GMs. The relevant screenshots of the 
console are provided below. Even though we were in the middle of other configuration tasks, as soon 
as 1800 seconds elapsed, we received the following notifications. 
*Oct 14 21:32:35.982: %GD?I-5-KS_SEND_UNICAST_REKEY: Sending Unicast Rekey 
for group GDOI-GROUPl from addres!'l 10.0.0.254 with seq t l using spi 999D3F786C16F07E 
Figure 6.14 As soon as the first SA expires (by the end of 1800 seconds), the first rekey will happen. The captured result 
on the KS's console reveals that with Unicast mechanism, rekeying has been performed sourced from the 10.0.0.254. 
According to the previous result, we can now expect the proper receipt of the first rekey messages 
on the GMs dispatched from 10.0.0.254. This can be verified immediately on GMs console as well, as 
Figure 6.15 illustrates. 
- - -
R2f 
-◊cc 14 21:32:46.254: \GDOI-5-G11_REC\'_REKEY: Received Rekey for group GDOI-GRCJPl ~ro~ 10.0.0.254 to lJ.0.0.l 
using 3p1 999D3F786C16F07E 
R2* 
R3* 
•Occ 14 2:.:32:36.'ile: \GDOI-5-Gl1_RECV_REKEY: Received Reke:,· for groui: GOCI-SRC:JFl frcrr. :.O.O.J.254 to :O.:S.0.2 
U3ing 3pi 999D3F7e6Cl6F07E 
RH 
•Occ 14 21:19:16.247: \SYS-5-COUFIG_I: Configured from con3ole b:,- con3ole 
RH 
•Occ 14 21:32:36.194: \GDOI-5-G11_RECV_REKEY: Received Rekey fer group GDOI-GROVPl from 10.0.0.254 cc 10.0.0.3 
U3ing 5pi 999D3F786C16F07E 
RHI 
Figure 6.15 GMs' (i.e. R2's, R3's & R4's) console upon receipt of the Rekey for the group GDOI-GROUPl from Rl 's 
10.0.0.254. The SPI shared for the group is 999D3F786C16F07E which is the same on the KS as well as GMs (the same SPI 
is shared within the group by GMs). 
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After a while, we verify receipt of the rekeys on GMs. The observation from the following result 
is that Acks are sent for each rekey message received by the GM (here R4 for instance, Acks are sent 
twice for retransmission rate equal to 2). The receipt of the first key rekey is verifiable on each GM' s 
console with show crypto gdoi gm rekey. 
R4fshow Cr''.:,'Pto gdoi gm rekey 
Group GDOI-GROUPl (Unicast) 
Nl.ll'!'.ber of Rekeys rece:.ved (cumulative) : 2 
NUI!".ber of Rekeys received after registration: 2 
NUI!".ber of Rekey Acks sent : 2 
Figure 6.16 The receipt of the "first" rekey can be verified immediately on each GM's console with show crypto gdoi 
gm rekey. The important observation is that Acks are sent for each rekey message received by the GM (two Acks are sent 
from the GM to the KS because of the retransmission rate of the rekeying) 
6.4.8 Crypto Sessions & ISAKMP/IKE SA Status Verification 
We then listed active GMs through show crypto gdoi ks members on the KS before as well as after 
the first rekey process. Accordingly, we observe the relevant changes in sent/received sequence 
numbers before and after the rekey. The output is for the moment that the first rekey has sent for the 
group (to all GMs in Unicast). While for 10.0.0.1, two rekeys have been retransmitted (and so far only 
one acknowledged), at this point in time; for 10.0.0.2 as well as 10.0.0.3 merely the first round of 
rekey retransmission has occurred. This implementation even keeps track of the number of Rekey 
Acks missed which is zero in all cases in this result (Appendix C. 35). 
We then examined the status info of each active crypto session in place with show crypto session 
on KS. Three crypto sessions have been established with three GMs over UDP 848 for GDOI. All 
three sessions are in Active Status. Session Status is UP-IDLE flagged meaning that IKE SAs exist 
and are active (IPsec SAs come later) on KS. While we only see IKE SAs here, on GMs we can later 
verify IPsec SAs as well. This result is shown in Appendix C. 36. 
In the next stage, we need to find out what IKE SAs are idle (which state is associated with Active 
status) through show crypto isakmp sa on the KS. As the result below reveals, three distinct 
connections with different connection IDs (1001, 1002, and 1003) exist between each pair of (KS, 
GM). Displaying current Internet Key Exchange (IKE) security associations (SAs) on the KS for each 
connection with Active Status, we come to know that each connection is in a GDOI_IDLE state here. 
Rl#show crypto isakmp sa 
IPv4 Crypto ISAKHP SA 
dst 
10.0.0.254 
10.0.0.254 
10.0.0.254 
src 
10.0.0.1 
10.0.0.2 
10.0.0.3 
state 
GDOI 
-GDOI 
-GDOI 
IDLE 
IDLE 
IDLE 
conn-id slot status 
1001 0 ACTIVE 
1002 0 ACTIVE 
1003 0 ACTIVE 
Figure 6.17 Displaying current Internet Key Exchange (IKE) security associations (SAs) on KS; each SA assigned with 
distinct connection ID in Active Status for (KS, GM) pair are currently in GDOI_IDLE state. 
The IKE session between the GM and KS (illustrated by GDOI_IDLE) will timeout after the 
configured IKE lifetime. An IKE session is only needed for initial registration and does not need to 
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stay up for normal secure group management operation. A rekey SA (indicated by GDOI_REKEY 
state) however always stays in the IKE database. Using show crypto isakmp peers, shown underneath, 
we then displayed the Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) peer 
descriptions on the KS for GDOI Phase 1 as discussed before. 
Rl#show crypto isakmp peers 
Peer: 10.0.0.1 Port: 848 Local: 10.0.0.254 
Phasel id: 10.0.0.1 
Peer: 10.0.0.2 Port: 848 Local: 10.0.0.254 
Phasel id: 10.0.0.2 
Peer: 10.0.0.3 Port: 848 Local: 10.0.0.254 
Phasel id: 10.0.0.3 
Rl#I 
Figure 6.18 displaying IKE peer description from the KS's viewpoint for GDOI Phase 1; UDP 848 is utilised for UDP 
protocol signalling 
6.4.9 Policy Verification 
We then listed the parameters for each Internet Key Exchange (IKE) policy leveraging the show 
crypto isakmp policy as illustrated below. 
There are eight IKE default policies supported with protection suites of priorities 65507-65514, 
where 65507 is the highest priority and 65514 is the lowest priority. If IKE policies have not been 
configured manually, the default IKE policies will take over. Recall that within the non-default IKE 
policy with priority 1, DES is the encryption algorithm, SHA-1 is the hash algorithm utilised, PSK is 
exploited as the means of authentication method, DH group identifier is set to 2 within the policy and 
finally lifetime of the IKE SA is set to 86400 seconds (while no volume limit lifetime is defined). 
Rlf.show cr:x,pto i.sak:mp policy 
Global IKE policy 
Protection suite of priority 1 
encr:x,ption algorithm: 
ha.sh algorithm: 
authentication method: 
Diffie-Hellman group: 
lifetime: 
Default protection suite 
encryption algor1thin: 
ha.sh algorithm: 
authentication method: 
Diffie-Hellman group: 
lifetime: 
DES - Data Encr:x,pt1cn Standard (56 bit keys). 
Secure Ha.sh Standard 
Pre-Shared Key 
#2 (1024 bit) 
86400 .seconds, no volu:me liw~t 
DES - Data Encryption Standard (56 bit keys). 
Secure Hash Standard 
Rive.st-Shamir-Adleman Signature 
*1 (768 bit) 
86400 seconds, no volume li~~t 
Figure 6.19 IKE SA Policy is verified; that is algorithms, methods and thresholds which include encryption, hash, 
authentication, DH group identifier and lifetime within the IKE Policy. 
Let's not lose sight of the fact that other options are available here for each Internet Key Exchange 
(IKE) policy with the current hardware infrastructure including authentication methods such as 
Rivest, Shamir, and Adelman (RSA) or pre-shared keys (PSK), encryption methods like Advanced 
Encryption Standard (AES) or Triple Data Encryption Standard (3DES), hash function, Secure Hash 
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Algorithm (SHA-1) or Message-Digest algorithm 5 (MD5), Diffie-Hellman (DH) group specification 
(identifier) DHl, DH2 or DH5 which in turn contain DHl specifying the 768-bit Diffie-Hellman 
group, DH2 specifying the 1024-bit Diffie-Hellman group and finally DH5 specifying the 1536-bit 
Diffie-Hellman group. 
Since we configured pre-shared authentication key with crypto isakmp key global configuration, 
we then verified the pre-shared keys in the Internet Key Exchange policy in Figure 6.20. Note that we 
need to perform this configuration at both peers for each pair of (KS, GM). 
Rl#show crypto isakmp key 
Keyring Hostname/Address Preshared Key 
default 10.0.0.0 [255.0.0.0 ] SECRET 
RHI 
Figure 6.20 verifying the key ring as the pre-shared key used for authentication method for the group 10.0.0.0/8 
If an IKE policy includes pre-shared keys as the authentication method, these pre-shared keys will 
be configured at both peers-otherwise the policy cannot be used (the policy will not be submitted for 
matching by the IKE process). If the mask argument is used, pre-shared keys are no longer restricted 
between two users. We stored the PSK intentionally unencrypted for validation reasons. Nevertheless, 
it can be hashed with MD5 for secure storage. 
As Appendix C. 37 discloses, we then displayed the RSA public keys of KS which we named the 
rsa_key. Secure Shell (SSH) may generate an additional RSA key pair used merely by SSH (Key 
name: rsa_key.server) which is also listed there. rsa_key is however exportable. We can also 
optionally encrypt the RSA key with another key called passphrase for added protection. This 
configuration needs to be then "written" to the start-up config (we skipped this). 
Before verifying the GDOI crypto map on the KS, note that with a basic secure group 
management solution, prior to registering with the KS, traffic that passes through GMs is in clear text. 
This is due to the fact that GM has not registered with KS yet and as such ACLs have not been 
downloaded so far. This default behaviour which opens the door for disseminating unencrypted traffic 
and may (for routing information) or may not (for security reasons) be desired behaviour is called 
"Fail Open" mode. By turning on the Fail Close mode, all the traffic passing through the GMs will be 
dropped until GM is registered successfully. As soon as GM registers with success and SAs are 
downloaded, Fail Close turns off by itself and subsequently the ACL(s) will dictate the encryption 
regulations. 
As Figure 6.21 suggests, the crypto map called MYCRYPTOMAP with sequence number 10 for 
the group name "GDOI-GROUPl" is validated here. With the aid of the various sequence numbers 
different crypto map entries can be ranked so that lower numbers will be evaluated firstly and thus are 
prioritised. In addition, under the same map name, different numbers can differentiate the ways that 
certain traffic will be forwarded to different IPsec peers whilst different security is applied for each of 
them. 
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Rlfshow crypco map 
Crypto Map "HYCRYPTOHAP" 10 gdoi 
Group Name: GDOI-GROUPl 
identity number 1 
server local 
Interfaces using crypto map MYCRYPTOMAP: 
FastEthernetl/0 
Figure 6.21 Displaying GDOI crypto map on the KS 
Back to the GMs, on R4 we assumed that the ACL will be downloaded from the KS upon 
successful GDOI registration and therefore we did not define any ACLs on the GMs including R4. 
Now we verify this assumption to observe whether or not the ACL has been downloaded from the KS 
in Figure 6.22. 
R4#show crypto gdoi gm acl 
Group Name: GOOI-GROUPl 
ACL Downloaded From KS 10.0.0.254: 
access-list deny udp any any port= 848 
access-list 
access-list 
access-list 
ACL Configured 
deny udp any port= 848 any 
permit ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 
permit ip 10.0.0.0 0.255.255.255 224.0.0.0 15.255.255.255 
L_ocally: 
Figure 6.22 While we did not define any ACLs on GMs, we display downloaded ACLs on R4 to verify proper GDOI 
registration of this GM into the KS. 
Verification tests on R4 as a GM here continues with displaying the relevant Internet Security 
Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP) peer descriptions as well as GDOI 
information as Figure 6.23 demonstrates. 
R4#show crypto isakmp peers 
Peer: 10.0.0.254 Port: 848 Local: 10.0.0.3 
Phasel id: 10.0.0.254 
RHO 
R4fshow crypto gdoi 
Group Information 
Group Name 
Group Identity 
Rekeys received 
IPSec SA Direction 
ACL Received From KS 
Active Group Server 
Group Server list 
GDOI-GROUPl 
1 
2 
Both 
gdoi_group GDOI-GROUPl temp acl 
10.0.0.254 
10.0.0.254 
Figure 6.23 verifying ISAKMP peering as well as GDOI GM status & information on R4 as a GM 
6.4.10 GDOI IPsec SA Verification 
We then display GDOI IPsec SA (not IKE SA discussed earlier) and its session status on GMs 
exploiting show crypto session. 
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Figure 6.24 Displaying GDOI IPsec SA (not IKE SA discussed earlier) and its Session Status on GMs using show 
crypto session. Based on VPN Session Status legend, UP-NO-IKE status indicates that IPsec SA exists (flow exists). For two 
summarised ACLs, two active SAs with crypto map as the origin are shown. Exploiting two active GDOI IPsec SAs, the first 
ACL is encrypting GM-to-GM communications while the second ACL is for any multicast traffic originated from GMs 
including PIM or OSPF traffic. Recall that for each ACL one SA is established. 
In other words, status information for active crypto sessions are highlighted with this show 
command. This is when the network has converged after a while. Convergence means that there is no 
added multicast traffic except the scenarios' default ones including PIM, OSPF, etc. According to 
VPN Session Status (Tunnel Status) Legend, the UP-NO-IKE status here indicates that IPsec SA 
exists (flow exists) no matter whether there is any active IKE SA or not. According to the results 
below on each GM, there are two Active SAs for two summarised ACLs. Recall that for each ACL 
one SA is established in each direction. Also, in compliance with Cisco recommendation in which 
designers are asked to utilise a private subnet addressing scheme to represent all the network 
interfaces (subnets) behind each GM which requires protection, two summarised ACL are defined to 
represent group subnet as well as multicast range. This leads to the usage of a contiguous network 
block in which one ACL is defined and subsequently GMs only install one summarised SA in their 
DB. Different blocks require separate SAs to be installed for each subnet block. The question here is 
which flows currently are encrypted with these two GDOI IPsec SAs? The first ACL originating from 
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the crypto map and downloaded from KS to each GM is for GM-to-GM communications over GDOI. 
The second ACL will encrypt all the communication leaving GMs and addressed at any multicast IP. 
Additionally, there is IKE SA between each GM and the KS in Active status. The tunnel status 
(session status) for IKE SA shown above is UP-IDLE meaning that IKE SA exists and is active over 
the GDOI port. 
Due to its significance, we also considered show crypto gdoi ipsec sa as shown below to overview 
IPsec SAs belonging to all the groups on the GMs. Recall that only upon accomplishment of the 
registration of a given GM (which entails authenticating it by KS, who has been provided with the 
expected IKE credentials) into the KS, can GM participate in the group SA. TEK as part of the IPsec 
SA then encrypts the data for the group while KEK facilitates the rekey before IPsec expires or upon 
new policies being enforced. Multicast rekey benefits from the scalability as keys are not needed to be 
sent to each GM individually and receipt acknowledgement is not required either (unlike unicast 
rekey). However, if three successive rekeys are not acknowledged by a given GM, KS will remove the 
GM from the database. 
R4fshow crypto gdoi ipsec sa 
SA created for group GDOI-GROUPl: 
FastEthernetl/0: 
protocol= ip 
local ident = 10.0.0.0/e, port= O 
remote ident = 10.0.0.0/8, port= 0 
direction: Both, replay: Disabled 
protocol= ip 
local ident = 10.0.0.0/8, pert= 0 
remote ident: = 224.0.0.0/4, port = 0 
direction: Both, replay: Disabled 
Figure 6.25 Overviewing IPsec SAs associated with all groups on R4 as the GM; two bidirectional SAs are encrypting 
both GM-to-GM as well as GM-to-Multicast traffic according to our scenario. 
According to the result above, two SAs are created for the group GDOI-GROUPl on R4. 
Untrusted GM' s interface, i.e. FastEthemetl/0, will not permit any user traffic through unless the GM 
has successfully registered to the KS. Note that SAs are bi-directional according to the result. Also, as 
we expect, two SAs are established for two summarised ACLs defined. The first one is for the GM-to-
GM communications while the second one addresses multicast traffic crypto disseminated from any 
GMs towards any multicast range. 
This is now time for eavesdropping on the subnet, let's say R4's link, to determine which flows 
are encrypted currently using the two aforementioned active GDOI SAs. According to our Wireshark 
results below (detailed in Appendix C. 38), periodic IGMP Reports destined for RP (10.100.0.1), · 
periodic OSPF Hello messages destined for 224.0.0.5, periodic PIM Hello/Join messages destined for 
224.0.0.13 and finally GM-to-GM communications are all the sensed traffic types existing on the 
physical link after proper GDOI implementation. They are encrypted with IPsec ESP as the result 
suggests. Later on, we will verify that all the GMs within the group are sharing the same SPI for 
GDOI-GROUPl. 
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4678 6743. 6888310. o. o. 2 10 . 0 . 0.3 ESP 166 ESP (SPI• 0xe53e8356) 
6 9 674 3. 70883 10. o. o. 3 10 . 0.0 . 2 ESP 150 ESP (SPI.,0xe53e8356) 
680 67 3. 1883 10 . 0 . 0 . 3 10 . 0.0. 2 ESP 166 ESP (SPI• 0xe53e8356) 
4681 67-l3 . 188310. 0.0 . 2 10 . 0.0 . 3 ESP 150 ESP (SPI• 0xe53e8356) 
4682 6 3 . 2883 10 . 0. 0 . 2 10.0 . 0.3 ESP 2 6 ESP (SP -oxe53e 356) 
4 683 6743 . 7588310 . 0 . 0.3 10. 0.0 . 2 ESP 198 ESP (SP - oxe53e8356) 
684 6 3 . 7688 3 10 . 0 . 0 . 2 10.0 . 0 . 3 ESP 150 ESP (SP • 0xe53e8356) 
468 5 6743. 7883 10 . 0 . o. 3 10.0.0.2 ESP 150 ESP (SPic0xe53e8356) 
4686 67 3. 7888 10. 0.0 . 3 10. 0 . 0.2 ESP 166 £SP (SPI,.,0xe53e8356) 
4687 6 3 . 7888410. o. 0 . 2 10 . 0.0 . 3 £SP 1.34 ESP (SP -Oxe53e8356) 
4688 6 3. 9884 10. 0 . 0 . 3 10 . 0 . 0 . 2 ESP 182 £SP (SPI• 0xe53e8356) 
689 6743 . 79884 10. o. o. 2 10.0.0 . 3 ~SP 150 £SP (SPI..Oxe53e8356) 
4690 67 3 . 8088 10 . 0 .. 0 . 2 10.0.0.3 ESP 29 £SP (SPI~Oxe53e8356) 
46916743.8688410.0.0.3 224.0.0.5 £SP 166 £SP (SPI~0xe53e8356) 
Figure 6.26 Wireshark captures communications after GDOI implementation to determine which flows are encrypted 
currently using two active GDOI SAs on R4's link. This also validates proper cryptographic group management protocol 
deployment. Periodic IGMP Reports destined for RP (10.100.0.1), periodic OSPF Hello messages destined for 224.0.0.5, 
periodic PIM Hello/Join messages destined for 224.0.0.13 and finally GM-to-GM communications are all the only sensed 
traffic types. 
6.5 Security Performance Evaluation 
6.5.1 IO Overhead of the Proposed Scheme 
XAxis: 
Tick Interval: 1 min 
Y Axis: 
Unit: Bytes/fick 
~ OnraU Traffic in Bia 
CDP Traffic in Blue 
19:15:21 19:35:21 19:55:21 20:15:21 20:35:21 20:55:21 
20000 
10000 
21:15:21 21:35:21 21:55:21 22:15:21 
Figure 6.27 Measuring the overhead added by ESP as the heart of GDOI before and after cryptographic group 
management protocol implementation; GDOI adds roughly 2000 Bytes overhead to the scenario here with three GMs and 
one KS. 
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Utilising the IO Graph of Wireshark as shown in the Figure 6.27, we first filter the IP traffic out of 
the overall traffic pattern of our three hour experiment captured from the beginning of the emulation 
on R4's link. Around 110 minutes after emulation began, GDOI has been defined on this GM (R4; the 
last) and the KS. The growth shows the IO overhead added by IPsec ESP of GDOI to the emulation. 
This is due to the fact that no other type of traffic was added and hence the overall growth after this 
time is because of the overhead imposed by IPsec as the heart of GDOI solely. While the IP traffic 
was estimated around 2300 Bytesffick (tick interval is 1 minute) before GDOI, after GDOI it rapi~ly 
rose by roughly 2000 Bytes to reach an average of 4300 Bytesffick in the presence of three GMs and 
one KS. Types of traffic other than IP such as Cisco Discovery Protocol traffic (CDP, Cisco 
proprietary protocol for device discovery) exist and remain steady throughout our experiment 
before/after GDOI. 
6.5.2 Protocol-specific Overhead 
We then tried to filter the previous result based on the desired protocol to determine the 
contribution of each protocol disseminating multicast traffic into the overall IP traffic pattern. To this, 
we filter ESP firstly according to Appendix C. 39. As we expect, before GDOI, there is no ESP traffic 
on the subnet. ESP type of traffic with approximately 4000 Bytesffick is almost solely shaping all of 
the existing IP traffic in the scenario after 110 minutes of the emulation (see Appendix C. 39). 
Next, we filter OSPF traffic. As we expect from the scenario, after GDOI, OSPF is no longer 
captured since it has been merged into the ESP. However, before GDOI, OSPF traffic was roughly 
around 1800 Bytes/Minute according to Appendix C. 40. 
Filtering PIM traffic for the next stage, we expectedly observe that this type of traffic cannot be 
detected after GDOI is configured, similar to OSPF. However, it fluctuates around more than 700 
Bytes/Minute as can be seen in Appendix C. 41. 
We then filtered IGMP traffic. The observation is that IGMP also vanished after GDOI is in place 
in a similar manner to OSPF or PIM. Fluctuating steadily around 120 Bytes/Minute, IGMP hits a peak 
of 180 Bytes/Minute as shown in Appendix C. 42. 
6.5.3 Overhead Evaluation Summary 
Strong security incurs costs and as a result most of the security proposals significantly increase the 
performance overheads. This point has played its prohibitive role for other BGP security remedies so 
far for their real-world business deployment [.21]. That is why utilising the IO Graph of Wireshark, we 
first examine the IP traffic pattern of our three hour experiment captured from the beginning of the 
emulation on R4's link. Out of the resultant pattern sensed by Wireshark, we then determine the 
contribution of each different existing type of traffic into the overall captured traffic to highlight the 
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overhead added solely by GDOI before and after the cryptographic group management protocol is 
deployed. This summary is reflected in the following result. 
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Figure 6.28 Measuring overhead added by ESP of GDOI with the aid of Wireshark IO graphs; around 110 minutes after 
emulation began, GDOI has defined GM and KS. The goal is to filter the different traffic types based on the desired protocol 
to determine the contribution of each protocol disseminating multicast traffic into the overall IP traffic. Accordingly, the 
captured IP traffic pattern as a whole is revealed in black, ESP in red, OSPF in green, PIM in blue and finally IGMP in 
purple. The observation is that the last three are merged into ESP as a result of GDOI proper implementation and as such are 
not sensed after simulation time around 110 minutes. ESP also includes all the GM-to-GM communications since then. 
Around 110 minutes after emulation, GDOI has defined on this GM with KS. The difference is 
shown in the black colour graph below which is the overhead added by the ESP as the heart of GDOI 
and estimated roughly around 2000 Bytes/Minute. We then tried to filter the captured traffic based on 
the desired protocol to determine the contribution of each protocol disseminating multicast traffic into 
the overall IP traffic. Firstly, we filter ESP highlighted in a red colour. As we expect, before GDOI, 
there is no ESP traffic in the subnet. However, later with ESP, ESP with roughly more than 4000 
Bytes/Minute is shaping almost all the existing traffic. Filtering next OSPF traffic, the observation 
proves that OSPF is no more captured after GDOI as we expected since it has been merged into ESP 
and as such is not readable anymore. Before GDOI, OSPF traffic was roughly around 1800 
Bytes/Minute on average. Afterwards, we filter PIM di splayed with a blue colour. Accordingly, while 
it fluctuates around just more than 700 Bytes/Minute before GDOI is in place, PIM traffic cannot be 
detected after GDOI is configured (similar to OSPF). Filtering IGMP traffic, before GDOI we noticed 
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that IGMP hits a peak of 180 Bytes/Minute (averaged around 120) whereas after GDOI is in place, the 
IGMP traffic shown in purple below also vanishes into ESP traffic and therefore is not analysable 
anymore by the network analyser. 
6.5.4 Message Signalling 
We then examine Wireshark Flow Graphs to highlight GDOI messaging signalling overhead in 
practice for our scenario. When R4 starts registering to GDOI, the following result reveals that six 
plus four (10 in total) GDOI IPsec messages for both are detected (see Appendix C. 43 for the result). 
6.5.5 Security Objectives Achieved 
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Figure 6.29 Figure 6.30 Upon finishing GDOI' s proper implementation onwards, no more unencrypted packets sourced 
from any of the GMs and destined for any previously defined multicast/unicast address are captured with Wireshark. All the 
communication with the advent of this cryptographic group management protocol is now IPsec-ESP protected. Notice that 
the communication within the group is also sharing the same SPl. 
Finally, the Flow Graphs shown in Appendix C. 44, Appendix C. 45 and lastly the following one, 
conclude the evaluation results from the quantitative viewpoint for the added overhead by the 
cryptographic group management protocol signalling messages as well as achieved security goals 
prespective. According to Appendix C. 44, unicast GM-to-GM as well as multicast communications 
and protocols signalling messages for the group are unencrypted and therefore unsecure before GDOI 
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deployment. Appendix C. 45 on the other hand, captures the first packet after GDOI is implemented 
between R4 and the KS by the flow graph; the packet used to be an unencrypted PIM Hello message 
destined for 224.0.0.13 as can be seen, but is now encrypted thanks to GDOI's IPsec and as such is 
not analysable by Wireshark anymore. 
For the security objectives achieved, Confidentiality (which in tum ensures Authenticity as well), 
Integrity and Availability (CIA) as the main security objectives for the network security is addressed 
here thanks to the cryptographic management protocol implemented. Appendix C. 44 confirms that 
the entire group associated communication, be it unicast GM-to-GM or multicast, is unencrypted and 
thus unsecure before the deployment of GDOI. Consequently, before GDOI is in place, eavesdropping 
is feasible over the communicated traffic. Next, as soon as R4 joins the group and GDOI is deployed, 
the first packet which used to be unencrypted PIM Hello is now captured which is encrypted and 
destined for 224.0.0.13 (Appendix C. 45). 
Last but not least, the following result demonstrates the fact that with the advent of proper GDOI 
deployment, all the communications for the group are now secured and encrypted owing to IPsec as 
the heart of this cryptographic group management protocol. The main observation is that all the 
captured communication with ESP is sharing the same SPI within the group. This significant 
characteristic will be utilised in the next chapter. 
6.6 Summary 
It was presented in this chapter LOMP architecture realisation between three LOMP nodes and a 
single KS. The architecture implementation was standard-based (IPsec ESP, GDOI, etc.) and 
employed multicast conduits amongst the trust anchors to advantage from its simulcast characteristics. 
The deployment was then critically evaluated in terms of the message signalling required for a single 
GM to register with the KS and obtain the group SA, the IO overhead cost incurred by the security 
and the fulfilled security objectives. As a result, the LOMP architecture deployment with transport 
VPN requires ten messages for a GM to accomplish the registration/authentication/authorisation with 
the KS. This implementation with the PIM-SM multicast routing and in the presence of IGMP as well 
as OSPF almost doubled the overall IP overhead in the scenario thanks to the IPsec ESP. However, 
this imposed overhead by LOMP is negligible. This is because although IRV, as the only analogous 
BGP security architecture to LOMP, is deemed to have low overhead [21], it requires one dedicated 
server per AS while LOMP benefits from the localised overlay (and thus quantitatively far fewer 
servers are needed). The LOMP therefore outweighs even IRV performance-wise. 
Our investigations of the "trust" element in the current inter-domain routing with IP networks so 
far have paved the way for the next chapter to analyse the trustworthiness as well as the robustness of 
the future Internet (Fl) forwarding planes. Two different themes of the FI are discussed in Chapter 7: 
Firstly, Information Centric Networking (ICN) and secondly, Software-defined Networking (SDN). 
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7 Robust Forwarding Plane with the Proinising 
Future Internet Proposals 
In this chapter, we are stepping beyond the current Internet infrastructure towards proposals for 
'Future Internet' as an attempt to evaluate them from a security viewpoint. More precisely, two major 
proposals for Future Internet, namely, Information-Centric Networks (ICN) and Software-Defined 
Networks (SDN) are analysed. The ICN concept is a significant common approach of several future 
Internet research activities [172]. As [172] suggests, by providing a network infrastructure service 
which suits today's use better (regarding content distribution, mobility) and is more robust against 
disruptions, we will demonstrate how vulnerable CURLING (Content-Ubiquitous Resolution and 
Delivery Infrastructure for Next Generation Services) [173], as one of the major ICN proposals, is to 
diverged hijacking risks. On the other hand, OpenFlow is currently the most commonly deployed 
SDN technology [174]. OpenFlow architecture, however, is unable to aggregate flows of IPsec-ESP 
in both transport and tunnel modes since layer 3 information is encrypted and therefore unreadable. 
This work also proposes the use of Security Parameter Index (SPI) of IPsec within the OpenFlow 
architecture as the distinguishing factor to uniquely identify IPsec flows and direct these flows 
accordingly. The latter work has been accepted for publication in the ZTE Communications Journal 
recently [175]. 
7.1 Hijacking Risks in CURLING 
The enormous number of interactions across the Internet will be pertaining to contents access by 
2016. The future tendency of the Internet towards catering for the explosion of multimedia-based 
content asks for taking novel architectures into consideration in addition to infrastructure evolution. 
CURLING [173] is an evolutionary Information-Centric Networking (ICN) approach for distributing 
as well as accessing popular content at the Internet scale. Here, we explore CURLING with regard to 
hijacking risks pertaining to content resolution. We come up with five distinct attack scenarios for 
hijacking content under the CURLING architecture. Afterwards, we propose a model to make 
CURLING robust against these hijacking vulnerabilities. 
7.1.1 Introduction to ICN & CURLING 
Based on Cisco Visual Networking 2012, 55 percent of overall Internet traffic in 2016 will be 
dominated by video content, up from 51 percent in 2011. The report also indicates that this reaches 
86% of global consumer traffic if we add other forms of video applications including Internet TVs 
and Video on Demand (VoD) [176]. This implies that the enormous number of interactions across the 
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Internet will relate to content access. Firstly, the current problems with the Internet today regarding 
accessing content include the fact that URLs are resolved to physical locations (IPs of servers) and if a 
given content is moved to another site (domain), it requires another name. In this way, naming the 
content is not unique based on the present approaches with URLs such as DNS redirections or 
rewriting http requests. In ICN instead, we need unique persistent allocation of names which is 
transparent to endpoints location-wise. All the copies of the same content object share the same 
unique ID. ICN fulfils end-users' interests in expressing named preferences (i.e. IDs) rather than 
physical locations (i.e. IPs) by provisioning architectural content distribution mechanisms through in-
network caching. These mechanisms then not only let us have access to content directly by object 
names (so IPs, URLs and URis are not significant anymore) but also help in distribution in a more 
scalable and robust manner (via location-independency). 
ICN name resolution and routing occur by either an evolutionary or revolutionary approach. 
Evolutionary approach (two-phase) starts with searching for the most appropriate copy of the content 
in advance and then forwarding it to the content consumer. Since the look-up process (resolution) 
utilises locators (IPs), content name resolution servers are needed similar to DNS. Delivery is fulfilled 
through reverse path forwarding afterwards. However, IPs are invisible to the applications. The 
revolutionary approach, on the other hand, is working on the premise that content IDs are structured 
and as such "ID-based routing" is possible throughout the network. Both approaches are similar in 
that to find the right copy of the content across the network, one needs to plant information of where 
particular objects are in advance which is known as breadcrumbs. To conclude, the two-phase 
approach benefits from incremental deployment over the current Internet due to usage of locator 
routing (IP routing) while the one-phase approach might seem radical at this early stage. 
Secondly, when popular content is requested, it can be cached in intermediate nodes so that when 
new users are joining, the flash-crowd effect due to surge in content subscribers can be addressed. 
This in tum opens the door for questioning about how to characterize popular content and where to 
cache the contents across the network. Granularity of the caching can also be tuned at different levels 
including object, chunk and packet-level according to various needs. ICN in comparison with the 
current Internet is a more receiver-driven model (like multicast, paradigm shift from the present 
sender-based primitives towards a more receiver-driven solution) in which by subscribing to an 
appropriate content publisher (or its pertaining cache which is topologically close to the subscriber), 
one can get their object of interest. 
Thirdly, at the moment, Internet security deals with security of the communication channels rather 
than the security of the content itself. In other words, the authenticity of the content object cannot be 
checked after a given object leaves its origin server and resides in the caches along the way of the 
transit path. 
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In summary, Future Internet (FI) requires improved mobility support initially. This is addressed in 
ICN by paradigm shift for location-transparency from locators (IPs) towards IDs for both users and 
contents (traditional Traffic Engineering asks for the locations of sources and destinations to be fixed 
and the traffic is propagated among links. In data centres, however, each physical server may run 
services using virtual machines (VMs) which can be moved to new locations for improved 
performance of these services [177]). Increased reliability and flexibility with regard to routing as 
another objective for FI is provided by multi-path routing in ICN through supporting anycast via in-
network caching rather than the current single path approach. Increased quality of experience (QoE) is 
another feature of FI with ICN since service-aware traffic is now mapped to resources. However, we 
argue that security as the final objective of FI is still overseen even with the advanced ICN approaches 
including CURLING. While object IDs need to be seen by the network (imposing privacy issues), 
they require incorporating security as well. 
7.1.2 Relevant Background: COMET & CURLING 
7.1.2.1 COMET Architecture: Content mediator architecture for content-
aware networks [178] 
Content mobility is limited in the current mechanisms to accessing content since access is bound 
to the knowledge regarding the server which hosts the content. Also, there is no global view of the 
content naming scheme which provides persistence. The best QoE is achieved when the network is 
aware of the content it carries while with today's networks it is unfeasible. As a consequence of being 
unaware of the network as well as the traffic characteristics by the network elements including 
intermediaries, traffic is delivered in the most inefficient way nowadays. 
Comet is an idea for accessing content in the FI through mediation concept. Comet exploits a 
unified mechanism to locate, access and distribute content regardless of the intermediary used. For 
this, a new mediation plane is placed in between a physical network and content server farms. This 
mediator provided by ISPs is injected with content/server awareness such as resource characteristics 
and limitations on one hand, and also with routing/network awareness such as topological view and 
available paths for routing between content subscribers and publishers on the other. 
Comet system must initially be aware of the network locations of the content copies. Content 
Registration operation performs this by relating given content ID to the physical location of the 
content. The content mediation plane then plays the crucial role of "decision maker" and thus has 
access to content registration as well as resolution (translation) information, server/network awareness 
information, and finally necessary information of the underlying forwarding plane. Comet requires its 
forwarding plane to be content-aware so that not only is the physical locator (IP) of the content source 
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concealed (through Network Address Translation or NAT capability), but it can also classify the 
traffic to address the QoS requirements and facilitate the multicast service. 
Comet architecture can be implemented either with coupled or decoupled approaches. The 
decoupled approach is more similar to the current Internet in that physical content resolution and 
delivery are performed separately. In this way, each mediation entity corresponds to a specific domain 
while the resolution entity operates globally in a hierarchical manner like DNS. Nonetheless, the 
prerequisite for this architecture is stored directory system of content records on a global scale. On the 
other hand, the coupled approach simply combines content resolution to the delivery process and as 
such is discordant with regard to the current Internet. The content resolution is performed in a hop-by-
hop manner while content states are stored in the intermediary domains to form the delivery path by 
following the reverse direction of the resolution route. CURLING is an implementation of Comet with 
a coupled approach [179]. 
Last, the content delivery path is enforced with the aid of Content Aware Forwarding Entities 
(CAFE). CAFE does this through handling dedicated Comet headers attached to the packets. The 
merits of this design include enforcing the delivery as required irrespective of the current routing 
paradigm limitations (like single path for BGP), classifying/marking packets to address specific QoS 
needs and finally multicast support at both inter and intra domain levels. 
7 .1.2.2 Anatomy of CURLING [173, 180] 
CURLING is a framework under the Comet project to precisely hit/not hit content objects and 
retrieve them in specific area(s) at the Internet scale. In CURLING, content resolution is 
constitutionally coupled with the delivery path construction (Comet's coupled approach). CURLING 
resolves requests for content consumption through its hop-by-hop and gossip-like communication 
model which interoperates amongst domains. This communication model results in IPs of content 
sources being hidden from their clients. 
In the current Internet, upon receipt of the request for a given content, local ISP' s DNS server 
resolves the request to the corresponding server address regardless of the network conditions such as 
congestion while alternative routes which allow bypassing the congested area might be available (lack 
of multi-path routing). Nevertheless, CURLING asks ISPs to play a more active role in distributing 
contents (for both resolution and delivery) across the Internet as opposed to the current end-to-end bit 
pipe. While traditionally traffic engineering (TE) was utilised merely with the aid of routing 
optimization, the CURLING system through knowing how/where the content has been sourced in 
addition to the awareness (network, server and finally routing awareness) gained from the underlying 
infrastructure, can better perform TE for content delivery with regard to resource management. The 
acquired flexibility in this way can compensate for the lack of the multi-path routing protocol in 
today's Internet. 
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The main entities in CURLING encompass Content Resolution and Mediation Entity (CRME) 
and Content-Aware Forwarding Entity (CAFE). For each domain, the corresponding CRME holds its 
content table. The table stores content ID as well as the associated next hop that indicates the domain 
to which the resolution request will be forwarded next. CRMEs talk to each other to publish 
consumption requests, discover the content and finally prepare the delivery path (reverse the 
resolution path). On the other hand, CAFE are positioned at the edge of the domain as the edge 
routers. Through communicating with their local CRME, CAFE delivers the content. Implementing 
content manipulation operations within CURLING for CRME and CAFE entities occur with the aid 
of Content Resolution Server (CRS) and Content-aware Router (CaR) respectively. CRS deals with 
resolving the consumption request to the content provider and subsequently installing the delivery 
path. Figure 7 .1 demonstrates the anatomy of CURLING entities and the messaging amongst them in 
six stages. According to this figure, CRS interfaces with CP (YouTube as an example) for the 
registration/publication operations and then with CC for handling consumption queries and user 
preferences. CRSs also interoperate with each other for further dissemination of Content IDs under 
the resolution phase across the Internet using a hop-by-hop gossip like communication method. 
Finally, CaR collaboratively works with its local CRS to enforce delivery path in a multi-cast manner 
(receiver-driven). To put it another way, CAFEs are required to store the state of the content so that if 
new consumers joined to request the same content in a multicast inter-domain fashion there will be no 
need to resolve the request( s) all the way back to the content provider again ( while intermediary 
domains already cached the state of the content in their CAFE(s)). CURLING does not ask for each 
router in the domain to be CaR necessarily. However, edge routers are typically the best candidates as 
CaR for processing content based on their IDs (rather than IPs). 
CP Content Provider 
CS Content Server 
CC Content Consumer 
CAFE Content Aware Forwarding Entity 
CRME Content Resolution & Mediation Entity 
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Figure 7.1 Anatomy of the CURLING and messagi ng amongst entities 
CRS entails three functional blocks. The first component, content management, deals with 
incoming consume requests as well as register requests from CC and CP respectively. This block also 
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maintains content record repository which stores the content IDs along with corresponding ingress as 
well as egress CaRs (intra-domain) to reach them. Each consume request triggers the content ID 
lookup process within this database. The second component, inter-CRS protocol, is assumed to 
perform inter-domain routing amongst CRSs in a gossip like manner. Lastly, the monitoring module 
takes care of collecting information from both content server as well as underlying network 
(awareness), so close to the real-time that optimized content resolution and delivery can be addressed. 
7.1.3 CURLING Resolution Operation and its Vulnerability to Byzantine 
Failure Attack 
CURLING's main operations entail publication, resolution and delivery. The content 
registration/publication follows a bottom-up direction in the hierarchical structure of domains (tiered 
structure made up of tier 1 or backbone ISPs, tier 2 and tier 3 or local ISPs) while the associated 
content table is updated with the newly advertised content ID at each domain. CURLING extensively 
benefits from introducing scoping function by means of which specific areas across the Internet can 
be targeted (hit) as the potential CC or CP. Either Register() or Publish() messages with Include 
option can fulfil the scoping requirement by which the CC ( or CP) is restricted to a specific region. If 
the targeted scoped area is all the domains without any locational preferences then Wildcard mode 
(illustrated by *) will be exploited. 
Publication operation can function in either wildcard or scoped modes. In wildcard mode, content 
can be advertised throughout the Internet. Nevertheless, in scoped mode, particular areas of the 
Internet are hit for the content to be published by the provider of the content. According to Figure 7 .2, 
S 1 under the Autonomous System 6 (AS6) domain enrols the given content ID (YouTube content 
item) through Register() message to AS6' s local CRS in wildcard publication mode indicated by a 
dashed line. Once CP informs local CRS through a register request about the new content being 
published, a new entry is added into CRS's content record repository. The entry involves the content's 
ID which is unique as well as the content server's IP address as the indicator for the explicit location 
of the content (WHOIS service can perform translation between domain names and IP addresses). 
Since business itself (YouTube) is involved initially in the content registration phase, we do not 
consider any security risk at this stage. After the initial registration, content publication needs to be 
enforced across the Internet on a global scale. This is performed by propagating the publish request 
from the local CRS further towards the provider's counterpart(s) CRS(s) until it is received by a Tierl 
ISP with the aid of CURLING's hop-by-hop gossip-like manner (AS3 and ASl respectively). 
However, unlike the registration phase, in the course of dissemination of publish requests, the content 
record repositories of the CRSs along the path are updated with the "implicit" IP address of the 
neighbouring domains. Note that peering domains do not exchange publish requests any further and 
thus AS4 will not know about YouTube and would need to query its provider (AS2) if need be. 
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Consequently, in our mind, CURLING is operating in a similar way to BOP for BOP UPDATE 
message propagations and its hop-by-hop gossip-like characteristics. 
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- - ► Curling inter-CRS Publications 
Figure 7 .2 CURLING Publication Operations in both wildcard and scoped modes 
On the other hand, candidate content sources and content destinations (consumers) on which 
scoping must be enforced to hit specific area(s) of the Internet are spelled out in the form of 
preferences in the course of content Register(lnclude()) as well as content Consume(Include()) 
requests respectively. Back to Figure 7.2, BBC !Player can publish its content restricted to a specific 
area (inside the UK) via CURLING's scoped option with Publish(lnclude(AS5)) under ASS and as a 
result, the Publish() request will not traverse any domains up in the hierarchy. 
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Figure 7.3 CURLING Resolution operations in both wildcard and filtered modes and following business relationships 
across domains 
Based on Figure 7 .3 content resolution follows the same track as the publication/registration 
process to resolve the content Consume() request to the ultimate content server. In other words, the 
local CRS performs a look-up process against its content record repository upon receipt of each 
consume request. If not found, the consumer request will be distributed further towards the local 
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domain's provider until it reaches Tierl domain. At the end, neighbouring Tierl domains may consult 
with each other where the final decision will be made and if the content is not yet found, Error() 
message informs the consumer of the failure of the resolution. Peer domains are unaware of each 
other's content record. Resolution can take place at wildcard, scoped or filtered modes according to 
CC's preference. The consumption request can be resolved to any source(s) for the given content in 
wildcard mode while the consumption request is routed based on business relationships across 
domains. Filtered mode operates similarly by aiming at excluding specific content source(s). 
However, if resolution operates at scoped mode for the content to be sourced from specific source(s), 
the request is forwarded according to BGP routes. Finally, content delivery flows back through the 
reverse path formed by the resolution setup immediately. Figure 7.4 illustrates the idea that if a 
consumer in the UK (under AS8) wants to check the price of an item from Amazon.com (US based 
under AS6) rather than from Amazon.co.uk, they might specify this preference through 
Consume(lnclude()) message. The scoped consume message will be resolved to the appropriate server 
in AS6 following the BGP inter-domain routing paradigm (AS8-AS4-AS3-AS6 route wins for its 
length in the absence of any other routing policies). 
Content ID Implicit 
location 
Amazon.com AS3 
Publish(AS3, Amazon.comi/ 
-Amazon.com AS6 
Publish(AS6,Amazon.com)/ 
(Amazon.com) 
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•• •• 
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lnclude(AS6),Amazo 
BGP route 
Peering link 
Provider-Customer link 
Curling inter-CRS Publication 
Resolution in scoped mode 
Figure 7 .4 CURLING Resolution operation in scoped mode and following BGP route 
From the security point of view, in the course of publishing the newly advertised content ID in 
Curling, intermediate CRSs can misbehave. This is known as Byzantine failure vulnerability in which 
a legitimate entity in the middle of conversation simply misbehaves [17-25]. Detection as well as 
prevention of such attacks in hearsay protocols such as CURLING or BGP are not easy and require 
collaboration between many entities in practice. It is worth mentioning that CURLING respects the 
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local policy of domains in the content publication dissemination phase of not propagating publish 
request for a given ID, and therefore in the case of hostile policy of not advertising specific content ID 
(for example in an attempt to filter specific content maliciously as was the case with YouTube in 2008 
in Pakistan), the gossip like hearsay CURLING characteristics fail to provide the intended outcome of 
ubiquitous delivery to CCs. 
7.1.4 Security Analysis of Hijacking Risks in CURLING 
7.1.4.1 Curling's Publication Operation & Byzantine Failure as the Basic 
Vulnerability 
In the scenario depicted in Figure 7.5, if AS5's CRS maliciously issues publish(AS5,YouTube) 
towards AS2, then customer ASes 4,8 and 9 will forward their requests for the Y ouTube to 
illegitimate ASS rather than legitimate AS 6 via the AS 1-AS3-AS6 route. 
~ - -
Content ID Implicit 
Location 
VouTube AS3 
Publish(AS3,VouTube) / 
W■II 
VouTube AS6 
Publish(AS6,VouTube )/ 
--■ VouTube S1 (You Tube's 
Server Farm) 
L 
I 
Provider-Customer link 
- - ► Curling resolution direction 
• • • • • • •► Hijacking by malicious Publish{) 
Figure 7.5 CURLING and Byzantine failure as the basic vulnerability whereby ASS misbehaves; AS4, AS8 and AS9 
are victims 
The Publish()/Register() will not be propagated between peers (AS 1-AS2) but goes up towards 
provider domains (unless it is scoped). Nevertheless, consume request will traverse across domains 
until it reache Tier 1 ISP. Here, malicious information in AS2 has been already injected by ASS 
which results in a hijacking attack. 
7.1.4.2 CURLING's Scoped Mode for Content Resolution and Hijacking 
through Poisoned DNS 
To specify and locate the content source, resolution phase takes place through the issuance of 
Consume() message by CC with Include() option in scoped mode. CURLING takes advantage of 
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respecting user preferences by attaching the named/prefix of preferred content source into the 
consume message. If CC only specified the name of the preferred content, the local CRS is 
responsible for IP translation of the name through DNS. The hijacking risk therefore would be the 
case if poisoned DNS tries to enroute the Consume() message into the malicious content provider 
residing on the attacker's domain instead of the legitimate content owner. This attack is easy to 
conduct since it is launched based on forwarding content request by following the BGP routes 
destined for the IP found in the poisoned DNS server attached to the local CRS. 
-
·······► 
Malicious route 
Peering link 
Provider-Customer link 
Resolution in scoped mode 
Poisoned DNS: 
Amazon.com ➔ AS7's IP 
.... 
AS9 •••• 
·« Cl: :Consume 
(lnclude(Amazon.com)) • 
Figure 7.6 CURLING and poisoned DNS, poisonous AS9's DNS server maliciously points to illegitimate AS7 instead 
of AS6 
Figure 7 .6 demonstrates the attack scenario. C 1 attached to AS9 issues Consume() request to its 
local CRS with Include() option indicating amazon.com (the user may physically reside on 
amazon.co.uk domain for instance). However, the local CRS exploits an already poisoned DNS and 
therefore the entry for amazon.com (which legitimately resides in AS6) is maliciously pointing to a 
fake prefix of the attacker in AS7. Since CURLING considers resolution in the scoped mode to be 
fulfilled by BGP, the routing protocol now tries to locate the fake prefix through the curved arrow 
route in the figure to the attacker sitting in AS7 while the legitimate route to the true owner of the 
content remains unused (AS9-AS5-AS2-AS l-AS3-AS6). 
7.1.4.3 BGP Prefix Hijacking & its Implications on Hijacking CURLING's 
Consume() Request in Scoped Mode 
In the next attack scenario, in order to hijack the content request, the attacker first targets the 
prefix associated with the content source itself and tries to conduct BGP prefix hijacking. Afterwards, 
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any attempts for content Consume() requests in scoped mode will unwantedly be directed to the 
malicious attacker instead of the legitimate content owner. In Figure 7.7, the attacker sitting on AS8 
first tries to hijack the 184.1.1.0/24 through a bogus BGP UPDATE message claiming that he is the 
legitimate owner of this prefix. Assume that this prefix is belonging to content source which resides in 
AS6. The malicious BGP UPDATE will be installed in the core router of Tierl AS2 (illustrated as a 
single router). However, the legitimate routes to the true owner of the content coexist there. If no 
other BGP policy has been defined in AS2, according to the BGP path selection process, the shortest 
path towards 184.1.1.0/24 wins the competition as the best route and therefore the traffic will traverse 
through AS4 to AS8 (curved arrow). Now if the user attached to AS9 issues the Consume() message 
based on the scoping feature of CURLING with include option carrying his prefix of interest as the 
content source (184.1. 1.0/24 in our case), the CRS will delegate the responsibility of locating the 
source to BGP. Nonetheless, hijacked prefix results in diversion of the request route towards AS8 
CRS instead of AS6. 
·······► 
Malicious route 
Peering link 
Provider-Customer link 
Resolution with preferences 
184.1.1.0/24 ➔ 
AS4-AS8 
(Malicious) 
184.1.1.0/24 ➔ 
AS4-AS3-AS6 
184.1.1.0/24 ➔ 
AS1-AS3-AS6 
• Cl::Consume 
■ (Include 
: (184.1.1.0/24) 
- ,YouTube) 
Figure 7.7 CURLING resolution in scoped mode and BGP prefix hijacking, AS9's Consume() will be delivered to 
illegitimate AS8 rather than AS6 
7.1.4.4 BGP De-Aggregation Attack and its impact on Hijacking the 
CURLING's Consume() Request in Scoped Mode 
To fully comply with today ' s inter-domain routing policy, if multiple routes towards a prefix 
coexist, the most specific one will win the competition as the best route in the event of scoped 
Consume() resolution phase. However, the CURLING architecture is vulnerable to hijacking if an 
intended attacker tries to de-aggregate the IP space intending to direct Consume() requests to his site 
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rather than the legitimate content source. Figure 7 .8 reveals the idea behind it. Accordingly, the 
attacker first claims that his domain has access to 174. 1.2.0/25 (more specific than /24) via a new 
BGP UPDATE message. This is preceded by a reconnaissance attack by means of which the attacker 
knows the prefix of the targeted content source and tries to announce a BGP UPDATE with a more 
specific network mask (/25 instead of /24 for instance). AS2's router is now poisoned with malicious 
route AS 1-AS3-AS7 for 174. 1.2.0/25. If C 1 issues Consume() request in scoped mode towards its 
local CRS, BGP tackles this by finding the route to CP. However, default behaviour of BGP routing is 
to direct the traffic towards a more specific prefix's subnet mask and therefore the request will reach 
the attacker in AS7 instead of AS6 shown with the curved arrow. 
174. 
·······► 
Malicious route 
Peering link 
Provider-Customer link 
Resolution with preferences 
17 4.1.2.0/25 ➔ 
AS 1-AS3-AS 7 
(Malicious) 
17 4.1.2.0/24 ➔ 
AS4-AS3-AS6 
17 4.1.2.0/24 ➔ 
AS1-AS3-AS6 
• Cl::Consume 
■ (Include 
: (174.1.2.0/24) 
,YouTube) 
Figure 7.8 CURLING resolution in scoped mode and BGP de-aggregation attack resulting in resolving Consume() to 
more specific prefix mask (/25) which resides in attacker's site 
7 .1.4.5 Hijacking through Byzantine Failure Behaviour in Resolution Phase 
for Content Consume() Queries in Wild card Mode 
In this mode, requests are forwarded following the business relationships between domains. Any 
sources can be responsive to the request upon receiving them. The propagation of requests across the 
network follows either a broadcast-based technique or a random-based one. Forwarding according to 
the business relationships (similar to filtering and unlike scoped mode of resolution phase) does open 
the door to another set of attacks conducted by misbehaving domains in the middle (Byzantine failure 
behaviour). The worst case scenario would be when more than one domain collude with each other 
and then misbehave in an attempt to hijack the content in wildcard scope (collusion attack). In Figure 
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7.9, Cl attached to AS7 firstly issues Consume() request in wildcard mode to the local CRS. Before 
the attack, through the dashed arrows, the request will be finally delivered to the relevant CRS in 
AS9. Since the forwarding rule in this mode is following the business relationships between domains, 
AS6 trying to hijack the request and impersonate the content source (YouTube) can misbehave by 
issuing a malicious publish message to AS3's CRS. The severity of the impact of the hijacking 
attempt would be higher since based on the CURLING system, ASl (Tierl) as the provider for AS3 
will be later maliciously updated as well. Now if any CC attached to AS4 tries to issue a Consume() 
message for Y ouTube, malicious AS6 will respond. 
--
. . . 
YouTube AS3 --
. 
. . . 
YouTube 
Peering link 
Provider-Customer link 
Curling resolution direction 
Hijacking by malicious Publi;5h() 
ASS 
--
• 
. . . 
YouTube AS9 
Figure 7.9 CURLING resolution in wildcard mode and hijacking through Byzantine failure behaviour of AS6; AS4 and 
AS8 are obvious victims in addition to the true provider (YouTube) 
7.1.5 Proposed Scheme for Securing CURLING against Discovered Hijacking 
Vulnerabilities 
We focus more narrowly on one particular attack scenario 7 .1.4.5 to motivate our design here. We 
argue that CURLING is analogous to BGP in that both hearsay protocols are using a hop-by-hop 
routing paradigm as well as gossip-like communication model for propagation of reachability 
information across domains and thus are subject to Byzantine vulnerability. Our previous work [149] 
for Byzantine failure attack in BGP reveals that through the added management plane above the 
control plane of BGP, a level of trust can be met to secure IP space against hijacking attempts. While 
this added plane does not make sense in ICN since the content naming space is enormously greater 
173 
Robust Forwarding Plane with the Promising Future Internet Proposals 
than the IP addressing space, the notion of trust to address Byzantine robustness requirement is still 
the same in our minds. We propose the usage of Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) for 
CURLING. A similar approach for BGP [181] has recently gained much appreciation. 
We assume that at the provider site, each item of content or a set of items is associated with a 
cryptographic key pair; a public as well as corresponding private key. The cryptographic hash over 
the associated public key (p) along with the cryptographic hash over the content data itself ( d) will 
represent the content ID of the item (ID: (p,d)). ICN content naming can be done essentially in a flat, 
hierarchical or combined manner. If distributed cache table approach is used, flat scheme is utilised. 
This in tum has a negative impact in terms of scalability for a vast amount of content across the 
Internet. Hierarchical style on the other hand acts similar to DNS today. Finally, we may have a 
combined scheme in which some regions take advantage of the hierarchical approach while flat style 
covers other regions. For now, we assume unique and flat names indicated by (p,d) as IDs are utilised. 
(d) can be used at the receiver site to ensure the integrity of the received content data. Each CP will 
now digitally sign (p,d) pair with its associated private key for a given item ( or a set of them) and 
issues Publish(EPrivate Key (p,d)) to the next CRS. CP is then required to certify and distribute the 
relevant public key through the trusted third party as with [181]. The receiver CRS upon the receipt of 
the aforementioned message will ask for the public key. If the public key obtained from the third party 
can decrypt the message, i.e. if DPubiic Key(EPrivate Key(p,d)) == (p,d), then (p,d) is installed in the content 
table of the corresponding CRS server. We also suggest that instead of Publish(EPrivate Key (p,d)), 
Publish((EPrivate Key (p,d)),(p,d)) can be issued leaving the flexibility for the receiver CURLING's CRS 
to perform cryptographic functions merely if need be (optionally or randomly) and thus avoid 
computational overheads pertaining to cryptographic validation of signatures. One implementation 
can ask for verifying the signature before installing the ID in the local content table or issuing its 
Publish() towards the remote CRS while validation can occur afterwards to maximize the 
performance. Note that CP can also attach other metadata associated with the key pairs such as the 
revocation list or TTL into (p,d) and disseminate the signed materials. Last, a certified public key can 
be either distributed with in or out of band mechanisms. Figure 7 .10 depicts our proposed design in 
detail, addressing the vulnerability elaborated in 7.1.4.5. CP attached to AS9 initially signs its content 
ID (p,d) for a given item of YouTube with its private key (Publish(EPrivate Key(p,d))) and publishes the 
relevant certificate for its public key through trusted third parties including VeriSign Trusted for 
instance. If AS6 exhibits Byzantine failure behavior and misbehaves, it claims that it has access to the 
item of content with a malicious Publish() query. Nonetheless, it does not have CP's private key 
residing in AS9 and thus must use another new private key to sign the item ID. On the other hand, 
AS3,upon receipt of any Publish(EPrivate Key()) will try to perform DPubiic Key() using the certified and 
indeed public key obtained from the trusted third party. Subsequently, AS3 will not validate DPubiic 
Key(Ewrong Private Key(p,d)) and consequently discard the malicious Publish(). 
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Figure 7.10 Proposed design to secure CURLING resolution in wildcard mode against hijacking through Byzantine 
failure behaviour of AS6; AS3 does not validate D r ublic Kcy(Ewrong Private Key (p,d)) exploiting the true CP's public key 
obtained from trusted third party because it cannot decrypt it. 
Our design is a synthesis of DONA (A Data-Oriented Network Architecture) [182] and RPKI 
resulting in our coherent architecture. Data-Oriented Network Architecture, DONA, is known as the 
first ICN approach that significantly has constructive influence on other approaches by being 
pioneered to them. DONA reveals the fact that most of the changes in the current Internet to 
accommodate FI's features reside in how Internet names are constructed and resolved. Essentially, the 
coupled approach in COMET, that is CURLING, shares many ideas with DONA on name resolution 
[1 79]. In contrast to DONA, with CURLING, regarding name resolution, the Publish() messages are 
not distributed to peering AS's, but only to parents so that state maintained at CRSs are reduced. 
When a Consume() message reaches a Tier-1 provider in an attempt to find a match, it needs to be 
distributed to all other Tier-1 providers to guarantee that a match will be found (if any exists) since all 
other Tier-1 providers are peered with each other. Also, for the coupled name resolution and data 
routing approach with CURLING, neither of them utilise peering links and this consequently asks for 
an additional signalling mechanism to switch to peering paths (if any exist). 
In DONA, naming deals with persistence and authenticity while name resolving handles 
availability objectives. DONA assumes that public key exchanges between Resolution Handlers 
(analogous to CRSs in CURLING) have already performed securely amongst them in relationship 
establishment phases so that an RH can receive packets merely from the counterpart RH. In this way, 
DONA ensures the authenticity of the received Register()/Find() messages (similar to 
Publish()/Consume() in CURLING). However, DONA sees the trust outside the frontiers of its 
architecture [182]. This remains the architecture vulnerable to Byzantine failure attacks. 
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7.1.6 Summary of Hijacking Risks in CURLING 
To conclude, we firstly observed that the enormous number of interactions across the Internet is 
pertaining to content access in the near future. Then we briefly discussed CURLING as one of the 
promising ICN approaches proposed to distribute and target items of content at the Internet scale. 
Afterwards, we endeavoured to analyse the CURLING system to reveal the hijacking risks to which 
the architecture is not immune. The result of our analysis indicates that five distinct attack scenarios 
can jeopardize the safety and security of content resolution in CURLING for the first contribution. In 
summary, CURLING is mainly vulnerable to Byzantine failure attacks due to the hearsay nature of 
the protocol by letting any intermediary entity misbehave. In addition to that, resolution in scoped 
mode follows BGP and as such CURLING is also vulnerable to DNS-Poisoning, BGP Prefix 
Hijacking and BGP De-Aggregation attack. On the other hand, resolution in wildcard/filtering is 
driven by the business relationship between domains and consequently an intermediary domain may 
still exhibit Byzantine behaviour. We finally proposed the usage of RPKI for CURLING to 
accommodate the Byzantine robustness and mitigate the hijacking risks. Our proposal is a synthesis of 
DONA and RPKI which unlike DONA does not underestimate trust in the FI. 
7 .2 Integrating IPsec within OpenFlow Architecture 
The network security protocol such as IPsec has been widely used for robust end-to-end 
communication for many years. Considerations become important in the contexts of SDN. Despite 
IPsec's huge install base and its provisioning of immune services so far, the per-packet protection 
characteristic of the protocol does not inter-operate well with leading future designs, such as 
OpenFlow, with flow-based behaviour. OpenFlow architecture is unable to aggregate flows of IPsec-
ESP in both transport and tunnel modes since layer 3 information is encrypted and therefore 
unreadable. This work proposes the use of the Security Parameter Index (SPI) of IPsec within the 
OpenFlow architecture as the distinguishing factor to uniquely identify IPsec flows and direct these 
flows accordingly. This enables previous packet-based behaviour of OpenFlow architecture to inter-
operate with IPsec. In addition, the ability to "distinguish between" IPsec flows empowers the 
architecture with the notion of secure group communication as the main use case. 
7 .2.1 Overview of OpenFlow & the Role of IPsec 
As an attempt to embrace the Future Internet and its tendency towards Software-Defined Networks 
(SDN), OpenFlow suggests moving into programmable rather than configurable network 
deployments. These result in faster innovations to be welcomed at the cost of software change in 
comparison to the infrastructure adaption [174, 183]. OpenFlow works well on the premise that the 
control plane can be separated from the data plane on network packet forwarders and brought into an 
OpenFlow controller (a server) with centralized network management. All the network elements 
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including routers and switches are now simple packet forwarders without having any complexity. 
Starting initially with campus networks, data centres like Google are now extensively reinforced with 
this evolving architecture [184]. On the other hand, end-to-end security of communication in the IP 
level is guaranteed by the IPsec framework [TI]. As the word "framework" implies, IPsec is not 
directly limited to any specific security algorithm or technology. Subsequently, the level of security 
can be tuned by different open standards and combinations to fulfil various security requirements of 
the production environment. Virtual Private Network (VPN) as a solution for providing a logical 
channel between two peers over a public and probably insecure network relies on the IPsec for its 
invulnerability. Small Office Home Office (SOHO) scenario or different sites of a corporation which 
are geographically spread out are other possible use cases to apply VPN remedy over IPsec. More 
importantly, while point-to-point tunnels between two VPN gateways used to be exploited to carry 
authenticated as well as encrypted traffic from one site to another, Group Domain of Interpretation 
(GDOI) ~' 69-71] with IPsec at its heart goes even further so that secure communication amongst 
various sites called group members (GM) can be performed without any tunnels in place amongst 
these branches. 
IPsec as an algorithm-independent framework addresses the confidentiality by encryption as well 
as the integrity with the aid of hashing as the main security objectives while allows for authenticating 
the origin of the traffic. Regardless of the core network and its elements, the tuneable IPsec protocol 
with huge install base is therefore simply provisioning the necessary security services for both end 
entities. Nonetheless, security gained through IPsec is per-packet. This is not deployable to leading 
future Internet designs such as OpenFlow architecture with flow-based behaviour. OpenFlow aims at 
aggregating different packets into flows and processing these flows rather than individual packets. 
OpenFlow, however, is missing the distinguishing factor of uniquely identifying IPsec flows and 
aggregating/directing these flows accordingly. In other words, we tried to provide the ability to 
"distinguish between" IPsec flows in order to integrate the notion of secure group communication 
within OpenFlow architecture. Our ultimate goal here is to address this deficiency within OpenFlow 
by our proposed method. We propose the use of a Security Parameter Index (SPI) of IPsec within the 
OpenFlow architecture as the distinguishing factor for uniquely identifying IPsec flows and directing 
these flows hereinafter. 
7.2.2 Relevant Background: OpenFlow, IPsec, IKE & Secure Group 
Communication 
7.2.2.1 OpenFlow Architecture Overview 
OpenFlow is an attempt to enhance programmability of the network while forwarding packets 
takes place at the speed near to the line-rate due to minimized complexity stemming from the 
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separation of the control plane from data plane [174, 183]. In order to reduce the complexity of the 
system, OpenFlow asks to consider all the network elements such as routers and switches as simple 
packet forwarders (hardware-base). Complexity then moves towards the application layer where 
software sitting on the OpenFlow controller ( a server with sufficient resources) deals with the 
decision-making process and tries to make forwarders aware of decision outcomes. These outcomes 
are disseminated as flow-tables across the packet forwarders to define various pairs (match, action), 
meaning that for each subsequent incoming packet if there is a match in the flow-table of the local 
device, a special action will be performed. Three standard actions are Forward, Encapsulate, and 
finally Drop. Forward action makes the OpenFlow-enabled device act as a router/switch but at line-
rate. If no match was found or if the packet is the first one of a new (and undefined) flow, it is 
encapsulated and forwarded to the OpenFlow controller where the decision making process will take 
place. Discarding the packet can also be addressed through Drop action. 
Network Operating System (NOX) as a programmatic interface facilitates the network 
management by providing an environment for running applications sitting on the OpenFlow 
controller. The communication between the OpenFlow controller and the packet forwarders is 
performed through OpenFlow protocol over a secure SSL/TCP channel. With the aid of this open 
OpenFlow protocol, different routers' and switches' flow-tables can be programmed in a scalable 
manner. Entries in each flow-table on every OpenFlow packet forwarder are associated with different 
actions while statistics are being collected. Figure 7 .11 depicts the separation of the control plane 
from data plane in OpenFlow architecture in addition to the flow-table structure. For instance, if the 
destination IP address of the incoming packet is equal to 1.1.1.1, the packet is forwarded to a given 
port. If it has 848 (UDP port for GDOI protocol) as the value for the source port, it will be 
encapsulated and then forwarded to the controller for further investigation. If the packet is an IPsec 
ESP packet with type equal to 50, it will be dropped. 
The first generation of OpenFlow packet forwarders, called "OpenFlow spec vl.0 conforming 
switches", defines flow header fields which encompass some features of each incoming packet as 
illustrated at the bottom of Figure 7 .11. When a packet arrives, its header is firstly checked against the 
Match field and if the header matches any row in the flow-table, the corresponding action is 
performed. Any combinations amongst these demonstrated 10-tuple can be utilised to define and 
aggregate flows accordingly. These flow header fields are then exploited for specifying matches in 
flow-tables for each incoming packet and performing the corresponding action. However, OpenFlow 
is currently unable to "distinguish between" IPsec flows. [183] emphasises the header fields of 
"OpenFlow spec vl .0 conforming switch" as the initial and standard header fields with which every 
OpenFlow switch must comply. This is substantial since later on we introduce our new flow header 
fields for the OpenFlow interface which is IPsec-aware and also backward compatible to "OpenFlow 
spec vl.0 conforming switch" header fields. 
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Figure 7.11 (a) reveals the internal structure of OpenFlow architecture. In (b), flow header fields defined for "Openflow 
spec vl .0 conforming switches" (first generation OpenFlow packet forwarders) are shown. OpenFlow is currently unable to 
"distinguish between" IPsec flows. 
7.2.2.2 .IPsec Anatomy and the SPI Role 
Working at the Network Layer, IPsec protects the traffic between peers by provisioning 
encryption as well as authentication from Layer 3 to Layer 7. On the other hand, all the current Layer 
2 technologies let the IPsec framework function over them. The IPsec framework consists of five 
different components as building-blocks. Available algorithm choices facilitated for each of these 
components result in different security solutions with each combination to satisfy various needs. The 
first component highlights the IPsec protocol and can support either Authentication Header (AH) or 
Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) (protocol type 50 for ESP and 51 for AH). Each IPsec protocol 
operate either in transport or tunnel operation modes. The encapsulations of the IP packet secured by 
IPsec with AH/ESP in both operation modes, transport as well as tunnel, are depicted in Figure 7.12. 
Both protocols share provisioning authentication and integrity security services. Nevertheless, 
confidentiality is not considered in AH. This is crucial to differentiate segments of information which 
are encrypted and thus unreadable from other readable segments which can be meaningful for the 
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third party in the middle of the conversation (i.e. OpenFlow Switch or Controller). The second 
component demonstrates the choice for the encryption/decryption algorithm pertaining to the 
confidentiality service. As with every cryptographic system, the longer the key, the harder it is for an 
attacker to break into the IPsec communication. The third component ensures that the IPsec 
communication is not tampered with in transit and thus provides integrity. The fourth component 
facilitates authentication of the endpoints in secure communication via IPsec. The last building-block 
specifies the Diffie-Hellman (DH) algorithm group according to the different needs. DH as a public 
key exchange mechanism allows for both communicating parties to come up with the same key over 
an insecure channel. The driven shared key is used by peers for symmetric encryption as well as 
hashing through the Message Authentication Code (MAC) in the second and third components of 
IPsec respectively. 
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Figure 7.12 IPsec packet encapsulations with AH and ESP in both tunnel and transport modes, fields in red are 
encrypted and thus known only to end entities (i.e. not any third party in the middle of conversation including OpenFlow 
Switch or Controller). It is also noteworthy that both protocols in different modes have their Security Parameters Index (SPI) 
in plaintext within the ESP/ AH header. 
In IPsec with AH, a message digest is formed by applying the hashing function to the original IP 
header and data payload utilising the shared key. A new AH header is then constructed with the digest 
and is injected into the original packet. The same calculation takes place in the receiving party to find 
the exact match of hashes. Nonetheless, the whole data is transmitted in plaintext. By not considering 
any encryption mechanisms all the Layer 3 information is in plaintext and therefore routable. 
However, the original IP header is also encrypted/unreadable with ESP in tunnel mode. As we will 
see later, this information in plaintext is of immense value for our method to differentiate "between" 
various IPsec flows. Despite AH, in IPsec with ESP, encryption makes payload and the ultimate 
transmitters' identifications meaningless to the eavesdroppers. The whole IP header and data payload 
are encrypted in this mode. This is followed by appending the new ESP header (as well as ESP trailer) 
and ESP Authentication fields including relevant encryption and authentication data respectively to 
the original packet. 
As seen in Figure 7.12, IPsec in transport mode merely considers the encapsulation of the data 
payload and TCP/UDP data (Layer 4 and above). Nonetheless, tunnel mode suggests that the whole IP 
datagram is encapsulated within a new IP packet. On the other hand, while secure communication 
between gateways demands the tunnel mode of the IPsec solution, transport mode facilitates the host 
to host immune transmissions. The observation is that while in AH the original IP header is remaining 
unencrypted and thus leaving the routing intact, the original TCP/UDP header will be encrypted in 
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ESP. It is also noteworthy that both protocols in different modes have their Security Parameters Index 
(SPI) in plaintext within the ESP/ AH header (for instance, for ESP in tunnel mode, SPI is 
authenticated but not encrypted). SPI uniquely differentiates various on-going conversations at the 
receiving party end. 
7.2.2.3 Internet Key Exchange (IKE) and the Security Association (SA) 
Role 
The key exchange mechanism in IPsec is accomplished through IKE version 2 protocol [.5.fil. The 
key exchange process with IKE finally leads to the construction of Security Association (SA) for 
IPsec. To establish an IPsec connection, IKE involves two phases. During these phases a set of 
messages is communicated (either in Main Mode or Aggressive Mode) resulting in establishing a 
secure channel between the peers. Phase 1 lets peers agree on the security proposals generally as well 
as the shared secret key and authenticate each other. Upon finalizing a secure tunnel in phase 1, phase 
2 negotiates the custom security parameters between peers. On completion of phase 2, an SA is 
formed in a unidirectional manner. Each SA, as a logical connection, defines the way that the 
traversing traffic will be processed. Subsequently, the same security processing applies to the traffic 
associated with every SA. 
Since a single SA specifies only two parties in a unidirectional manner, each party holds a Security 
Association Data Base (SADB) comprising of multiple SAs where each SA is associated with a 
different peer. SPI consists of an arbitrary 32-bit value utilised by a receiving party to differentiate the 
SA to which an incoming IPsec packet is associated. For a unicast communication, SPI on its own can 
specify an SA. Other parameters such as the type of IPsec protocol can come along with SPI to 
highlight a unique SA. However, [59] emphasises that the sufficiency of SPI on its own to determine 
an individual SA to which inbound traffic will be mapped or exploit other parameters in conjunction 
with SPI is a local matter. As we will see later, SPI can fall into a domain large enough to be capable 
of uniquely identifying an SA. The following tuple illustrates the parameters, any combination of 
which can be used to construct the primary key for SADB locally: 
{ SPI, IPsec Protocol Type (AH/ESP), Peer IP Address, Transform Set, Secret Key, SA Lifetime} 
A combination of the elements in the vector above will shape SADB and determine various 
SAs stored on each peer. 
7.2.2.4 Secure Group Communication as the Use-case for the Proposal 
Group Encrypted Transport VPN solution [n, 64, 65, 185] with GDOI at its heart is deemed to 
provide revolutionary and ultimate technology which alleviates complexity and overheads pertaining 
to scalable need as well as secure transport remedy for always-on and dynamic connectivity of 
extremely integrated network sites spread over diverged domains. Any-to-any network connectivity is 
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guaranteed to be end-to-end encrypted, authenticated and globally scalable for all applications namely 
voice, video and data with both unicast as well as multicast traffic. In other words, with the advent of 
GDOI architecture, the arduous obstacle of complexity pertaining to manageable as well as scalable 
VPN solutions for an abundance of fully-meshed sites (not only two endpoints) is not out of the 
question anymore. 
GDOI as a cryptographic protocol for key management is based on IKE. While IKE ensures 
pair-wise security associations between various peers, GDOI utilising IKE phase 1 between each 
Group Member (GM) and a Key Server (KS) ends up with a single and common SA amongst all the 
GMs. Additional to pair-wise SAs with IKE phase 1, GDOI also "interprets" IKE to come up with a 
single SA for the group security domain. In other words, as the foundation of the secure group 
management solution, GDOI defines IKE Domain of Interpretation (DOI). Utilising UDP port 848, 
GDOI messages are performing creation, deletion and maintenance of SAs established amongst 
authenticated and authorised GMs. KS rekeys the group before current keys downloaded at the time 
of registration by GMs expire. As Figure 7.13 reveals, regardless of what the core network's 
technology is (WAN, MPLS, OpenFlow, etc.), each GM initially exchanges an GDOI Register 
message with KS which leads to downloading the required keys and policies via bidirectional arrows. 
KS at some point before the current keys expire pushes the Rekey message which entails new policies 
as well as keys to given GMs via unidirectional arrows. In this way, encrypted multicast/unicast 
conduits are established amongst all GMs, not merely two endpoints, to communicate without any 
tunnelling in place. 
GDOI Register 
Messages from GMs 
to KS and 
Subsequent 
Downloading of 
JPsec SA and Keys 
GDOI Rekey 
Messages Including 
New Policies and 
Keys 
Tunnel-less 
Encrypted 
Multicast/Unicast 
Communications 
KS 
Figure 7.13 Upon downloading IPsec policies and keys from KS, GM is now registered with "the IPsec SA for the 
group" and can exchange unicast/multicast traffic securely with other GMs laying away the KS. 
To conclude, tunnel-less but secure communication with GDOI for Transport VPN 
requires GMs firstly to dispatch registration queries to KS. With the aid of GDOI, KS performs 
authentication as well as authorisation for a given GM and sends back keying materials in 
addition to the IPsec policy needed for secure GM-to-GM(s) unicasting/ multicasting back to the 
given GM. 
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7 .2.3 Proposed Method and Discussion 
7.2.3.1 Integration of IPsec within OpenFlow Architecture Proposal 
Increased control gained through the custom forwarding feature provided by OpenFlow does open 
the door to processing different flows in various ways. OpenFlow is benefitting from this wide range 
of definitions for flows in which any combination for header fields defined for "OpenFlow spec vl.0 
conforming switch" in section 7.2.2.1 can highlight a flow. However, when it comes to the end-to-end 
IPsec transmission, OpenFlow is unable to detect encrypted IPsec headers, which is discussed in 
section 7.2.2.2, and thus cannot aggregate them into a flow [186]. The only exception is when 
OpenFlow filters the incoming packets to find a match for the IPsec protocol type which is not 
sufficient for uniquely identifying a flow since various but irrelevant entities might disseminate IPsec 
traffic for each other. Encrypted packet headers in IPsec act as a deterrent for an OpenFlow switch to 
treat them as a distinct flow. With the standard header fields of "OpenFlow spec vl.0 conforming 
switch" today, each IPsec ESP encrypted packet cannot be processed based on layer 4 information or 
above in either operation mode (transport and tunnel). OpenFlow architecture currently is also unable 
to deal with decrypting layer 3 information for IPsec with ESP in tunnel mode if any boundary packet 
forwarder peels the new IP header off before processing further for original layer 3 discovery and then 
delivery (when VPN tunnel terminates one hop before). In summary, OpenFlow architecture is unable 
to aggregate flows of IPsec with ESP in both transport and tunnel modes since layer 3 information and 
above is encrypted and therefore unreadable for OpenFlow interface. Our method tries to find the 
distinguishing factor for uniquely identifying IPsec flows and directing these flows accordingly in 
order to replace the packet-based behaviour of OpenFlow architecture towards IPsec with flow-based 
behaviour. We argue that through our proposed method in the OpenFlow environment we can 
overcome the aforementioned obstacles within the core network. 
Figure 7 .14 reveals the baseline scenario in which A tries to establish a secure communication 
with B via IPsec. It is possible that A, for instance, acts as a remote access server which serves many 
clients or shares files with them via IPsec communication ( can be KS in GDOI like implementation). 
R2, R3, R4 and finally R5 form the core network elements in which OpenFlow architecture is 
employed. Rl and R6 can be thought of as security-aware gateways between which IPsec tunnel 
mode is constructed. In the transport mode of IPsec, they can be seen as local routers while end hosts 
address immune communication directly. 
Black dashed-arrows illustrate the conduits for the OpenFlow controller to securely talk to 
OpenFlow switches across the core network by OpenFlow protocol. Without our proposed method, 
IPsec packets from endpoint A to B in Figure 7 .14 reaching R2 cannot be treated as a flow and should 
be sent to the OpenFlow controller one by one for decision making if they are encrypted with ESP 
(unreadable layer 3 and above information). This will obviously degrade the network performance 
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and impose a huge processing burden on the OpenFlow controller within the core network. This is 
because each IPsec packet is treated with packet-based behavior by being encapsulated and sent to the 
OpenFlow controller for decision making one by one. Our goal is to aggregate IPsec packets 
associated with each secure communication and forward them as flow satisfying arbitrary routing 
policies of the core network for instance. This might be the case if in an attempt to assign a specific 
physical route which considers security countermeasures and thus is more trustworthy to the IPsec 
communications ( or other QoS/traffic engineering tasks such as seeking more available bandwidth), 
IPsec flows are separated from other flows and then forwarded through this route. Another use case as 
we will discuss is when more than two endpoints as group members participate in secure group 
communications over IPsec via GDOI. 
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Figure 7.14 (a): Each IPsec packet is treated with packet-based behavior by being encapsulated and sent to the 
OpenFlow controller for further decision making one by one. (b): Flow-based behaviour through our proposed method, 
aggregation of given IPsec traffic along with its separation from other IPsec traffic in the core network has been 
accomplished. 
(b) in Figure 7.14 shows that R2 through our method will eventually separate IPsec flow from 
other incoming traffic sent by Rl such as http and direct it via capable and highly trustworthy R2-to-
R3-to-R4 links to R6 as the egress point. The observation is that in packet-based behavior of 
OpenFlow architecture, encrypted packets must be encapsulated and then traverse to the OpenFlow 
controller one by one for further processes. Nevertheless, we aim to aggregate IPsec traffic at R2 and 
treat it as a flow without involving the OpenFlow controller's resources for processing each packet 
individually. More precisely, while the problem was that when packets are encrypted using ESP the 
flow identifiers are encrypted and hence cannot be used to distinguish flows, we propose using the 
Security Parameter Index (SPI) of IPsec within the OpenFlow architecture as the distinguishing factor 
for uniquely identifying IPsec flows and directing these flows accordingly. 
The functionality of our design is irrespective of IPsec modes or protocols. This makes the 
remedy flexible enough to cope with the four different encapsulations shown in Figure 7 .12. 
However, since the security database (SOB) construction on OpenFlow controller is slightly different 
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in transport mode than tunnel mode, we bring two scenarios here for different modes. The design 
needs to consider the fact that network elements in the core network are simple packet forwarders 
which are security-unaware (backward compatible to "OpenFlow spec vl.0 conforming switches"). 
To put it another way, we cannot expect any cryptographic processing to be performed on these 
OpenFlow switches. They are only capable of finding a simple match for each incoming packet 
against their flow-table and performing a particular action like forwarding the packet and subsequent 
packets of the same match accordingly to treat them as a flow. However, this flexibility acquired 
through the simplicity of OpenFlow architecture cannot distinguish "between" IPsec flows, which are 
now needed to adapt to secure group communication in GDOI like architecture for instance. This is 
due to the fact that the distinguishing factor (if residing in layer 3 or above) is encrypted in the ESP 
protocol. Each incoming packet encrypted by IPsec with ESP is required to be forwarded to the 
OpenFlow controller if any information above the IP layer is required for the flow-table match-
finding process. 
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Figure 7.1 5 (a): End-entity B shares its SPI with the controller through in-band/out-of-band mechanisms to add the 
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7.2.3.2 Considerations for ESP in Transport Mode 
Recall in section 7.2.2.3, the first set of messaging between end-devices forms the secure channel 
over which the transmitters communicate. Once the agreement by end-devices has been reached (IKE 
phase 2 finished), SAs are established separately for each direction by A as well as B and stored 
locally in their SADBs. We consider IKE negotiations between endpoints irrespective of the proposed 
method here since SAs need to be constructed prior to treating secure IPsec communication as a flow. 
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Once SAs are established via IKE, the first IP datagram containing the actual secure data onwards can 
be handled with the proposed design as a flow. Finding a match for header fields listed in Figure 
7 .11.b for IPsec on an OpenFlow switch and forwarding based on that simply fails since the end-to-
end secure communication ensures that the transmission is unreadable to any entities in the middle 
when it is ESP for layer 3 and above. On the other hand, these fields are considered as the assets 
accessible only to end-entities who might be reluctant to share them with any third parties. OpenFlow 
controller initially determines each flow with the aid of the first packet of the communication. This is 
reasonable since at the beginning the flow-table has no entry of the flow information before launching 
the communication. Nevertheless, for IPsec flows, the relevant information is asset (secret) and thus 
only both ends have access to it. Since SAs are formed in each direction, each end device is 
responsible for sharing the required information (here SPI) with the OpenFlow controller prior to 
traversing of actual flows. Another approach is to let the controller itself infer the SPI since the 
controller can intercept all IPsec session setup traffic (IKE) and learn the SPI used between hosts. 
Recall that SPI acts like a cookie for IPsec where, for A-to-B secure communication (two ends, not a 
group), B firstly determines SPI's value for A-to-B SA and announces it via IKE to A who then 
carries it in its header field (either AH or ESP header) of IPsec packet(s) to B in plaintext. 
Consequently, in theory, either A as the data originator should share the received SPI specified by B 
to OpenFlow controller (B can do the same initially) or the controller itself infers it directly by 
intercepting IKE messages. Upon establishing each SA, the end-device will populate its SADB table 
locally with the relevant security related information. So far, only A and Bin Figure 7.14 are aware of 
the security credentials pertaining to IPsec communication between one another. Each SA in each 
direction can be associated with an SPI number. Subsequently, 2"32 different SAs can theoretically be 
established and differentiated between two end-hosts on each site. It is noteworthy that SPI is the 
same for different sequence numbers of the same IPsec communication in a unidirectional manner and 
this makes it an appropriate candidate as well as a distinguishing factor among various flow header 
fields in the design (with more than two entities, SPI also remains the same within a group domain in 
GDOI). IPsec is an immune communication from one sender to another receiver in a one-way 
direction in which the relevant SA is associated with an SPI carried within AH/ESP headers in 
plaintext. As a result of this, at the receiving party's end, this SPI determines the corresponding SA 
and thus how the IPsec packet (and resultant flow) will be processed based on the security policy 
already agreed-on mutually via IKE. In this way, IPsec exchange from A to B is distinguished by a 
different SPI value (and thus SA) than from B to A. 
Back to Figure 7.15.b, we suggest that B shares the SPI with the OpenFlow controller either 
through in-band (if controller intercepts IKE messages and infers SPI base on them) or out-of-band 
channels for secure transmission A-to-B before disseminating the actual data. A might have big data 
and be willing to transit them in a secure manner to B for instance. The dashed blue arrow reveals the 
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process of handing out the SPI to the OpenFlow controller. Our method asks for Security Database 
(SDB) on the OpenFlow controller. This SDB contains security related information for IPsec 
communications. The amount of security credentials shared with the OpenFlow controller is in the 
end-hosts' hands. But our design emphasises that for flow-based behaviour towards IPsec within 
OpenFlow architecture, SDB should be populated with SPI at least. In IPsec transport mode, original 
layer 3 information is also added. Upon sharing SPI with OpenFlow controller by B, the OpenFlow 
controller must perform an existing check against SDB looking for the announced SPI. If duplicated 
SPI coexists, OpenFlow controller should use the original layer 3 information as complementary to 
SPI to uniquely identify the IPsec conversation and update the packet forwarders on the way 
accordingly. Next, we introduce our new flow header fields for OpenFlow interfaces on the switches 
which contain new field "SPI" in tuple below in addition to that already mentioned in Figure 7 .11.b: 
{Forwarding Port, VLAN ID, Source MAC, Destination MAC, Ethernet Type, Source IP, 
Destination IP, IP Protocol, Source TCP, Destination TCP, Security Parameter Index (SPI)} 
According to section 7 .2.2.2, SPI in plaintext is carried within AH/ESP headers. Therefore, 
OpenFlow switches are able to detect it directly. The addition of the SPI header field is backward 
compatible to "OpenFlow spec vl.0 conforming switches" and does not deem that network elements 
have any cryptographic capabilities and thus is scalable at the minimum cost. 
In a similar way to Figure 7.15.a, with (b) A, B and C form a group for secure communication in 
multicast from A to both B and C with the same method in a GDOI like manner. The group is 
associated with SPI=123 and OpenFlow forwarders are updated accordingly. R2 now forwards the 
incoming packets with SPI= 123 to both R3 and R5 to form the IPsec flow for the group under the 
common SA. 
7.2.3.3 Considerations for ESP in Tunnel Mode 
The main difference is that in tunnel mode the original layer 3 information is itself encrypted. 
Subsequently, OpenFlow controller will now store new IP source and destination information in 
addition to SPI within its SDB at a minimum. This information is needed in case the same SPI has 
been already installed within SDB and thus more information is required to uniquely identify an IPsec 
flow. Back to our scenario, OpenFlow controller now makes a decision for forwarding IPsec flows 
fulfilling its local routing policy and goals by updating appropriate switches' flow-tables while the 
end to end security is still guaranteed. However, in addition to other header fields, SPI will now also 
be included for determination of IPsec flows. 
7.2.4 Use-case: Secure Group Communication based on GDOI 
Traditionally, point-to-point tunnels between VPN gateways were utilised to carry authenticated 
as well as encrypted traffic from one site to another (two ends). For secure group communication with 
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GDOI, encryption/authentication task is separated from transport task. The merit is that secure 
communication amongst various sites (more than two) is performed without any tunnels in place 
amongst these branches. This does open the door also to the OpenFlow architecture in the core 
network eliminating any need for crypto functionality to address the transport requirements. 
In Figure 7.16 on the left, we tried to emulate through Cisco infrastructure [138] GDOI 
between three nodes namely R2, R3 and R4 (can be thought of as A, Band C in Figure 7.15.b) as the 
GMs. 
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Figure 7.16 On the left, baseline scenario in GNS3; R2, R3 and R4 are willing to form a group based on GDOI. Right: 
Wireshark Flow Graph highlights the captured SPI. The same SPI is used amongst all the group members for secure group 
communications after proper GDOI implementation. 
R2, R3 and R4 with assigned IP 10.0.0.1/24, 10.0.0.2/24 and 10.0.0.3/24 (all on one subnet) 
respectively are forming a group looking for secure communications through GDOI. Rl will play the 
role of KS in there. It is likely that OpenFlow controller serves as the KS. SWl will represent the core 
network which is OpenFlow equipped with our method to respect distinct IPsec flows. Let's not lose 
sight of the fact that GDOI can operate over all the core technologies and therefore must remain 
infrastructure-independent. The objective here was to eavesdrop on the SWl after proper GDOI 
implementation between R2, R3 and R4 via Wireshark to infer the SPI associated with this group 
domain. Wireshark Flow Graph depicted in Figure 7 .16 captures all the encrypted communication on 
the subnet within the group (10.0.0.0/24) after GDOI implementation showing that all the group 
members are sharing the same SPI for IPsec ESP for the group domain communications. SWl is 
required to respect our method by the ability to "distinguish between" IPsec flows using SPI in order 
to integrate the notion of secure group communication within SDN. Despite AH, in IPsec with ESP, 
encryption makes payload and the ultimate transmitters' identifications meaningless to the 
188 
Robust Forwarding Plane with the Promising Future Internet Proposals 
eavesdroppers. This will highlight the main use case for our method within OpenFlow. R2, R3 and R4 
were already coded for multicast OSPF as well as PIM to generate some multicast traffic before and 
after GDOI implementation to highlight the role of this IPsec-based group control protocol. As the 
right-side of Figure 7.16 reveals, upon finishing GDOI implementation, all the communications 
originating from GMs (R2, R3 and R4) destined for any multicast addresses including 224.0.0.5 (for 
multicast OSPF) or 224.0.0.13 (for PIM multicast) are secured with IPsec ESP while all the 
communication within this group domain is sharing the same SPI. That's where our method utilising 
this common SPI can integrate ( and differentiate) IPsec flows for each group and direct them 
accordingly within the OpenFlow-based core network. 
7.2.5 Summary of Integrating IPsec within OpenFlow Architecture 
Here we have tried to address the deficiency of the interworking of OpenFlow with IPsec in both 
IPsec tunnel as well as transport modes. OpenFlow architecture is unable to aggregate flows of IPsec 
with ESP since layer 3 information and above is encrypted and therefore unreadable. This work 
proposed the use of the Security Parameter Index (SPI) of IPsec within the OpenFlow architecture as 
the distinguishing factor for uniquely identifying IPsec flows and directed these flows accordingly. 
This replaces packet-based behaviour of OpenFlow architecture towards IPsec with flow-based 
behaviour and removes the obstacle of encrypted flow identifiers. We also proposed new flow header 
fields for OpenFlow switches/interfaces which contain SPI for switching IPsec flows. Sharing SPI 
with the OpenFlow controller will not jeopardize the security of end-to-end IPsec conversation as it is 
already in plaintext. The proposed method facilitates the ability to "distinguish between" IPsec flows 
in order to integrate the notion of secure group communication within OpenFlow architecture as well. 
The main use case where identifying "between" IPsec flows can be useful is when secure group 
communication is required in a similar way to GDOI architecture as discussed. 
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8 Conclusions 
The following diagram illustrates the ideas of this research and draws the main concluding points: 
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Figure 8.1 Summary of the Contributions & Concluding Points 
8.1 Key Achievements 
8.1.1 A Detailed Survey on the BGP State-of-the-art Security Challenges and 
Solutions 
BGP version 4, as a hearsay whisper-like NLRI distribution mechanism, remains the de-facto 
protocol for inter-domain routing. The first contribution classified security solutions in BGP into four 
different categories followed by a critical analysis of them from the Byzantine robustness viewpoint 
namely Crypto, Oddity Check, Anomaly Detection and the comprehensive security architectures. The 
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main conclusion to be drawn is that the result of the state-of-the-art analysis showed that almost all 
the remedies in this area were vulnerable to a Byzantine class of attacks due to the implicit trust 
relationships between BGP speakers. For this gap, there was no systematic mechanism currently in 
place to check whether the injected information into the inter-domain routing system's control plane 
is genuine or not on a global scale. Byzantine failure can be thought of as the inherent deficiency with 
each distributed system where every entity puts a level of trust in the others. The analysis summarised 
that the potential solution should meet the following: be an incrementally deployable remedy (as there 
is no Flag Day for the new protocol), involve minimum/standard crypto (as today's infrastructure has 
largely limited crypto capabilities), be placed on a higher layer than BGP (since BGP is already too 
heavy to incorporate new task) and not be an option (BGP origin and its security is overlooked by the 
operators). 
8.1.2 Robust Modelling of BGP & Thorough/ Accurate Emulations/Simulations 
of its Security Vulnerabilities/Schemes 
Robust modelling as well as aggressive simulation for a diverged range of BGP operations and its 
security schemes were needed to attain practicable and economically acceptable trade-offs. 
Subsequently, four different case-studies have been emulated/simulated to anatomise BGP and 
pinpoint the gap in the area with the aid of GNS3/0PNET. These include but are not limited to: the 
reconnaissance attack against BGP, BGP route filters construction to control BGP UPDATEs, BGP 
Filter-List implementation for defensive filtering, Emulating Byzantine failure with the aid of 
manipulating BGP attributes, BGP Route Map utilisation for overriding BGP path selection 
mechanism, Overcoming BGP scalability issue with the aid of implementing BGP Route Reflectors, 
Enforcing inbound/outbound BGP policy routing, Implementing BGP TCP MD5 between peers as the 
current remedy, Conducting BGP prefix hijacking (black hole attack), Conducting BGP de-
aggregation attack (sub-prefix), Conducting DoS attack against BGP speaker and evaluating its 
adverse impact on the convergence time of the de-facto inter-domain routing protocol. 
The results in 4.6.6 as well as 5.1.1 confirm that the_ lack of any mechanisms for BGP NLRI 
validation has given rise to the propagation of the false info generated by the attacker throughout the 
whole routing system. While TCP MD5 ensured that the legitimate party is the one who sent the 
NLRI and thus is authentic, the semantics of the NLRI was not validated in any way and therefore can 
disrupt routing severely in today's Internet. As the experimental results also stressed, the magnitude 
of the adverse effect of accepting false or malicious NLRI is reliant directly on the location of the 
origin and thus the attacker's position in relation with the victim's location becomes determinant. 
Additionally, as an attempt to alleviate de-aggregation risks with defensive filtering, we observed that 
the current AS-wide view (as opposed to the proposed global view) with each AS in both inwards as 
well as outwards directions has made filtering mechanisms a tedious task. 
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8.1.3 Design & Analyses of a Novel Method to Ensure Byzantine Robustness of 
the Inter-domain Routing through an Integrated Management Plane 
In chapter 5, this research stepped beyond the state-of-the-art solutions arguing that a more 
resilient Internet infrastructure requires "additional verifications and validations" to not blindly accept 
all BGP message exchanges. Studying the hierarchical structure as well as the power-law structure 
properties of the Internet in addition to the thorough FA & RA analyses with the aid of the OPNET 
simulation results, a novel method was proposed to move towards a more Byzantine robust Internet. 
Accordingly, an integrated management plane was elaborated demonstrating that having a few 
security-conscious ASes (i.e. trust anchors), interconnected in a hierarchical manner, and placed over 
the highly connected vantage points, as the repositories for the route attestations for the origin 
veracity (& check-in), can add Byzantine robustness to BGP to a large extent. Active probing amongst 
multiple trusted vantage points can help the overall network to adhere to a consistent and valid view 
for the prefix ownership all the time. 
While fortunately the hierarchical structure and the power-law structure properties fit each other 
very well (aiding with breaking the BGP's hop-by-hop paradigm), there was no accurate consensus on 
"where" the trust anchors need to be located and "how" they should architecturally interact with each 
other in a systematic manner. These two arduous questions were fundamentally the reasons for why 
the contemporary solutions such as Defensive Filtering or Byzantine robust IRV had not succeeded so 
far and thus set our next objectives. Thorough Byzantine studies have been conducted which resulted 
in fulfilling the above goals. 
8.1.4 Visual Analytics for Identifying BGP Prefix Hijacking and its Impacts 
The Byzantine simulations studies in 5.3.3 resulted in a graphical tool to detect abnormal routing 
patterns in huge amounts of BGP data. The development of such tools (only few exist today), which 
can aid an analyst in understanding and confirming BGP hijacks, has gained appreciation recently. 
Not all the hijacks can always be identified by automated algorithms. According to our RA results, 
whereby ASl was misbehaving, 85% of the ASes were fouled. This reached 100% with the 
misbehaviour of AS2 while both ASes were of out-degree=3. AS3's Byzantine failure behaviour was 
similar to that of ASl with an 85% success rate. AS4 as the attacker could hijack 100% of the traffic 
destined for the victim's subnet. Misbehaving AS5 (immediate hop to the victim) affected the traffic 
for 100% of the ASes towards the victim. Where AS6 as stub AS misbehaved, the attack success rate 
degraded to 71 %. AS7's misbehaviour led to 71 % of the success rate of the attack and its adverse 
influence on the affected nodes. When attacking stub AS approached the target, as with AS8, the 
Byzantine attack success rate again went up to 85%. The results here validated the findings in [147] in 
a sense that the richer the attacker is in the interconnectivity (higher in layered hierarchy), the larger 
the adversary impact is (compare the results for AS3 & AS4 with the rest of ASes). However, we 
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stepped beyond that study meaning that according to our findings, the closer the attacker is to the 
victim (no matter whether the attacker is at the core, forwarding or marginal layer); the higher the 
attack's success rate is (see the results for misbehaviour of AS2 & AS5 in comparison with other 
ASes). 
8.1.5 Implementation & Evaluation of an Emulated Architecture Deployment 
for the Proposed Management Plane 
It has been seen as a result of our analyses in chapter 4 that many proposals for BGP security have 
faced reluctance from the industry due to their massive reliance on new infrastructure (no Flag Day) 
or lack of a feasible deployment platform in practice. For this, we decided to provide a prototype for 
the deployment of the management plane architecture through the industrial-based (Cisco) emulation 
testbed with GNS3. Trust anchors as we explored in chapter 5, needed to have always-on, dynamic, 
tunnel-less, transport (and thus scalable) and fully meshed connectivity for extremely integrated sites 
spread over diverged geographical domains (i.e. amongst anchors) over precious WAN links. Such 
implementation for the proposed management plane was additionally required to be. infrastructure-
independent (not bound to a particular core technology). In such a management plane, the end-to-end 
security for any-to-any network connectivity needed to be fully encrypted, authenticated and globally 
scalable for the multicast-based software distribution amongst anchors. We have realised this system 
in chapter 6 based on a Cisco solution and evaluated the deployment critically in terms of the 
overhead and protocol message signalling. Secure group management purpose was met by the GDOI 
standard with IPsec at its heart to manage the trusted group members (trust anchors). 
8.1.6 Identifying the Hijacking Risks in CURLING & DONA-based Remedy 
In chapter 7, this research first discussed that the enormous number of interactions across the 
Internet will be pertaining to contents access by 2016. Then we introduced CURLING as an 
evolutionary ICN approach for distributing as well as accessing popular content at the Internet scale. 
Afterwards, we endeavoured to analyse the CURLING system to reveal the hijacking risks against· 
which the architecture was not immune. The result of our analysis indicated that five distinct attack 
scenarios could jeopardize the safety and security of the content resolution in CURLING. CURLING 
was mainly vulnerable to Byzantine failure attacks due to the hearsay nature of the protocol by letting 
any intermediary entity misbehave. In addition to that, resolution in scoped mode follows BGP and as 
such CURLING was also vulnerable to DNS-Poisoning, BGP prefix hijacking and BGP de-
aggregation attack. Also, resolution in wildcard/filtering was driven by the business relationship 
between domains and consequently an intermediary domain may still exhibit Byzantine behaviour. 
We finally proposed the usage of RPKI for CURLING to accommodate the Byzantine robustness and 
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mitigate the hijacking risks. Our proposal was a synthesis of DONA and RPKI which unlike DONA 
does not underestimate trust in the FI. 
8.1.7 A Novel Method to Integrate IPsec within OpenFlow Architecture with 
Group Communication Use-case 
Chapter 7 secondly tried to address the deficiency of the interworking of OpenFlow with IPsec in 
both the IPsec tunnel as well as transport modes. OpenFlow architecture was -unable to aggregate 
flows of IPsec with ESP since layer 3 information and above was encrypted and therefore unreadable. 
Our method proposed the use of the Security Parameter Index (SPI) of IPsec within the OpenFlow 
architecture as the distinguishing factor for uniquely identifying IPsec flows and directing these flows 
accordingly. This replaced the packet-based behaviour of OpenFlow architecture towards IPsec with 
flow-based behaviour and removed the obstacle of encrypted flow identifiers. This research also 
proposed new flow header fields for OpenFlow switches/interfaces which contain SPI for switching 
IPsec flows. Sharing SPI with the OpenFlow controller will not jeopardize the security of end-to-end 
IPsec conversation as it is already in plaintext. The proposed method facilitated the ability to 
"distinguish between" IPsec flows in order to integrate the notion of secure group communication 
within OpenFlow architecture as well. The main use-case where identifying "between" IPsec flows 
can be beneficial is when secure group communication is required in a similar way to the GDOI 
architecture discussed before. 
8.2 Future Research Work 
A potential avenue for further investigations based on this work can cover: 
1) Evaluating the LOMP impact on the convergence time of the BGP control plane in a relatively 
large & realistic tiered Internet backbone test topology. The initial objective for the test-bed is to 
parameterise the scalability of the LOMP solution versus the added overhead both across the test 
topology as well as the location/out-degree of each trust anchor. Such parameterisation clarifies 
the security versus deployability trade-off. 
2) Clarifying the contribution of LOMP into the overall SIDR and its sufficiency & abstracting the 
key factors of SIDR with LOMP solution and proposing a secure design which goes beyond the 
current BGP to meet Byzantine robustness for the promising proposals of the Future Internet 
including CDN/ICN & SDN is intended next. 
3) Simulating/emulating the Byzantine failure studies whereby two or more ASes collude with each 
other (collusion attack) and evaluating the hostile impact on the affected ASes. 
4) While our major focus was already dedicated to the architecture and its realisation in an emulation 
environment for LOMP, another potential direction can be the LOMP application development 
194 
Conclusions 
enriched with GUI functionalities based on the proposed scheme which sits on the top of the trust 
anchors. 
5) The proposed management plane can further be utilised for the path authentication (in addition to 
the origin authentication) purposes. Additionally, it can confront with AS-prepending attempts by 
validating the semantics provided for different BGP attributes from trusted anchors perspective. 
6) Studying the sufficiency of the proposed management plane in securing the control plane of BGP 
regarding prefix hijacking on the overall security of inter-domain routing. This is because routes 
in the data plane are not necessarily coherent with the control plane [ll]. The efficiency and 
accuracy of data-plane-base detection methods for prefix hijacking are still questionable. 
7) The system realisation for the management plane can be further investigated in different ways. 
Studying anti-replay attack remedy for GDOI rekeys, examining unicast rekey vs. multicast 
rekey, exploring rekey behaviour after policy/matching ACL/authentication key/crypto algorithm 
changes, analysing GDOI' s IPsec and ISAKMP different timers and their behaviour and above all 
implementing cooperative key server (COOP KS) whereby servers jointly manage the group 
(which in tum ensures redundancy, ·high-availability and fast-recovery) can all be derived based 
on the provided cornerstones in this work. 
8) This research can carry out further work on implementing the proposal for securing CURLING 
against the current content hijacking vulnerabilities based on our DONA & RPKI based approach. 
Prior to this, simulating the hijacking scenarios as a result of our analysis can reflect the insecurity 
of CURLING. 
9) While our experimental results proved that our method for integrating IPsec flows within 
OpenFlow architecture with secure group communication use-case can operate properly, further 
investigations are required to evaluate its scalability as well as the performance in the next step. 
For this purpose, simulators such as fl 87] or NS3-based OpenFlow Software Implementation 
Distribution (OFSID) can be employed. 
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